1,723 segments
Mr. Borland, thank you for your service to our country.
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And we appreciate you.
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And we are sorry about how you've been treated and we will make sure that we try to rectify
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Thank you, Dr. Russell.
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I am a senior policy counsel at the Project on Government Oversight, a nonpartisan independent
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watchdog organization that investigates and exposes waste, corruption, abuse of power, and when
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the government fails to serve the public or silences those who report wrongdoing.
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are the first line of defense to root out waste, fraud,
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abuse of power, and corruption in our government.
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Congress relies on whistleblowers
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so that it can fully exercise its oversight
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and legislative authorities.
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It's understandable that former presidents of both parties
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have often taken a hostile approach toward whistleblowers.
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Their disclosures can embarrass the president
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and their political party,
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or even lead to a national scandal.
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But whistleblowers continue to play a vital role
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during both Democratic and Republican administrations.
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They help Congress and the public identify and understand
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what government corruption looks like.
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Their disclosures fuel investigations
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and allow us to address wrongdoing
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and hold those responsible to account.
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That's why historically,
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there's been a strong bipartisan consensus in Congress
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to support and protect whistleblowers.
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Doing so protects the country
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and ensures our government is more responsive
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and accountable to the people.
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National security whistleblowing, in particular,
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is a tradition going back to the founding of our country.
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And over time, national security whistleblowers
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and their disclosures have impacted some
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of the most fundamental issues and questions
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about how we wish to be governed
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and how our government can better serve its people.
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From the role the U.S. plays around the world
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to holding powerful actors accountable,
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government ethics and transparency,
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human rights and civil liberties,
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executive branch authority,
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First Amendment freedoms of speech and dissent,
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freedom of the press,
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and the public's interest and right to know.
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Despite this invaluable public service,
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blowing the whistle comes at great personal risk.
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Whistleblowers risk losing their jobs, careers,
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livelihoods and reputations.
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They can face retaliatory investigations, lawsuits,
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and even serious criminal charges.
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And they can endure deep mental, emotional,
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and psychological harm.
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All of that risk to speak the truth,
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to ensure that agencies fulfill their core missions,
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and that they serve the best interests of the people.
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Those who retaliate against whistleblowers don't just violate
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They inflict real harm on our government
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and betray the public's trust.
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Targeting whistleblowers instead of the corruption they expose
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wastes agency resources,
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and further allows that corruption to continue unaddressed.
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It can instill a chilling effect across an agency,
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fostering a climate of fear and distrust,
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quieting dissent and free speech,
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and deterring potential whistleblowers
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from coming forward in the future.
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Whistleblowers are often some of the most dedicated
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and principled public servants we have
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because of their willingness to put themselves on the line
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And Congress has historically supported them,
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again, on a bipartisan basis,
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but unfortunately, whistleblowing has increasingly
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become more politicized,
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with support for whistleblowers often hinging
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on which party is in power,
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and which party is politically inconvenienced
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by the misconduct being exposed.
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But to be clear, targeting whistleblowers individually
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risks undermining whistleblowing, period.
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POGO advises members of Congress on both sides of the aisle
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to focus on the evidence, not the individual.
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We will always need whistleblowers to achieve the government
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that best serves its people,
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because when people of conscience, integrity,
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and good character refuse to speak up,
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out of fear, complacency, or self-preservation,
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and leave corruption to fester behind closed doors,
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that is probably the most dangerous risk of all.
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If we are serious about increasing government transparency
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and restoring the public's trust,
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we need public servants committed to the truth.
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Whistleblowers need safe and effective channels
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to make lawful disclosures.
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They need stronger protections against retaliation.
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And when they do face retaliation,
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they need a fair shot to be made whole.
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Congress has made strides to pass whistleblower legislation,
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and these laws need to be updated and expanded,
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so that whistleblowers truly receive the protections they need,
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retaliators are held accountable,
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and we can achieve the type of government the people deserve.
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We strongly urge Congress to continue its historic tradition
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of championing the rights and protections of all whistleblowers.
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Thank you again for the opportunity to testify here this morning.
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POGO is committed to working with you
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and the Oversight Committee to address these critical issues.
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I look forward to any questions.
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Thank you, sir, very much.
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Additionally, without objection...
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Additionally, without objection,
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the following members are waved onto the task force
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for the purpose of questioning witnesses at today's hearing.
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Representative Perry of Pennsylvania
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and Representative Grothman of Wisconsin.
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Oh, and Representative Biggs from Arizona.
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I already got you, but yeah, we're good.
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Without objection, so ordered,
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I now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning.
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Also, as my friend Mr. Moskowitz might have to go...
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Would you like to go now?
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Mr. Borland, in your testimony,
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you described witnessing large triangular craft wall station
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at Langley Air Force Base in 2012.
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Can you explain what you observed in terms of size behavior
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and why you're confident it was not conventional technology?
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Great question, ma'am.
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So, on barracks, on the base, I lived in the barracks.
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There was a little smoke pit outside.
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I was there on the telephone and looking across to the flight line,
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and I see a white light pop up and stop about 100 feet in the air.
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I thought it was a weather balloon.
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I've seen tests from there before.
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A weeknight, you know, normal thing, not surprising.
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I actually finished my cigarette,
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and I began walking up towards the flight line.
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There is a track, and because I was on three months of night work,
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I would walk the track at night when we were weathered down.
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And as I began walking towards the light,
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towards the flight line and the track,
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the light then flies across the base, across the flight line,
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and as it flies to me, a triangle manifests around the light.
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I can't tell you if it was active camouflage.
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I can't tell you if it appeared around the light,
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but I can tell you that it was a white light, and then it was a triangle.
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It stopped about 100 feet in front of me and approximately 100 feet above me.
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My telephone got extremely hot, completely froze, dead.
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I remember how thick it was.
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It was between one to two stories thick, equilateral triangle.
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I could never see the top of it, and the edges were 90 degrees.
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There were four lights in total, one light on each corner,
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and a larger light in the center, two to three times the size of the corner lights.
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But what was really odd was the outside...
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The best way to describe it is like looking at a James Webb telescope picture
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where you have the colors and then the black background.
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So the craft itself was this black metallic flake paint,
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but on top of the craft was this gold, lava, plasma,
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some type of fluid going over and around the craft.
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I'm under this for about two to three minutes,
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and then the center light flashes two to three times, no sound,
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immediately shoots up to commercial jet level minimum, in my opinion,
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and I immediately feel static electricity all over my body.
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And then I smell the smell of after a thunderstorm or lightning storm,
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that really strong summer thunderstorm smell.
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Gets up to flight level.
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I'm trying to get my phone reset,
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and I can only see the center light at this point.
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If I didn't actually see it take off, I would have thought it was a star.
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And then it hovers up there, and it begins to slowly move due east
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out over the Atlantic Ocean.
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I finally got my phone reset, the entire thing was about from the time
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I saw the light pop up near the hangar until it took off out over the ocean,
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it was about 15 minutes.
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And following up to that question,
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after you disclose this information to the intelligence community
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inspector general, you're subject to phishing attempts
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and job blacklisting.
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How widespread do you think this is across the intelligence community
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for those who raise concerns regarding UAP programs?
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It's a difficult question to answer.
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I think prior to David Grosh and people beginning this process of bringing people
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into awareness of the reality of these programs and certain things people have witnessed,
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probably extremely widespread.
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I think today there's still an issue, but because people are able to come before you
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and people are speaking out, I think it has been somewhat less.
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I would hope though that people would because if this goes back into closed doors,
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this is going to get really ugly.
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What type of behavior have you witnessed from former Arrow director Sean Kilpatrick
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as well as his staff in relation to this information you provided to them?
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Did they ever try to classify this information as non-human technology?
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The problem with this is that I know what I experienced firsthand and I know other things.
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I think the staff at Arrow that I met with in March of 2023, I think they were good people
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doing the job they were told to do.
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I did not meet with Kirkpatrick.
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He was either not present or did not want to meet me that day.
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However, they did classify information about the reality of this subject and it was very
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concerning because in my Arrow MFR, they had actually referenced a former staff member that
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was the one who told me to go there and they probably shouldn't have done that.
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And real quick before my time is up and we might go to second round of questioning just
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so you're all aware.
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How important, given everything that you've seen and experienced, is the UAP Disclosure
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Act of 2025 in restoring both public accountability and trust?
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I think very important.
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I would hope, though, that the seven-year window could be shrunk, my opinion, but very important.
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The truth needs to be known.
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Thank you very much.
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I now recognize Jared Moskowitz of Florida.
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Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
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Thank you for allowing me to wave on to the committee.
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I remember, you know, the last committee when we had a bunch of former military personnel
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folks that either served on bases, were pilots, or were in different programs experiencing knowledge.
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It made me recognize that the narrative has changed, right?
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It's politically convenient for the government if you all weren't military folks in suits.
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It would be much better if you pulled up in Winnebago's and were wearing hats.
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And so the picture of this, because that's important for the American people on how you
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tell a story, what the message looks like, and who the messenger is.
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So this is now the second or third committee where we have former military folks with impeccable
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records, with information and knowledge.
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And it's definitely clear on a bipartisan basis that we have to protect our whistleblowers.
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And in a day in which it's really hard to tell what's true or not from a political standpoint.
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And so I don't really know what is true.
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I don't know on this subject.
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But I do know when we're being lied to.
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And we are definitely being lied to.
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There's just no doubt about that.
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Mr. Wiggins, I want to talk to you.
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I find your background and testimony compelling.
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When you first saw what you were looking at, what were your first thoughts?
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Mr. Wiggins, I think everything that I was told and taught as a kid and as a growing
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adult no longer, you know, was applicable.
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If I'm able to see something that I thought defies gravity in such a way, then what else
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That was my first thought.
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Mr. So did you think what you were looking at was a weapons program that you were unaware
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Or did you think what you were looking at was obviously some extraterrestrial piece
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Neither one of those crossed my mind.
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What do you think it is now?
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Mr. I'm not the expert.
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I think it, I want to be as skeptical as everyone else and just hope to know the information.
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Mr. Anyone in the U.S. government tell you what you were looking at to try to dissuade
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you from what you thought it was?
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Mr. So no one was like, oh, you know, there was some anomaly with the technology.
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No one from the government did that?
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Mr. How do you think you were treated when you reported this information or have talked
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about, you know, the Tic Tac video is well out there.
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How were you treated?
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Mr. I've had no pushback at all.
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I haven't had anyone reach out to me or try to, you know, dissuade me in either direction,
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militarily speaking.
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So I was treated fair and I appreciate the Navy itself with assisting me with coming here
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to being able to testify.
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So what do you think the American people should take away from watching your video?
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Because when we watch it, obviously, right, we've never seen anything like that.
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It defies what we know to be technologically possible.
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What are we supposed to think?
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Mr. No one's lying about something.
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Someone's hiding something.
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That's not normal what you looked at.
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Mr. I think what the American people should think when seeing that video, along with others
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before me, is that there is something out there and we should know as the people what it is.
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And so let's eliminate possibilities.
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So they didn't come to you and say there was a technological error with what you were looking
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So we put that aside, right?
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They didn't say it was broken.
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We look at that and we see something.
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So it's either a weapons program being reverse engineered by our governments or other governments,
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or it's nobody's government.
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And it's not from here.
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You agree with that assessment?
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Mr. Borland, when you first experienced what you were looking at, what did you do next?
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Like what was your next step after it had passed and you were done?
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Mr. I actually kind of laughed at myself and said, okay, so this exists as well.
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Worked in enough programs, been exposed to enough that I was like, okay, so this is a
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I went back, walked the track, talked with a couple of my friends about it.
[1:15:37 - 1:15:42] ▶
I did talk with some of my coworkers, one in particular, which I thought was a joke and
[1:15:42 - 1:15:47] ▶
it definitely wasn't, was like, you probably should never say this to anybody.
[1:15:47 - 1:15:51] ▶
And then what happened to me happened.
[1:15:51 - 1:15:53] ▶
What about you, Mr. How do you pronounce your last name?
[1:15:54 - 1:16:00] ▶
And sorry, I know I'm running out of time, Madam Chairman, Chairman.
[1:16:02 - 1:16:06] ▶
So obviously your incident happened well before we could record things on cell phones
[1:16:06 - 1:16:13] ▶
and things of that nature, right?
[1:16:13 - 1:16:16] ▶
How do you, what did you do when you first experienced?
[1:16:16 - 1:16:19] ▶
Because what you saw, right, you saw it happen like right out of your base.
[1:16:19 - 1:16:24] ▶
So, so tell me what you did after you saw that.
[1:16:25 - 1:16:27] ▶
What was like your next move?
[1:16:27 - 1:16:28] ▶
And I want to hear how, what your experience was.
[1:16:28 - 1:16:30] ▶
My next move, I, I went into my house after it left.
[1:16:30 - 1:16:34] ▶
I made sure no one had been abducted and I picked up the landline.
[1:16:34 - 1:16:40] ▶
I called the security forces command center.
[1:16:40 - 1:16:43] ▶
I requested that they give me a call back and make notifications up the chain of
[1:16:44 - 1:16:49] ▶
I got a call back in about 15 minutes.
[1:16:50 - 1:16:52] ▶
They reported that the weather station reported no balloons or aircraft, nothing on radar,
[1:16:52 - 1:16:59] ▶
no aircraft inbound or outbound.
[1:16:59 - 1:17:01] ▶
So I got that notification.
[1:17:01 - 1:17:03] ▶
And then within the following day or two, me and the other witnesses wrote statements.
[1:17:03 - 1:17:08] ▶
We prepared to report.
[1:17:08 - 1:17:09] ▶
And then we filed all that information.
[1:17:09 - 1:17:12] ▶
Madam Chairman, thank you for your indulgence in my questioning.
[1:17:12 - 1:17:15] ▶
And thank you for continuing to lead on, on this subject.
[1:17:15 - 1:17:19] ▶
What do you and your friends think about it today?
[1:17:19 - 1:17:22] ▶
You, you, you all have talked about it.
[1:17:22 - 1:17:24] ▶
I mean, so what do you think about your experience as a collective group?
[1:17:24 - 1:17:27] ▶
That'll be my last question, Madam Chairman.
[1:17:27 - 1:17:29] ▶
I mean, we, we, we've been talking about this for 20 years.
[1:17:29 - 1:17:33] ▶
We don't know what we saw.
[1:17:33 - 1:17:35] ▶
What we saw changed our lives and the way we think about everything.
[1:17:35 - 1:17:40] ▶
It was incredibly profound.
[1:17:40 - 1:17:43] ▶
The object I saw, I don't even know if it was an object.
[1:17:43 - 1:17:47] ▶
It was a, it was a light.
[1:17:47 - 1:17:48] ▶
It didn't look like a craft, but it did look solid.
[1:17:49 - 1:17:52] ▶
And that's what we talk about.
[1:17:52 - 1:17:54] ▶
We noticed the object, and this was a pattern across all the encounters.
[1:17:54 - 1:17:59] ▶
Someone would see a light.
[1:17:59 - 1:18:01] ▶
They would pay attention to the light.
[1:18:01 - 1:18:03] ▶
That, and then the object responds, it performs for you.
[1:18:03 - 1:18:07] ▶
And then it, they come down and they investigate you.
[1:18:07 - 1:18:11] ▶
So it's almost like they're curious.
[1:18:11 - 1:18:13] ▶
So that's the thing we primarily talk about.
[1:18:13 - 1:18:16] ▶
Um, you know, why did it come after we knows, noticed it?
[1:18:16 - 1:18:21] ▶
Maybe it noticed us after we noticed it.
[1:18:21 - 1:18:24] ▶
I now recognize Representative Mace for five minutes.
[1:18:27 - 1:18:32] ▶
Thank you, Madam Chair.
[1:18:32 - 1:18:33] ▶
And I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today.
[1:18:33 - 1:18:36] ▶
Uh, Mr. Borland, I'd like to start with you and ask a few questions.
[1:18:36 - 1:18:40] ▶
Um, were there any other witnesses when you saw the equilateral triangle?
[1:18:40 - 1:18:44] ▶
Were there other witnesses that saw the same thing?
[1:18:44 - 1:18:46] ▶
Not to my knowledge, ma'am.
[1:18:46 - 1:18:47] ▶
Um, at that point, the only people that would be awake is us, those of us that were doing operations
[1:18:47 - 1:18:52] ▶
for the GWAT and then security forces.
[1:18:52 - 1:18:54] ▶
So not to my knowledge.
[1:18:54 - 1:18:55] ▶
Um, and do you think that, in your opinion, that the equilateral triangle was the U.S. government's technology?
[1:18:55 - 1:19:04] ▶
I did once upon a time, but knowing what I know now, um, I'll have to answer that question in a skiff probably.
[1:19:04 - 1:19:11] ▶
I was getting, well, my next question is you, you teased us.
[1:19:11 - 1:19:13] ▶
So knowing what you know now means what?
[1:19:13 - 1:19:15] ▶
I know enough to know that if you want an answer to that question, go to Arrow.
[1:19:15 - 1:19:20] ▶
They have the answer.
[1:19:21 - 1:19:22] ▶
Do you think it was a foreign government?
[1:19:22 - 1:19:24] ▶
And Arrow is supposed to be disclosing.
[1:19:26 - 1:19:29] ▶
The last time I was in a skiff with Arrow, they said they were going to be doing disclosures.
[1:19:29 - 1:19:33] ▶
Uh, had they been doing much of that?
[1:19:33 - 1:19:36] ▶
I don't have an answer to you, for you.
[1:19:36 - 1:19:39] ▶
I know what Arrow reports publicly and I know what I've been through.
[1:19:41 - 1:19:43] ▶
Um, and some of this stuff can be, I think, uh, debunked, right?
[1:19:44 - 1:19:49] ▶
There are sometimes there are weather balloons that look kind of a little funky or drones or whatever,
[1:19:49 - 1:19:53] ▶
depending on the angle, direction, speed, et cetera.
[1:19:53 - 1:19:55] ▶
Um, are you scared for your safety?
[1:19:55 - 1:19:58] ▶
Um, that's a complicated question.
[1:19:58 - 1:20:03] ▶
Uh, so being here today, um, if I say the wrong word, technically I can be charged with espionage.
[1:20:03 - 1:20:09] ▶
Espionage is a death penalty.
[1:20:09 - 1:20:11] ▶
Whistleblowers have faced it.
[1:20:11 - 1:20:12] ▶
John Carriaco, for example.
[1:20:12 - 1:20:14] ▶
I am not scared for my physical safety in the sense of an agency or company coming to kill me.
[1:20:14 - 1:20:22] ▶
But, uh, I have no job.
[1:20:22 - 1:20:24] ▶
My career is, has been tarnished.
[1:20:24 - 1:20:27] ▶
You know, I'm unemployed, living off of unemployment for the next three, four weeks until that's gone.
[1:20:27 - 1:20:32] ▶
So, it's a complicated question.
[1:20:32 - 1:20:34] ▶
Have there been stories leaked about your life to try to discredit you and the public eye?
[1:20:34 - 1:20:39] ▶
I, as of now, I don't know.
[1:20:39 - 1:20:41] ▶
We know they did that to Mr. Grush.
[1:20:42 - 1:20:44] ▶
They leaked his medical, private medical information, horrific things.
[1:20:46 - 1:20:48] ▶
You said in your testimony earlier with the chairwoman, you know other things.
[1:20:50 - 1:20:56] ▶
Um, I guess it has to be mentioned in a SCIF.
[1:20:56 - 1:20:59] ▶
I'm even legally allowed to speak on it and the people in the room are even legally allowed
[1:21:02 - 1:21:05] ▶
And, and is that, would we need to know the, like the, the compartmentalized word?
[1:21:07 - 1:21:11] ▶
Like what the code word is or the name of the program, the special access program in
[1:21:11 - 1:21:15] ▶
order to even hear it?
[1:21:15 - 1:21:16] ▶
You have to know the word, right?
[1:21:16 - 1:21:17] ▶
The name of it, right?
[1:21:18 - 1:21:19] ▶
I, I would suggest that to be asked to, uh, D and I Dabbard, um, and work with her for that.
[1:21:19 - 1:21:24] ▶
Cause I can't give you the answer on what is the requirement.
[1:21:24 - 1:21:27] ▶
This is what the U.S. government does, right?
[1:21:27 - 1:21:29] ▶
They compartmentalize the information.
[1:21:29 - 1:21:30] ▶
We, certain people know the, the name of the program.
[1:21:30 - 1:21:33] ▶
And if you don't know it, you can't get the information.
[1:21:33 - 1:21:35] ▶
If you don't have the name, you don't know what to ask for.
[1:21:35 - 1:21:37] ▶
Even when we're reviewing the budget, we go into a SCIF, we look at DOD budget and the,
[1:21:37 - 1:21:41] ▶
the budget of like black box programs.
[1:21:41 - 1:21:43] ▶
And we don't know what we're looking at because we don't know what these programs are.
[1:21:43 - 1:21:46] ▶
Is it a way for the government to hide from Congress?
[1:21:46 - 1:21:49] ▶
What's really going on where the money's going?
[1:21:49 - 1:21:51] ▶
In my opinion, absolutely.
[1:21:51 - 1:21:52] ▶
Um, you, you mentioned too, in your testimony earlier that, uh, quote, the, you went to speak
[1:21:53 - 1:21:59] ▶
with the government and they said, they said somebody's name, a colleague's name.
[1:21:59 - 1:22:02] ▶
And you said they shouldn't have mentioned that staff person's name.
[1:22:02 - 1:22:05] ▶
What, what, what does that mean?
[1:22:05 - 1:22:06] ▶
Uh, a Senate staffer who is the one who helped me get to Arrow, uh, recommended me I go there,
[1:22:06 - 1:22:11] ▶
gave me the email and the phone number because I could not find that information at all at the time.
[1:22:11 - 1:22:15] ▶
Um, in fact, I believe you guys have talked about how Arrow didn't even have a website for quite a period of time.
[1:22:15 - 1:22:20] ▶
We were told they were gonna do disclosures, both what they've debunked, because some of it can be debunked,
[1:22:20 - 1:22:24] ▶
and then what they haven't been able to debunk.
[1:22:24 - 1:22:26] ▶
And to my knowledge, you know, it hasn't been a thing.
[1:22:26 - 1:22:29] ▶
I, I only have one minute left.
[1:22:29 - 1:22:31] ▶
So, Mr. Knapp, we were definitely going to you, watched every documentary.
[1:22:31 - 1:22:34] ▶
You, you guys have done a, you and Jeremy have done a terrific job.
[1:22:34 - 1:22:37] ▶
It's, I usually have more questions than I have answers.
[1:22:37 - 1:22:39] ▶
I think we all do, and you guys are doing a terrific job to bring information to the public.
[1:22:39 - 1:22:42] ▶
Do you think that any of this is a psyop by the U.S. government?
[1:22:42 - 1:22:46] ▶
I mean, they've, uh, our government and other governments have admitted that they've tried to use U.F.O.s to cover secret projects.
[1:22:48 - 1:22:56] ▶
But I think they also do some reverse engineering of those claims.
[1:22:56 - 1:22:59] ▶
So, years after, uh, people start seeing U.F.O.s over Area 51, for example, they come up with a story.
[1:22:59 - 1:23:06] ▶
Oh, yeah, that, that was, uh, we, we planted that story.
[1:23:06 - 1:23:09] ▶
So, I'm, I read in a major newspaper just a couple of weeks ago, they planted this story.
[1:23:09 - 1:23:14] ▶
An Air Force colonel went out into the desert, went to a bar at Rachel, and gave them some fake U.F.O. photos.
[1:23:14 - 1:23:21] ▶
And that's how the whole story about Area 51 started, which is preposterous.
[1:23:21 - 1:23:25] ▶
Yeah, and I didn't even get to the crash retrieval program stuff yet, Ms. Chairwoman.
[1:23:25 - 1:23:29] ▶
There's just so much.
[1:23:29 - 1:23:31] ▶
Um, okay, thank you so much for your time today.
[1:23:31 - 1:23:34] ▶
I wish we had more time.
[1:23:34 - 1:23:35] ▶
Thank you, Madam Chair.
[1:23:35 - 1:23:36] ▶
I now, uh, recognize Ms. Crockett for five minutes.
[1:23:41 - 1:23:45] ▶
Thank you so much, Madam Chair, and thank you so much to each of the witnesses that have come before us today.
[1:23:45 - 1:23:50] ▶
Before us today, the federal government has had a long-standing over-classification issue in general.
[1:23:50 - 1:23:58] ▶
We all know that from the assassinations of MLK and Malcolm X, to the COINCELL PRO and torture programs, to now UAPs.
[1:23:58 - 1:24:08] ▶
The federal government has kept the American public in the dark about issues of immense public interest.
[1:24:08 - 1:24:14] ▶
The federal government has routinely made excuses for failing to provide transparency to the public.
[1:24:14 - 1:24:19] ▶
The most common of which is national security concerns.
[1:24:19 - 1:24:23] ▶
Mr. Spielberger, can you provide an example of when national security was inappropriately used as a pretext for classification?
[1:24:23 - 1:24:31] ▶
Congresswoman, probably one of the most infamous examples of that is the 9-11 Commission that found that over-classification was a key factor in the failure to adequately prevent the attacks of that day.
[1:24:31 - 1:24:47] ▶
In addition to that, what lessons from these oversight failures should guide Congress in approaching UAP oversight?
[1:24:47 - 1:24:59] ▶
Generally speaking, we would advise this Congress to ensure that agencies adopt general policy in favor of disclosure instead of a knee-jerk needing to over-classify information and documents.
[1:24:59 - 1:25:17] ▶
We should ensure that when information is classified or deemed sensitive, it's only for legitimate national security and privacy concerns.
[1:25:17 - 1:25:29] ▶
We would recommend adding additional factors to the considerations of cost, value, and certainly to the extent that it's critical for the public interest and the public's right to know, especially when we are talking about these very serious national security concerns and implications.
[1:25:29 - 1:25:49] ▶
Can you speak to how whistleblowers have historically helped Congress uncover the truth in other areas and how that might apply here?
[1:25:49 - 1:26:00] ▶
So, again, Congress has always relied on whistleblowers coming forward and making disclosures in a number of different issues across different agencies, anything from national security to airline safety, railway safety, environmental concerns, workplace health and safety, a lot of issues coming out of the COVID pandemic, for example.
[1:26:02 - 1:26:28] ▶
So, whistleblowers have come forward with important disclosures on just about any critical issue affecting our government and affecting the American people, all of which have grave implications for the rights and protections that we have and how we live our lives in communities across the country.
[1:26:28 - 1:26:49] ▶
How important is it for whistleblowers to have strong protections when it comes to UAP related disclosures or disclosures of other topics of excessive government secrecy?
[1:26:49 - 1:27:01] ▶
It's absolutely vital.
[1:27:01 - 1:27:03] ▶
This has been one of the disappointing failures of doing this work of advocating for stronger whistleblower protections.
[1:27:03 - 1:27:12] ▶
We recognize the invaluable public service that brave whistleblowers play in coming forward, again, taking all of these risks that we've heard about just to speak the truth, to get important information out in the public consciousness.
[1:27:12 - 1:27:30] ▶
But they can only do so when we have safe and secure channels for reporting, when there is trust in the independence of agency watchdogs like inspectors general, like the Office of Special Counsel, like the Merit Systems Protection Board that play critical roles in investigating whistleblower disclosures and enforcing the protections of whistleblowers.
[1:27:30 - 1:27:53] ▶
All of that is essential to allow whistleblowers to keep coming forward and playing these incredibly important public roles.
[1:27:53 - 1:28:04] ▶
Let me just say this.
[1:28:05 - 1:28:06] ▶
People look at Congress, especially now, and they see a lack of unity.
[1:28:06 - 1:28:12] ▶
They don't see the ability for us to come together really on much of anything.
[1:28:12 - 1:28:17] ▶
I will say that I do applaud the chairwoman and the work of this committee because for once I feel like we are focusing on governing, which should be about transparency.
[1:28:17 - 1:28:29] ▶
The reality is that we cause more harm than good when we allow a lack of transparency to fester.
[1:28:29 - 1:28:37] ▶
It allows for all types of conspiracy theories instead of us actually making the investments that we need to make to get the information and actually make the information.
[1:28:37 - 1:28:46] ▶
And actually provide it to the American people.
[1:28:46 - 1:28:49] ▶
The reason that I wanted to focus on making sure that we answer some questions specifically around the protections of those that are willing to come forward is because the only way that we can make this government actually work for all of us is if no matter where you are in this federal government, you feel as if you are safe when you come forward with information of any issue.
[1:28:49 - 1:29:14] ▶
And so I do want to thank you for all of your stories.
[1:29:14 - 1:29:18] ▶
The reality is that we only get five minutes and the vast majority of everything that you have to say cannot be contextualized within five minutes.
[1:29:18 - 1:29:28] ▶
But I know that my colleagues are going to get to kind of pulling some more of that out.
[1:29:28 - 1:29:32] ▶
But again, I really just want to thank you for your courage in this moment and thank you for your service to our country.
[1:29:32 - 1:29:38] ▶
I now recognize Mr. Burchett from Tennessee for five minutes.
[1:29:46 - 1:29:49] ▶
Thank you, Chair Lady, and thank you, Ranking Member Crockett.
[1:29:49 - 1:29:53] ▶
I see a lot of friends out there and I see a couple enemies, so I'll remember that.
[1:29:53 - 1:30:01] ▶
But it's a pleasure being here.
[1:30:01 - 1:30:03] ▶
I want to remind people, too, this thing is an ongoing deal.
[1:30:03 - 1:30:06] ▶
We're not going to get this overnight.
[1:30:06 - 1:30:08] ▶
We've been fighting this battle, some of y'all, for 30 years and maybe longer.
[1:30:08 - 1:30:14] ▶
I hope we just keep focused on what we're trying to get to as total disclosure.
[1:30:14 - 1:30:20] ▶
We get a little wrapped up in a lot of things, but the government has something and they need to turn it over to us.
[1:30:20 - 1:30:28] ▶
We pay their dadgum salary, you pay our salary, and you ought to get more out of us than you do.
[1:30:28 - 1:30:33] ▶
And that's what disgusts me about this whole thing.
[1:30:33 - 1:30:36] ▶
I think they're just trying to run the clock out on us, really.
[1:30:36 - 1:30:39] ▶
They'll poke us a little and they'll make jokes to us and try to pull us off the target, but I think we know where we're at.
[1:30:39 - 1:30:48] ▶
And that's why they're firing at us, because we are over the target.
[1:30:48 - 1:30:51] ▶
My first question is, Mr. Knapp.
[1:30:51 - 1:30:55] ▶
I recently introduced the UAP Whistleblower Protection Act to help provide whistleblower protection to federal personnel for disclosing the use of federal taxpayer funds to investigate UFOs.
[1:30:55 - 1:31:08] ▶
I still don't want to say UAPs.
[1:31:08 - 1:31:10] ▶
How can Congress further increase whistleblower protections?
[1:31:10 - 1:31:14] ▶
I think you've got to unleash the dogs and go track down the money and where it goes, because a lot of this stuff has been moved out of government.
[1:31:14 - 1:31:24] ▶
As you know, Rep. Burchett, it's been given to private contractors who stashed it away.
[1:31:24 - 1:31:30] ▶
They've had it for so long that there's nobody left inside government, or very few, who know where it is.
[1:31:30 - 1:31:36] ▶
And they do that to keep us from FOIA, correct?
[1:31:36 - 1:31:38] ▶
To keep it from FOIA.
[1:31:39 - 1:31:41] ▶
And I think that the contractors who've had this stuff for a very long time set their own standards about who is allowed to know what.
[1:31:41 - 1:31:48] ▶
And it's a very small group that ever cracks that.
[1:31:48 - 1:31:51] ▶
I think Representative Luna has been looking at the use of classifications to hide things.
[1:31:51 - 1:31:58] ▶
I'm not sure that even this committee getting security clearances that should allow you to see this stuff would allow you to follow where it really goes.
[1:31:58 - 1:32:07] ▶
I worry about the people that are looking at it and don't even know what they're looking at.
[1:32:07 - 1:32:10] ▶
I mean, it's gone through so many.
[1:32:10 - 1:32:12] ▶
I mean, since Roswell, for instance.
[1:32:12 - 1:32:15] ▶
I mean, you think there's nobody even alive that was around any of that stuff.
[1:32:15 - 1:32:19] ▶
I don't think they've made much progress from the people that I've talked to.
[1:32:19 - 1:32:23] ▶
I don't think they've made much progress in learning that technology.
[1:32:23 - 1:32:25] ▶
Might have made some.
[1:32:25 - 1:32:26] ▶
But you wonder, you know, the implication is Tic Tac.
[1:32:26 - 1:32:29] ▶
Oh, yeah, that's ours.
[1:32:29 - 1:32:30] ▶
What flew over Washington, D.C. in 52, is that ours, too?
[1:32:30 - 1:32:34] ▶
When are you going to break that out?
[1:32:34 - 1:32:35] ▶
You guys authorized tens of billions, hundreds of billions of dollars on weapons systems that can't do half of what we've seen UFOs do.
[1:32:35 - 1:32:43] ▶
So when do they break this out if it's really a classified project could change the world?
[1:32:43 - 1:32:49] ▶
I don't think they've made much progress.
[1:32:49 - 1:32:51] ▶
I think they've been lying to us and to you and the rest of the world, and they're still doing it.
[1:32:51 - 1:32:55] ▶
How did you manage to obtain the classified Russian UAP documents, and how did you get them back in the United States?
[1:32:57 - 1:33:04] ▶
Well, I met this Russian physicist who was in the United States lecturing on.
[1:33:04 - 1:33:09] ▶
And I want to clarify that.
[1:33:09 - 1:33:10] ▶
I can't even take a thing of honey home on my airplane when I fly back to Tennessee.
[1:33:10 - 1:33:16] ▶
I did something pretty dumb.
[1:33:16 - 1:33:18] ▶
And I'm bitter about it, but go ahead.
[1:33:18 - 1:33:20] ▶
I did something kind of dumb.
[1:33:20 - 1:33:21] ▶
I met with these officials who, you know, during that time period, glasnost, perestroika, the Russians were trying to open up to the world.
[1:33:21 - 1:33:28] ▶
And I saw it as a window of opportunity, and it was.
[1:33:28 - 1:33:30] ▶
And we were able to talk these folks into providing us information that otherwise we would never have seen.
[1:33:30 - 1:33:36] ▶
Some of that was classified.
[1:33:36 - 1:33:38] ▶
I found out that they only stamped the top pages of these documents that were classified.
[1:33:38 - 1:33:43] ▶
So I just removed them.
[1:33:43 - 1:33:44] ▶
I removed those pages, and I carried them out.
[1:33:44 - 1:33:46] ▶
And if they'd caught me, I'd be in a gulag still.
[1:33:46 - 1:33:48] ▶
We'd be saying, what happened to George Knapp?
[1:33:49 - 1:33:51] ▶
What happened to the Russians that came forward to you in 1993, and were there any repercussions for them?
[1:33:52 - 1:34:00] ▶
The first thing that happened, when I talked about this after getting back and going through the files and things and sifting through it, the Russian physicist who had helped us be introduced all these people wrote back and said there was a huge eruption, that there was the real right, far autocratic,
[1:34:01 - 1:34:09] ▶
forces that wanted a return of the USSR had really go after these guys.
[1:34:09 - 1:34:28] ▶
And there was traitors.
[1:34:28 - 1:34:29] ▶
Nikolaj Kapanov, the physicist friend of mine, said, look, if this had happened five years earlier, we would be in prison.
[1:34:29 - 1:34:34] ▶
If it had happened 10 years earlier, we would have been shot.
[1:34:34 - 1:34:37] ▶
Luckily, at that point, Putin was not in power.
[1:34:38 - 1:34:40] ▶
But none of those people that we talked to on that trip in 1993 would ever talk to me again.
[1:34:40 - 1:34:45] ▶
I went back in 1996, and it was like I had the plague.
[1:34:45 - 1:34:48] ▶
I spoke to different people, but they were scared.
[1:34:48 - 1:34:51] ▶
And eventually, the story was spun where the Ministry of Defense officials who gave us this information were described as ufologists who said there was nothing really significant to these files.
[1:34:51 - 1:35:03] ▶
They didn't really find anything a big deal.
[1:35:03 - 1:35:06] ▶
And I can tell you, you'll see those files that I shared with you.
[1:35:06 - 1:35:09] ▶
They did find stuff.
[1:35:09 - 1:35:10] ▶
There was an incident in October of 1982 over an ICBM base where ufos popped up, was observed over this base where the missiles are pointed at us, United States.
[1:35:10 - 1:35:21] ▶
These ufos perform incredible maneuvers.
[1:35:21 - 1:35:24] ▶
They fuse back together.
[1:35:25 - 1:35:26] ▶
They'd appear and disappear.
[1:35:26 - 1:35:27] ▶
And right at the end of this four hour period, the launch control codes for the ICBMs lit up.
[1:35:27 - 1:35:34] ▶
Something entered the correct codes.
[1:35:34 - 1:35:37] ▶
The missiles were fired up and ready to launch, and they could not shut it down.
[1:35:37 - 1:35:40] ▶
The Russian officers were panicking.
[1:35:40 - 1:35:42] ▶
The launch control system goes back to normal.
[1:35:44 - 1:35:47] ▶
Colonel Sokolov and his team came in, took the thing apart, could not figure out what it was.
[1:35:47 - 1:35:51] ▶
It wasn't a power surge or EMPs or some of the baloney excuses that our country has given for similar events involving our nuclear missiles.
[1:35:51 - 1:35:59] ▶
They thought it was a message from wherever the ufos were from.
[1:35:59 - 1:36:02] ▶
And that's a chilling thing.
[1:36:02 - 1:36:04] ▶
I mean, that was, we were a couple of seconds away from World War three starting and the ufos were responsible for it.
[1:36:04 - 1:36:09] ▶
I'm out of time, but real quick.
[1:36:10 - 1:36:11] ▶
Who are the contractors that have this material?
[1:36:11 - 1:36:14] ▶
Well, one of them is Lockheed.
[1:36:15 - 1:36:16] ▶
And I'll tell you, I mean, you know, I'm not saying Lockheed's the bad guys.
[1:36:16 - 1:36:19] ▶
They're doing what they were asked to do.
[1:36:19 - 1:36:21] ▶
They have lied about this because that's what they're supposed to do.
[1:36:22 - 1:36:24] ▶
But Lockheed would be one.
[1:36:24 - 1:36:26] ▶
There's a list I can give you, congressmen, some of the big ones, the usual suspects.
[1:36:26 - 1:36:31] ▶
You're back, Chair Lady.
[1:36:33 - 1:36:34] ▶
Sorry for going over.
[1:36:34 - 1:36:35] ▶
It's all George Knapp's fault.
[1:36:36 - 1:36:37] ▶
I now recognize Ms. Boebert for five minutes.
[1:36:37 - 1:36:42] ▶
Thank you, Madam Chair.
[1:36:42 - 1:36:43] ▶
Chief Wiggins, based on your training and operational experience, could the behavior that you were
[1:36:43 - 1:36:49] ▶
witnessed a transmedium object vanishing without a sound be explained by any known technology
[1:36:49 - 1:36:56] ▶
that we possess or other governments possess?
[1:36:56 - 1:36:59] ▶
And has any government agency debriefed you or any of your shipmates regarding the EOIR
[1:37:01 - 1:37:09] ▶
and radar confirmed UAP encounter aboard USS Jackson?
[1:37:09 - 1:37:15] ▶
What was that encounter like when you brought that up?
[1:37:17 - 1:37:20] ▶
If you want to briefly summarize that, when you brought that to their attention and then
[1:37:20 - 1:37:24] ▶
you were not provided any follow-up, who was told and how did you feel when there was no
[1:37:24 - 1:37:33] ▶
contact back to you?
[1:37:33 - 1:37:35] ▶
As far as the actual incident happening or the reporting level?
[1:37:35 - 1:37:39] ▶
It was within the event happening.
[1:37:40 - 1:37:45] ▶
My duties are to report to the tactical action officer on watch while we're standing watch.
[1:37:45 - 1:37:50] ▶
So, tactical action officer was there.
[1:37:50 - 1:37:52] ▶
I've not had any discussion outside of that day.
[1:37:55 - 1:38:00] ▶
There's been no communication to me or requests from me, you know, with inside of the military.
[1:38:00 - 1:38:07] ▶
But, speaking of that actual incident itself, once the report was made to the tactical action officer,
[1:38:07 - 1:38:15] ▶
that's when I made the decision to ask the individual watch stander that was controlling SAFIRE to be able to slew into the location.
[1:38:15 - 1:38:28] ▶
And that's what you see in the video itself is when the watch stander is slewing in and kind of showing us what we're looking at.
[1:38:28 - 1:38:37] ▶
But outside of that, that's as far as the reporting went that I know of.
[1:38:37 - 1:38:42] ▶
Just for the sake of time, Mr. Nusatelli, has ARO, the Air Force, or the FBI ever followed up with you personally about the Red Square event?
[1:38:43 - 1:38:52] ▶
I did have follow-up by ARO.
[1:38:52 - 1:38:56] ▶
Nothing with the Air Force.
[1:38:56 - 1:38:58] ▶
The ARO office updated me, I think, at least two times.
[1:38:58 - 1:39:04] ▶
They let me know that they were unable to locate any records, that the records had been destroyed by the Air Force.
[1:39:04 - 1:39:11] ▶
The Air Force is destroying all their police records every three years on a schedule.
[1:39:11 - 1:39:15] ▶
You were informed that these documents were destroyed?
[1:39:15 - 1:39:19] ▶
Well, I have a Freedom of Information Act from the Air Force that states clearly that they destroy all police records on a three-year schedule.
[1:39:19 - 1:39:27] ▶
Okay. So they were sitting on documentation, destroyed it, refused to question any of the lead investigators? Anything leading into this investigation?
[1:39:27 - 1:39:39] ▶
Yeah, basically they destroyed all the police records.
[1:39:39 - 1:39:44] ▶
So you couldn't even, like, call the Air Force and ask them if there was a vehicle accident in that timeframe.
[1:39:44 - 1:39:50] ▶
So that's a big problem.
[1:39:50 - 1:39:53] ▶
We're losing data in real time.
[1:39:53 - 1:39:56] ▶
So we'll never be able to go back and track.
[1:39:56 - 1:39:58] ▶
I think our federal government has a history of destroying records.
[1:39:58 - 1:40:01] ▶
Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Nusatelli.
[1:40:01 - 1:40:03] ▶
Dr. Borland, as a geospatial intelligence officer, have you seen classified data indicating UAPs operate in restricted U.S. airspace?
[1:40:03 - 1:40:14] ▶
And has that information been withheld from Congress?
[1:40:14 - 1:40:18] ▶
I have not in U.S. airspace.
[1:40:18 - 1:40:21] ▶
That is intelligence oversight, so I did not have domestic authorities.
[1:40:21 - 1:40:25] ▶
After filing your inspector general complaint over retaliation inside the Pentagon's UAP office,
[1:40:25 - 1:40:32] ▶
did you receive any kind of protection or just more retaliation?
[1:40:32 - 1:40:37] ▶
Within the IG or the, or ARO, ma'am?
[1:40:37 - 1:40:40] ▶
ARO, they went after the staff member and classified everything, shut that down.
[1:40:41 - 1:40:47] ▶
The IG, to this day, I don't even know if my complaint's active.
[1:40:47 - 1:40:51] ▶
I know my attorney that represented me was very, very, very concerned.
[1:40:51 - 1:40:55] ▶
And the best of my understanding, I was determined credible, not urgent.
[1:40:55 - 1:41:00] ▶
And do you, do you think that that experience would suggest that the internal UAP investigations may be compromised?
[1:41:00 - 1:41:07] ▶
I mean, it's so hard because this goes back to people doing the job they're told to do,
[1:41:09 - 1:41:15] ▶
and very few people are going to want to give up their careers, 20, 30-year pension,
[1:41:15 - 1:41:19] ▶
give up, get rid of their kids' health care, get rid of their house.
[1:41:19 - 1:41:22] ▶
Thank you very much, Dr. Borland.
[1:41:25 - 1:41:26] ▶
Mr. Spielberger, do national security whistleblowers currently have any external appeals processes to challenge retaliation,
[1:41:26 - 1:41:37] ▶
or are they just stuck relying on the same agencies that they're accusing?
[1:41:37 - 1:41:43] ▶
Congresswoman, this is one of the biggest concerns that we at POGO have, basically, around the independence of investigations and accountability for retaliation.
[1:41:43 - 1:41:56] ▶
Basically, yes, national security whistleblowers have to rely on internal administrative processes that go through agency inspector generals.
[1:41:56 - 1:42:05] ▶
There are some differentiations, but the bottom line is that they are forced to rely on protection from the same agencies and people who they are alleging retaliated against them.
[1:42:05 - 1:42:18] ▶
Well, I thank you all for your bravery.
[1:42:19 - 1:42:20] ▶
We are out of time here.
[1:42:20 - 1:42:22] ▶
Thank you so much for coming forward, and we will do everything that we can to ensure that you are all protected.
[1:42:22 - 1:42:27] ▶
Thank you for trying to bring truth and transparency to the American people.
[1:42:27 - 1:42:30] ▶
Madam Chair, I yield.
[1:42:30 - 1:42:32] ▶
I now recognize Mr. Burleson for about five minutes.
[1:42:32 - 1:42:35] ▶
Thank you, everyone.
[1:42:35 - 1:42:36] ▶
It takes such great courage to come forward, and we acknowledge that, and I hope that you see that we are taking that seriously.
[1:42:36 - 1:42:43] ▶
And so very thankful for what you're doing today.
[1:42:43 - 1:42:46] ▶
I'm also very thankful for previous witnesses that have come forward.
[1:42:46 - 1:42:50] ▶
I see Matthew Brown in the audience.
[1:42:50 - 1:42:52] ▶
He courageously stepped forward and was as a witness.
[1:42:52 - 1:42:56] ▶
I encourage everybody to look and seek his testimony.
[1:42:56 - 1:43:00] ▶
I want to thank the people that came in our first hearing.
[1:43:00 - 1:43:03] ▶
Ryan Graves, David Grush, David Fravor, and in our second hearing, Admiral Gallaudet, Lou Elizondo, and Mr. Gold, and the many others that have come forward.
[1:43:03 - 1:43:16] ▶
We hear you, and it's time that we, you know, enough is enough.
[1:43:16 - 1:43:20] ▶
It's time that we take action.
[1:43:20 - 1:43:22] ▶
Look, I'm not, I'm not jumped to the conclusion that I believe that there are, you know, aliens coming from another planet.
[1:43:22 - 1:43:28] ▶
But I'm open to the conclusion that there are aliens coming from another planet.
[1:43:28 - 1:43:30] ▶
And I think that it's my, our responsibility, especially when we're seeing that we have a government that is blocking, actively blocking information from us.
[1:43:30 - 1:43:39] ▶
Just last night, I tried to get an amendment onto the National Defense Authorization Act that fit in the germaneness of that bill to have UAP disclosure.
[1:43:39 - 1:43:49] ▶
And conveniently, it was named non germane, mostly deemed by staff, not even an elected official.
[1:43:49 - 1:43:57] ▶
This is the kind of stuff that we repeatedly see.
[1:43:57 - 1:44:00] ▶
Last year, we were blocked by someone in House administration from being able to receive a full briefing from Arrow.
[1:44:00 - 1:44:08] ▶
So, not, not an elected official, but someone in staff blocked us.
[1:44:08 - 1:44:13] ▶
I want to queue up a video that, that I've been given.
[1:44:16 - 1:44:19] ▶
And as, as before it starts, I'm going to describe this was taken October 30th of 2024.
[1:44:19 - 1:44:26] ▶
This video is of an MQ-9 drone tracking an orb or this object off the coast of Yemen.
[1:44:26 - 1:44:33] ▶
You'll see that another MQ-9 launched a Hellfire missile that you cannot see that drone.
[1:44:33 - 1:44:41] ▶
And so, you'll, and I'm not going to explain it to you.
[1:44:41 - 1:44:46] ▶
You'll see exactly what it does.
[1:44:46 - 1:44:48] ▶
The next slide, let's see.
[1:45:27 - 1:45:28] ▶
So, Mr. Knapp, do you have any, have you heard about events like this occurring and what
[1:45:33 - 1:45:41] ▶
What information might you have?
[1:45:41 - 1:45:44] ▶
I have heard about events like this.
[1:45:44 - 1:45:47] ▶
I have heard about this event.
[1:45:47 - 1:45:48] ▶
Jeremy Corbell and I talked about it in one of our episodes a while back.
[1:45:48 - 1:45:52] ▶
We did not have the video, though.
[1:45:52 - 1:45:53] ▶
There are servers where there's a whole bank of these kind of videos that Congress has
[1:45:53 - 1:45:59] ▶
not been allowed to see, that the public hasn't been allowed to see.
[1:45:59 - 1:46:02] ▶
Occasionally, some of that stuff gets out in the wild and it comes our way.
[1:46:02 - 1:46:06] ▶
It should be going to you.
[1:46:06 - 1:46:07] ▶
You know, the public should be seeing this stuff.
[1:46:07 - 1:46:10] ▶
And why you're not allowed to, I don't know.
[1:46:10 - 1:46:12] ▶
But that's a Hellfire missile smacking into that UFO and just bounced right off.
[1:46:12 - 1:46:17] ▶
And it looks like the debris was taken with it.
[1:46:19 - 1:46:21] ▶
What the hell is that?
[1:46:22 - 1:46:23] ▶
What flies like that?
[1:46:23 - 1:46:24] ▶
Again, I'm not going to speculate what it is, but the question is, you know, why are we
[1:46:24 - 1:46:29] ▶
being blocked from this information consistently?
[1:46:29 - 1:46:33] ▶
I want to ask this question.
[1:46:33 - 1:46:35] ▶
How in the world, this is the document, I want to enter this in for the record if it hasn't
[1:46:35 - 1:46:39] ▶
already been entered, Madam Chair.
[1:46:39 - 1:46:42] ▶
The document that you provided on Thread 3.
[1:46:42 - 1:46:45] ▶
This is a huge file.
[1:46:45 - 1:46:47] ▶
How in the world did you smuggle this out of Russia?
[1:46:47 - 1:46:50] ▶
I don't think I want to be really specific about it because I might have to go back there
[1:46:52 - 1:46:57] ▶
and get some more sometime.
[1:46:57 - 1:46:58] ▶
No, that'd be crazy to do that.
[1:46:59 - 1:47:01] ▶
Well, again, I took the top pages off that were stamped with a security signature and I
[1:47:01 - 1:47:08] ▶
carried them out on my person.
[1:47:08 - 1:47:10] ▶
But the rest of them I just threw in my suitcase and threw some caviar in there as a distraction
[1:47:10 - 1:47:14] ▶
as well and hope for the best.
[1:47:14 - 1:47:17] ▶
Otherwise, I'd be a citizen of Siberia right now.
[1:47:17 - 1:47:21] ▶
And you had, you reported James Lekatsky came to you with government possession of NHI craft
[1:47:21 - 1:47:30] ▶
and how they ultimately gained entry.
[1:47:30 - 1:47:31] ▶
Can you testify to the veracity of that claim?
[1:47:31 - 1:47:34] ▶
Dr. Lekatsky is an honorable man who served most of his career with the DIA, a very trusted
[1:47:34 - 1:47:40] ▶
high-level rocket scientist and intelligence analyst who inspired the OSAP program, as
[1:47:40 - 1:47:46] ▶
And in full disclosure, I've co-written two books with him.
[1:47:47 - 1:47:51] ▶
He dropped this on myself and our other co-author out of the blue.
[1:47:51 - 1:47:55] ▶
And it took 14 months for us to get Dobser approval for him to release two sentences on
[1:47:55 - 1:48:01] ▶
And so the first thing I was thinking about, when I was in the craft, we had managed to
[1:48:02 - 1:48:05] ▶
It had no wings, no rotor, no tail.
[1:48:06 - 1:48:08] ▶
It had no fuel, no fuel tanks.
[1:48:08 - 1:48:11] ▶
They didn't know how it flew or how it was operated.
[1:48:11 - 1:48:13] ▶
It clearly looked like it was aerodynamic, but he would not go further.
[1:48:13 - 1:48:19] ▶
He's a by-the-book guy and until he gets clearance to say more about that, I don't think we're
[1:48:19 - 1:48:24] ▶
going to hear much more.
[1:48:24 - 1:48:25] ▶
We didn't know who made it and how it was built and how it operated.
[1:48:28 - 1:48:32] ▶
We've got at least one.
[1:48:32 - 1:48:33] ▶
I think that's enough confirmation that we do have recovered disks and materials.
[1:48:34 - 1:48:38] ▶
And Leslie, Mr. Borland, in the classified realm, have you been exposed to undeniable
[1:48:38 - 1:48:46] ▶
confirmation of NHI technology?
[1:48:46 - 1:48:49] ▶
And then my second question is, is Bayes Systems involved in any way with reverse engineering
[1:48:49 - 1:48:54] ▶
exploitation of non-human intelligence craft?
[1:48:54 - 1:48:57] ▶
Bayes Systems involved in any way with reverse engineering.
[1:48:57 - 1:48:58] ▶
We're going to have to have a conversation in this gift for that, whether I'm legally even
[1:48:58 - 1:49:03] ▶
allowed to answer that and whether you're even allowed to hear it, sir.
[1:49:03 - 1:49:07] ▶
Again, you can sense our frustration.
[1:49:08 - 1:49:11] ▶
And so I just want to thank you for coming forward.
[1:49:11 - 1:49:14] ▶
We will continue to fight because, look, this is about making sure that this government
[1:49:14 - 1:49:17] ▶
belongs to the people and restoring the republic the way it was intended to be.
[1:49:17 - 1:49:23] ▶
Madam Chair, I also have further witnesses of courageous individuals.
[1:49:23 - 1:49:27] ▶
It was given to me by Dr. Steven Greer, including Michael Herrera and his testimony.
[1:49:27 - 1:49:35] ▶
We have Roderick Castle and his testimony, Randy Anderson, his testimony, Steven Digna, and
[1:49:35 - 1:49:42] ▶
others, three others, all saying similar things to what the witnesses today have said.
[1:49:42 - 1:49:48] ▶
And I would like to enter that into the record as well.
[1:49:48 - 1:49:50] ▶
I now recognize Representative Lee for five minutes.
[1:49:52 - 1:49:56] ▶
Thank you, Madam Chair.
[1:49:56 - 1:49:57] ▶
I think we need to make sure that we don't get distracted by sensational stories only of
[1:49:57 - 1:50:05] ▶
unidentified anomalous phenomena and lose track of what the core of this hearing is about.
[1:50:05 - 1:50:11] ▶
This is all a perfect example of why whistleblowers are so important and why it's so important
[1:50:11 - 1:50:16] ▶
that we step up and protect them.
[1:50:16 - 1:50:19] ▶
With Trump, RFK Jr., EPA Administrator Lee Zeldin, and others committed to dismantling government
[1:50:19 - 1:50:25] ▶
and firing professionals who do dare to speak out against the threats this administration's
[1:50:25 - 1:50:30] ▶
disastrous policies create, we have to focus on protecting all whistleblowers, not only
[1:50:30 - 1:50:36] ▶
the ones who are reporting on UAP.
[1:50:36 - 1:50:38] ▶
I'd like to thank the whistleblowers who have agreed to come before the committee today and
[1:50:38 - 1:50:42] ▶
This administration's claims to care about waste, fraud, and abuse, and so often, it
[1:50:44 - 1:50:49] ▶
is the whistleblowers who care and who are the tip of the sword fighting against the real
[1:50:49 - 1:50:54] ▶
waste, fraud, and abuse.
[1:50:54 - 1:50:56] ▶
One study found that whistleblowers expose fraud at more than twice the rate of third-party
[1:50:56 - 1:51:01] ▶
So, Mr. Spielberger, what are some of the best examples of whistleblowers exposing fraud and
[1:51:02 - 1:51:07] ▶
abuse in the federal government?
[1:51:07 - 1:51:09] ▶
Mr. Spielberger, thank you, Congresswoman.
[1:51:09 - 1:51:13] ▶
Again, whistleblowers have played such a vital role across so many different issues.
[1:51:13 - 1:51:17] ▶
One prominent example goes back to the 2014 VA waitlist scandal.
[1:51:17 - 1:51:24] ▶
POGO actually played a very instrumental role coordinating with Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans
[1:51:24 - 1:51:29] ▶
At that time, we received tips and whistleblower disclosures from over 800 different individuals
[1:51:30 - 1:51:37] ▶
talking about the VA subjecting veterans to extensive wait times in order to get the basic standard
[1:51:37 - 1:51:50] ▶
of care that they deserve.
[1:51:50 - 1:51:52] ▶
It certainly prolonged serious illnesses, even contributing to hasten deaths.
[1:51:52 - 1:52:00] ▶
And we were able to help shed more light on that issue, which I think just emphasizes the importance, even outside
[1:52:00 - 1:52:13] ▶
of the national security context.
[1:52:13 - 1:52:15] ▶
We are often still talking about serious issues and even life and death concerns.
[1:52:15 - 1:52:20] ▶
And, unfortunately, whistleblowers can, whistleblowing can lead to serious repercussions and retaliation,
[1:52:20 - 1:52:27] ▶
especially in this vindictive and lawless administration.
[1:52:27 - 1:52:30] ▶
Mr. Spielberger, in the past, what kinds of retaliation have they faced and what are we seeing today under
[1:52:30 - 1:52:35] ▶
the Trump administration?
[1:52:35 - 1:52:37] ▶
Mr. Spielberger, in the past, what kind of retaliation have they faced?
[1:52:37 - 1:52:38] ▶
So, we've certainly heard about a number of different examples of retaliation.
[1:52:38 - 1:52:43] ▶
One that I'd like to highlight that Mr. Borland referenced previously is retaliation through abuse
[1:52:43 - 1:52:50] ▶
of the security clearance process.
[1:52:50 - 1:52:53] ▶
That can have grave implications not just for a whistleblower, but also their ability to seek
[1:52:53 - 1:52:57] ▶
legal counsel and defend themselves against retaliation.
[1:52:57 - 1:53:01] ▶
And when we look at the past several months of this administration, unfortunately, we've seen
[1:53:01 - 1:53:07] ▶
a really systematic approach toward dismantling the nonpartisan civil service.
[1:53:07 - 1:53:12] ▶
We've seen the mass firings.
[1:53:12 - 1:53:14] ▶
We've seen undermining of independent agency watchdogs, mass firings of inspectors general,
[1:53:14 - 1:53:21] ▶
undermining the Office of Special Counsel, the Merit Systems Protection Board.
[1:53:21 - 1:53:25] ▶
Again, these entities that are meant to be independent and play a critical role in investigating whistleblower
[1:53:25 - 1:53:31] ▶
disclosures and ensuring that their rights are protected.
[1:53:31 - 1:53:36] ▶
In 1989, Congress passed the Whistleblower Protection Act and then broadened it again in 2012 to
[1:53:39 - 1:53:43] ▶
ensure that federal workers could feel free to come forward to their elected officials.
[1:53:43 - 1:53:47] ▶
And it's a good thing we did, because whistleblowers have played a more important role than ever
[1:53:47 - 1:53:51] ▶
since Trump has taken office.
[1:53:51 - 1:53:53] ▶
It was thanks to a whistleblower that we learned that Doge allegedly put every single American's
[1:53:53 - 1:53:57] ▶
personal security information at risk by bypassing safeguards and copying all this data to
[1:53:57 - 1:54:02] ▶
I asked unanimous consent to enter into the record a New York Times article titled, quote,
[1:54:03 - 1:54:08] ▶
Doge put critical social security data at risk, whistleblower says.
[1:54:08 - 1:54:11] ▶
We've had whistleblowers at the National Labor Relations Board reveal that Doge minions may
[1:54:13 - 1:54:17] ▶
have shipped case files outside of the agency, possibly to help then co-president Elon Musk
[1:54:17 - 1:54:22] ▶
continue to exploit his workers.
[1:54:22 - 1:54:23] ▶
And last week, whistleblowers at the National Institute of Health came forward to say that RFK Jr's
[1:54:23 - 1:54:27] ▶
vaccine and for misinformation campaign have pervaded even the highest levels of the agency.
[1:54:27 - 1:54:33] ▶
Typically, whistleblowers have an inspector general they can rely on to investigate their
[1:54:33 - 1:54:37] ▶
claims and register issues with agency leadership.
[1:54:37 - 1:54:38] ▶
But President Trump has fired or demoted over 20 inspectors general.
[1:54:38 - 1:54:42] ▶
If I may ask one more question, Mr. Spellberger, can you explain how eroding the independence
[1:54:42 - 1:54:46] ▶
and capabilities of inspectors general further endanger these whistleblowers?
[1:54:46 - 1:54:50] ▶
So again, whistleblowers already face incredibly great challenges in coming forward under normal
[1:54:51 - 1:54:58] ▶
And when we erode these entities that are expected and required to enforce whistleblower protections,
[1:54:59 - 1:55:08] ▶
fairly investigate their disclosures, it calls into question the integrity of their investigations
[1:55:08 - 1:55:14] ▶
and findings, whether they'll take whistleblowers seriously when they come forward, and whether
[1:55:14 - 1:55:19] ▶
we can trust that they will use their authority to enforce the protections of whistleblowers who
[1:55:19 - 1:55:24] ▶
do come forward, essentially whether they will continue in their role as an independent watchdog,
[1:55:24 - 1:55:31] ▶
or basically become a lapdog for a current or future president.
[1:55:31 - 1:55:36] ▶
And I will note, I will take no longer liberty, no more liberties.
[1:55:37 - 1:55:40] ▶
I now recognize Mr. Crane for five minutes.
[1:55:42 - 1:55:46] ▶
Thank you, Mr. Chairwoman, for holding this hearing.
[1:55:46 - 1:55:49] ▶
Thank you to the witnesses for appearing.
[1:55:49 - 1:55:52] ▶
In the effort of transparency here, I got to admit to the witnesses that, you know, growing
[1:55:52 - 1:55:58] ▶
up, I really never believed in UFOs or any of this stuff.
[1:55:58 - 1:56:01] ▶
I always thought it was a little kooky and whatnot.
[1:56:01 - 1:56:05] ▶
But, you know, after hearing, you know, your testimony from honorable service members, watching videos
[1:56:05 - 1:56:12] ▶
like my colleague, Mr. Burleson, just presented, you know, I got to admit, I've become a believer.
[1:56:12 - 1:56:18] ▶
Not that I know where these things come from or, you know, what they really are up to.
[1:56:18 - 1:56:22] ▶
But I'd like to start with asking the witnesses.
[1:56:22 - 1:56:28] ▶
Mr. Nusatelli, you were in the Air Force, right?
[1:56:28 - 1:56:30] ▶
Did you believe in UFOs prior to your encounter?
[1:56:31 - 1:56:35] ▶
I've always been interested.
[1:56:35 - 1:56:37] ▶
Chief Wiggins, you're currently in the Navy, is that correct?
[1:56:38 - 1:56:41] ▶
Did you believe in UFOs before your encounter?
[1:56:42 - 1:56:45] ▶
I'm from Las Vegas and I've watched George Knapp my whole life.
[1:56:46 - 1:56:49] ▶
What about you, Mr. Borland?
[1:56:50 - 1:56:52] ▶
I have always been open to where facts go, so.
[1:56:52 - 1:56:57] ▶
Were you guys scared or hesitant to come forward and tell your story because of fear and believing
[1:56:57 - 1:57:05] ▶
that you might be reprimanded or ostracized from society because of your stories?
[1:57:05 - 1:57:12] ▶
I probably would not have come forward if I didn't have documentation to prove some of my story.
[1:57:15 - 1:57:21] ▶
And I also wouldn't have come forward without the people that paved the way for us in, you know, the first congressional hearing.
[1:57:21 - 1:57:27] ▶
Chief, what about you?
[1:57:27 - 1:57:29] ▶
Once I got the okay from the Navy from top down, that gave me a level of relief.
[1:57:29 - 1:57:37] ▶
Prior to that, I didn't have any thought left or right of that, but I thank the Navy to give me the go-ahead and that gave me the relief that I would not have any level of reprisal or anything happen to me.
[1:57:37 - 1:57:50] ▶
Mr. Borland, how about you?
[1:57:50 - 1:57:52] ▶
I mean, after I went through everything, it was pretty clear that I caused a major issue in the executive branch, so I did what I was supposed to do.
[1:57:53 - 1:58:02] ▶
And that's why I haven't spoken publicly.
[1:58:02 - 1:58:05] ▶
That's why I'm happy to be here.
[1:58:05 - 1:58:06] ▶
This is how I wanted this to be done in regards to me.
[1:58:06 - 1:58:10] ▶
Mr. Borland, why do you think that you faced reprimand and discipline for your effort to come forward and be transparent about what you saw?
[1:58:10 - 1:58:20] ▶
About what I saw is the reason why I got into what I know and has been disclosed to Arrow and the IG.
[1:58:20 - 1:58:29] ▶
And I think that information, well, it was, it was labeled an extremely sensitive national security issue.
[1:58:29 - 1:58:35] ▶
Mr. Knapp, I've watched many of your videos on Joe Rogan and other places.
[1:58:37 - 1:58:42] ▶
One of the big questions, I think, for many of us is why do you believe that the federal government refuses to be transparent about
[1:58:42 - 1:58:49] ▶
I think there's probably multiple reasons.
[1:58:50 - 1:58:53] ▶
At the start, when these things first started invading our skies in large numbers, we were scared.
[1:58:53 - 1:58:58] ▶
It was right after World War II, and we didn't know what they were, and they didn't want to panic the public.
[1:58:58 - 1:59:03] ▶
And that was probably a good call.
[1:59:03 - 1:59:05] ▶
Over time, I think the lying sort of became institutionalized, you know?
[1:59:05 - 1:59:10] ▶
Flights over Washington, D.C. in 1952, they're seen, they're captured on radar, jets are chased after these objects, and then we get an explanation it was a temperature inversion.
[1:59:10 - 1:59:21] ▶
And those kind of lies have been told for a long time.
[1:59:21 - 1:59:24] ▶
What was told to me by an investigator from Congress, a guy named Richard D'Amato, who was sent after this story by Robert Byrd and Harry Reid, he came out to Nevada, tried to get into Area 51, did get in there, looked around, talked to people, trying to get to the bottom of it.
[1:59:24 - 1:59:39] ▶
He believed that this program, reverse engineering, et cetera, was inside, had been moved inside these corporations.
[1:59:39 - 1:59:46] ▶
And he said, when this comes out, people are going to go to prison.
[1:59:46 - 1:59:49] ▶
And he meant people who were basically misusing legitimate national security funds, tens of billions of dollars, in order to keep this cover-up going.
[1:59:49 - 1:59:57] ▶
I also believe there's a legitimate reason for the cover-up in that there is undeniable connection of national security involved in this technology.
[1:59:57 - 2:00:06] ▶
If we are racing for it, to master that technology against the Russians and the Chinese, which is what I have been told by Senator Reid and many others, then it is a race that's critical to our survival.
[2:00:06 - 2:00:19] ▶
There could be a form of disclosure, I think.
[2:00:19 - 2:00:21] ▶
It's from somewhere else without revealing all the details that would allow someone else to have an advantage in the race for this technology.
[2:00:22 - 2:00:29] ▶
Finally, I'd like to enter into the testimony a letter I sent to the DOD regarding the case of Major David Charles Grush, a UAP whistleblower who's been extremely helpful to this committee.
[2:00:30 - 2:00:44] ▶
Unfortunately, due to his participation in the disclosure of UAP, he suffered reprisal like the removal of his clearance, denial of promotion, and loss of medical retirement.
[2:00:44 - 2:00:54] ▶
I wrote the DOD on July 24, 2025, on behalf of Major Grush, and I'm still waiting for a reply.
[2:00:54 - 2:01:01] ▶
I appreciate any help the committee can offer to get a response.
[2:01:01 - 2:01:05] ▶
Without objection, we'll be following up with the DOD after this hearing.
[2:01:07 - 2:01:09] ▶
Thank you, Representative Crane.
[2:01:09 - 2:01:11] ▶
I'd next like to recognize Representative Gill for five minutes.
[2:01:11 - 2:01:16] ▶
Thank you, Chairwoman Luna, for holding this hearing, and I'd like to yield a minute of my time to you.
[2:01:16 - 2:01:23] ▶
My first question is to Mr. Knapp.
[2:01:24 - 2:01:26] ▶
Mr. Knapp, how do we know that the files that you obtained from the former Soviet government are not BS and just given to you as a disinformation campaign against the U.S. government?
[2:01:26 - 2:01:34] ▶
That's a good question.
[2:01:34 - 2:01:35] ▶
So I shared some of them with the Senate Intelligence Committee when I first got back because that was requested by the Russian government.
[2:01:35 - 2:01:41] ▶
I just had a few questions who shared some of that information with me.
[2:01:41 - 2:01:44] ▶
Secondly, I gave all of that material to the DIA through BASS, the OSAP program.
[2:01:44 - 2:01:49] ▶
Sorry for the acronyms.
[2:01:49 - 2:01:50] ▶
Can you name names real quick?
[2:01:50 - 2:01:51] ▶
Who did you give them to directly?
[2:01:54 - 2:01:55] ▶
I gave them to Robert Bigelow and to Jim Lukaski.
[2:01:55 - 2:01:58] ▶
Katsky. And they hired a whole team to go through them and retranslate them and analyze
[2:01:58 - 2:02:05] ▶
it and they created a structure of how the UFO programs in the USSR and Russia were put
[2:02:05 - 2:02:10] ▶
together. They said they were real. The other person who said they were real is David Grush.
[2:02:10 - 2:02:15] ▶
Noted. Thank you. Representative Gill.
[2:02:15 - 2:02:18] ▶
And thank you. I'd like to yield the remainder of my time to Eric Burleson.
[2:02:18 - 2:02:24] ▶
Thank you. Representative Gill. Mr. Wiggins, Chief Wiggins, in your view, what mechanisms
[2:02:24 - 2:02:33] ▶
such as internal protocols, witness debriefings or cross-agency documentation should be better
[2:02:33 - 2:02:40] ▶
established in order to ensure that such a credible sighting like the one that you have given are
[2:02:40 - 2:02:46] ▶
preserved and made available to oversight bodies like this? Thank you, sir.
[2:02:46 - 2:02:53] ▶
As an active duty Navy member, our mission is to carry out the ship's mission or the command's mission.
[2:02:54 - 2:03:03] ▶
And we, on a general basis, don't have knowledge of what to do when we see things like this. We just
[2:03:03 - 2:03:11] ▶
don't. We're there to do our mission and do what's told of us, right? So I think what would be important
[2:03:11 - 2:03:18] ▶
is giving active duty members a clear way of being able to report things like this to where it gets to
[2:03:18 - 2:03:29] ▶
this point. And ensuring that we have a standard level of understanding that there wouldn't be any
[2:03:29 - 2:03:37] ▶
level of reprisal or anything happening. Because, you know, I've been in the Navy for almost 24 years,
[2:03:37 - 2:03:42] ▶
but what about the sailors that have been in for two years that experience things like this? They're
[2:03:43 - 2:03:48] ▶
not going to have the knowledge or they'll probably be a little bit more fearful to speak up, being at
[2:03:48 - 2:03:53] ▶
that their career is just starting.
[2:03:53 - 2:03:55] ▶
I just want to commend you. You're the first witness to come forward that is currently serving
[2:03:55 - 2:04:01] ▶
and it's recognized. And so I thank you. And your testimony is unbelievable. Let me ask this question.
[2:04:01 - 2:04:07] ▶
Are you familiar with the Witness Protection Act that Representative Burchett has filed?
[2:04:07 - 2:04:13] ▶
I'm not too familiar, sir. Anyone on the committee familiar with it? It's fantastic. It's the language
[2:04:13 - 2:04:20] ▶
that we need. It's language that will protect, you know, whistleblowers from any kind of reprisal. And yet,
[2:04:20 - 2:04:29] ▶
it's again and again blocked by by, you know, this body in some way. Many times it's being blocked,
[2:04:29 - 2:04:37] ▶
not by elected officials, but by staff behind the scenes. And the other bill, the UAP Disclosure Act,
[2:04:37 - 2:04:44] ▶
which was filed last year, Senator Schumer, who I cannot believe that there's a topic that he and I agree on,
[2:04:44 - 2:04:51] ▶
but he and I agree on this topic. He is sponsored in the Senate. He put it on the National Defense
[2:04:52 - 2:04:57] ▶
Authorization Act last year. Remarkably, I can't get it on the it was stripped out by the House last
[2:04:57 - 2:05:03] ▶
year. And I can't get it onto the bill leaving the House this year. Mr. Knapp, how far would that,
[2:05:03 - 2:05:12] ▶
would that doc, that bill go to actually getting the answers that we need?
[2:05:12 - 2:05:16] ▶
Mr. Knapp, pretty far. I think that they're still going to have roadblocks. You know, the keepers of the
[2:05:16 - 2:05:22] ▶
secrets, the private companies that have been doing this job for intelligence agencies for a long time,
[2:05:22 - 2:05:27] ▶
are not going to cough it up. You'd have to force it out of them. And whether you can get them to
[2:05:27 - 2:05:31] ▶
admit that they have it or not, I mean, they're supposed to lie about it. They've been lying about
[2:05:31 - 2:05:35] ▶
it. You know, I more power to you. I hope it works. I hope it passes this time. But it's a,
[2:05:35 - 2:05:42] ▶
it's a daunting challenge to get them to open up after lying about it for more than 75 years.
[2:05:42 - 2:05:48] ▶
Yeah. And then finally, Mr. Borland, when you engaged with Arrow in 2023, you noted that their public
[2:05:48 - 2:05:55] ▶
statements did not match the reality that you and others had witnessed. In your assessment,
[2:05:55 - 2:06:01] ▶
what were the key limitations of Arrow? You know, I would put it to you this way. The statement Arrow
[2:06:01 - 2:06:08] ▶
has made is scientific evidence of extraterrestrials. Scientific evidence requires a scientific control.
[2:06:08 - 2:06:14] ▶
Extraterrestrial is an entity on another planet. The only way to scientifically prove extraterrestrial is
[2:06:14 - 2:06:22] ▶
we have to go to that planet, acquire technology, bring it back and compare it to what we have here.
[2:06:22 - 2:06:27] ▶
So you're saying they won't let anything out because, or they won't, they won't come forward
[2:06:27 - 2:06:32] ▶
unless they confirm that it, it, unless they go to the planet and confirm where its origin is.
[2:06:32 - 2:06:37] ▶
That, that would be scientific evidence. Yes. And by that statement, Arrow found no scientific evidence
[2:06:37 - 2:06:43] ▶
of extraterrestrials is basically, I don't want to call it a PSYOP, but a misrepresentation because
[2:06:43 - 2:06:48] ▶
we do have things. But making that statement is not technically a lie. It's a misrepresentation of the
[2:06:48 - 2:06:55] ▶
full truth. Thank you. Madam Chair, may I, just since we're on that topic real quick,
[2:06:55 - 2:07:00] ▶
how do we get to these other planets? How do we pass the Van Allen radiation belt safely?
[2:07:02 - 2:07:06] ▶
Mr. Perry. Good question for you. I, I cannot answer that for you. Thank you. I would now like to
[2:07:06 - 2:07:15] ▶
recognize Mr. Perry for five minutes. Thanks, Madam Chair. I think I'll start with maybe Mr. Borland.
[2:07:16 - 2:07:24] ▶
So you have a clearance, right? You're in uniform, you have a clearance. When did you leave at service?
[2:07:25 - 2:07:30] ▶
What year? I left in 2013, February. 2013, who was the president, if you recall?
[2:07:30 - 2:07:34] ▶
Mr. Perry for five minutes, 2013 would have been President Obama, sir.
[2:07:34 - 2:07:37] ▶
Was it President Trump, right? Mr. No, sir.
[2:07:37 - 2:07:39] ▶
Okay. So you have a clearance, right? You're certain you inform you have a clearance. Your story,
[2:07:39 - 2:07:43] ▶
you know, I think many of us are kind of picturing the scene, you walk out in the flight line,
[2:07:44 - 2:07:48] ▶
having a smoke, this event occurs. Do you have the perception, at least I do, based on your story,
[2:07:48 - 2:07:56] ▶
that this involves the US government? Whatever you saw involves the US government?
[2:07:57 - 2:08:03] ▶
Mr. That is 100% my opinion then and now.
[2:08:03 - 2:08:07] ▶
And was there an after action? Was, do you do a daily debrief of the activities of the day? Was any of
[2:08:07 - 2:08:16] ▶
that recorded? Was there a conversation with the command? Was there any documentation that you know
[2:08:16 - 2:08:21] ▶
of at the time? Mr. Not to my knowledge. I mean, like I said, I talked about it in, on the ops floor,
[2:08:21 - 2:08:26] ▶
and a couple of people had pulled me aside, some older enlisted, and were like,
[2:08:26 - 2:08:29] ▶
you probably want to keep that to yourself. So did you get the impression that they knew what
[2:08:29 - 2:08:37] ▶
you were talking about, just didn't want you to harm your career or seem crazy, or that they didn't
[2:08:37 - 2:08:42] ▶
really witness? Did you know anybody else that witnessed what you saw? Again, not that night.
[2:08:42 - 2:08:47] ▶
Like I said, the only people that would have been out there would have been security forces and then
[2:08:47 - 2:08:51] ▶
those of us that were doing the ops. Security forces in uniform or contract?
[2:08:51 - 2:08:54] ▶
Probably both. Did you talk to them? Did anybody talk to them in an after action?
[2:08:54 - 2:08:59] ▶
Not to my knowledge, sir. Is there any interest in the command to determine
[2:09:00 - 2:09:03] ▶
and verify what you saw? Not to my knowledge, sir. It's unfortunate. Chief Wiggins.
[2:09:04 - 2:09:09] ▶
Thank you for your service. Gentlemen, thank you all of you for your courage to be here.
[2:09:10 - 2:09:14] ▶
Um, your story's a little bit different. Sounds like it, well, for both of you guys and also Mr.
[2:09:14 - 2:09:24] ▶
Nusatelli, if this were sanctioned by the US government, even though you have a clearance,
[2:09:24 - 2:09:30] ▶
but it's classified above the clearance level, do you see any reason why they would allow you access,
[2:09:30 - 2:09:38] ▶
being present, viewing it, hearing it, you know, being around it? Like what? Is this an accident?
[2:09:38 - 2:09:47] ▶
Like does the US government make these kind of acts? They make accidents, mistakes like this?
[2:09:47 - 2:09:53] ▶
Like, oh, we're doing this, we're doing this test of this new system and we forgot these guys were
[2:09:53 - 2:09:59] ▶
standing here. Does that sound like something that the US government would do? Uh, no, sir.
[2:09:59 - 2:10:05] ▶
Uh, some of the launches we were doing were like $5 billion projects that had taken like 10 years
[2:10:05 - 2:10:12] ▶
to develop the technology. And these objects were coming right up to the launch pad. So any kind of
[2:10:12 - 2:10:18] ▶
mistake, I mean, we could, it could cause a catastrophe. Right. So it's very confusing why these
[2:10:18 - 2:10:24] ▶
objects would be operating in and around our bases or during training exercises. So it would lend us,
[2:10:24 - 2:10:31] ▶
would lend you to believe that the US government had no, had nothing to do with whatever it is you saw.
[2:10:31 - 2:10:38] ▶
Correct. They wouldn't want it there because it would potentially interrupt the proceedings at the
[2:10:38 - 2:10:43] ▶
time. Was there an after action? Was there a discussion by your command where that was there
[2:10:43 - 2:10:47] ▶
an investigation? It's pretty significant activities that you're involved in. Was there an investigation
[2:10:47 - 2:10:54] ▶
that you know of? We conducted investigations in real time. Right. We document all the evidence,
[2:10:54 - 2:10:58] ▶
but as far as anything from higher up, I don't know if there was an investigation. No, no information
[2:10:58 - 2:11:04] ▶
came down on what we should. Were you ever interviewed at someone else's request?
[2:11:04 - 2:11:08] ▶
About that incident? Yeah, about the incident. I don't believe so. Do you think that's,
[2:11:10 - 2:11:14] ▶
you find that odd? If something happens, you're around multimillion, maybe billion dollar operations
[2:11:14 - 2:11:20] ▶
and launches of national security interest, very sensitive. There's an anomaly in the operation.
[2:11:20 - 2:11:27] ▶
The only person witnessed it, saw UAP at Vandenberg at that time frame, that was interviewed,
[2:11:29 - 2:11:36] ▶
was the one that witnessed the thing land. Why wouldn't, well, I don't know why I'm asking you,
[2:11:36 - 2:11:41] ▶
but it seems to me that we would want to interview everybody associated, even not associated, to find out
[2:11:41 - 2:11:46] ▶
if they were associated. Chief Wiggins, how about you? Did anybody, was there an investigation? Was there
[2:11:46 - 2:11:52] ▶
an after action? Was there documentation on the incident that you were privy to? No, sir, not that I
[2:11:52 - 2:11:58] ▶
knew of. And in my previous experience as an operations specialist, all operations that I've been a part of
[2:11:58 - 2:12:07] ▶
have been deliberate. So, yeah, they're there. And deliberate operations, after the operations, you conduct an
[2:12:07 - 2:12:14] ▶
after action review, or that's what the Army calls it. I don't know what the, I imagine the Navy has
[2:12:14 - 2:12:18] ▶
something similar to determine your weaknesses, your successes. Did you do that in regard to this
[2:12:18 - 2:12:24] ▶
incident? No, sir. The Navy calls it after action reports, and not to my knowledge was there an after
[2:12:24 - 2:12:31] ▶
action report of this incident, sir. It's unfortunate. Thank you, Chair. I yield. I now recognize Mr. Biggs for
[2:12:31 - 2:12:39] ▶
five minutes. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you to the witnesses for being here today. I'll tell you,
[2:12:39 - 2:12:44] ▶
that today's testimony should alarm every American, no matter their views on UAPs. This isn't simply
[2:12:44 - 2:12:49] ▶
about UAPs. It's about government integrity, responsible use of taxpayer funds in Congress's
[2:12:49 - 2:12:54] ▶
constitutional duty to oversee the executive branch. I've heard evidence of critical information hidden
[2:12:54 - 2:13:00] ▶
in special access programs, off limits to virtually every elected representative, and certainly to the
[2:13:00 - 2:13:08] ▶
public. Credible witnesses report retaliation for speaking out. These are clear attempts to
[2:13:08 - 2:13:13] ▶
silence those who are exposing the truth. We must protect the whistleblowers, and decades of
[2:13:13 - 2:13:18] ▶
government disinformation have eviscerated public trust. So this isn't a partisan matter. It's a
[2:13:18 - 2:13:25] ▶
constitutional matter, and when you talk about the VAs, Mr. Spielberger, and all the problems that they had,
[2:13:25 - 2:13:32] ▶
the hub of that was Phoenix, and they went after the whistleblowers there, and that was under the Obama
[2:13:32 - 2:13:38] ▶
administration. So it doesn't matter which administration, which party, both parties have
[2:13:38 - 2:13:44] ▶
got to come clean, particularly on this. So if the government thinks it can hide the truth and punish
[2:13:44 - 2:13:49] ▶
those who speak out, Congress has to keep pushing until the facts, whatever they are, wherever they lead,
[2:13:49 - 2:13:54] ▶
come to light. I'm going to go to you, Mr. Knapp, first. You've interviewed numerous UAP whistleblowers over the years.
[2:13:54 - 2:14:00] ▶
The question is, how do you verify their claims before deciding they're credible enough to report on?
[2:14:00 - 2:14:05] ▶
It's a combination of factors. First, you check their credentials. Did they really serve where they
[2:14:05 - 2:14:10] ▶
said they did, and did they work where they said they did? Are there any other witnesses? Is there visual
[2:14:10 - 2:14:16] ▶
proof, film, footage, things of that sort? You ask the people around them that know them, that used to
[2:14:16 - 2:14:21] ▶
work with them, if they're credible people. That's one way. You know, I think about Arrow, the organization
[2:14:21 - 2:14:26] ▶
that this body created to deal with witnesses and whistleblowers. I hope I'm not taking too much of your
[2:14:26 - 2:14:33] ▶
time here, but they invited people to come forward, service members who knew, saw things and had
[2:14:33 - 2:14:39] ▶
experiences. And I can tell you that the people that I have talked to who went through that are
[2:14:39 - 2:14:43] ▶
deeply disappointed. There was a guy named Bob Jacobs, who was a lieutenant, attached to Vandenberg in 1964.
[2:14:43 - 2:14:49] ▶
His unit would record missile tests. They recorded all of them. On one of these particular tests, a UFO comes out of
[2:14:49 - 2:14:57] ▶
nowhere, zaps what looks like a laser beam at what would have been a nuclear dummy, a nuclear weapon, and
[2:14:57 - 2:15:04] ▶
disabled it. And he is called into the commander's office. Two guys in suits clipped that film footage out that shows the UFO,
[2:15:04 - 2:15:13] ▶
and he's ordered to never talk about it. He comes forward to Arrow. He heeds the call, thinking he's doing his duty as
[2:15:13 - 2:15:19] ▶
an American to tell that story. And they completely dismissed him. They made up a story that they had
[2:15:19 - 2:15:25] ▶
tracked down the original footage, and there was nothing like that in it. Well, there was no original
[2:15:25 - 2:15:29] ▶
footage. It had been taken away the day the footage was recorded. He's deeply disappointed. People like
[2:15:29 - 2:15:34] ▶
Bob Salas, who had worked at a nuclear ICBM base, who saw UFOs flying over the base, and these missile silos
[2:15:34 - 2:15:41] ▶
were taken down. He went to Arrow, too, and was completely disregarded. It almost looks like Arrow operated as a
[2:15:41 - 2:15:47] ▶
counterintelligence operation to get people to come in, tell their stories, and then discredit all of
[2:15:47 - 2:15:51] ▶
them. I can't imagine that any whistleblower or witness will ever go to Arrow again because of what
[2:15:51 - 2:15:57] ▶
happened under the first director, who's now long gone, but still seems to act as the spokesperson for
[2:15:57 - 2:16:03] ▶
that organization. And I would say, I would say, Madam Chair, maybe at some point we need to really dig deep
[2:16:03 - 2:16:10] ▶
into Arrow. And I would encourage us. Oh, I'd be happy to send maybe a subpoena to Mr. Kilpatrick.
[2:16:10 - 2:16:14] ▶
Congress? Yes. Okay. Were you or your crew ever instructed formally or informally not to document or discuss the event? Ever? No. Good. Mr. Borland, you've talked about manipulation of your security clearance records. Can you identify which agencies or offices were responsible and whether they provided any written justification? I can do that in a SCIF, sir, 100 percent, because of being a part of a multi-agency special access
[2:17:09 - 2:17:39] ▶
program. I cannot give those publicly. So I'd encourage us, Madam Chair, to have that SCIF, that SCIF meeting if we can. And then, Mr. Borland, again for you. He testified that you withheld certain sources and methods from Arrow due to mistrust. Can you give us some specifics that led you to believe they were misrepresenting the truth? Well, as I said already, what I said about scientific methods, scientific control, extraterrestrials, I mean, I know what I've seen. I know what I know. And I know it's
[2:17:39 - 2:18:09] ▶
true. So any agency that's going to go public and try and manipulate the public perception of this subject in such a way that is negative when I know the truth about it is why I had extreme reservations with it and also what I've been through and other whistleblowers and people and then know about this subject have been through.
[2:18:09 - 2:18:31] ▶
So, Madam Chair, thank you for letting me wave on. I think the key thing there you talked about was manipulation of message, manipulation of narrative. That is really the problem with this entire system that we've seen since you've started these wonderful hearings, Madam Chair, and I thank you so much.
[2:18:31 - 2:18:52] ▶
Thank you, Representative Biggs. The Chair would now like to recognize Mr. Begich for five minutes.
[2:18:52 - 2:19:00] ▶
Thank you, Madam Chair. First question, Mr. Borland, earlier today you mentioned that under, in a SCIF, you would be able to discuss whether a member of Congress is actually legally able to access certain information. Under what authority would a member of Congress be restricted from accessing information on this topic even within a SCIF?
[2:19:00 - 2:19:21] ▶
I would suggest reaching out to Director Gabbert and speaking with her about that. I'm hopeful that this goes back to the executive branch and who even has authority. Unfortunately, I can't give you a 100% solid answer because I don't even have that knowledge.
[2:19:21 - 2:19:37] ▶
Next question to George Knapp, what is the estimated annual budget, your view, for the program for investigating or reverse engineering UAP-related technology, including official, misappropriated, or black budget funds?
[2:19:37 - 2:19:51] ▶
I wouldn't have a clue. I don't know any person that's ever seen it.
[2:19:51 - 2:19:55] ▶
Does anyone on this panel wish to address that question? Okay, moving on. Are any of you willing to name specific gatekeepers within the root cell of the UAP SAP Federation?
[2:19:55 - 2:20:06] ▶
You mean specific people and contractors that have dealt with this and kept the secret?
[2:20:06 - 2:20:18] ▶
Specific individuals.
[2:20:18 - 2:20:20] ▶
Well, one of them was named Dr. James Ryder at Lockheed. But, you know, again, to emphasize, I don't fault these contractors for doing what they were asked to do by our government.
[2:20:20 - 2:20:35] ▶
They're supposed to lie if people ask about it. And the intelligence agencies who gave this stuff to them, CIA, I think, primarily, told them to keep it quiet.
[2:20:35 - 2:20:46] ▶
And they've done that. And I suspect that they'd like an off-ramp, that they'd like some help with figuring out this technology at some point.
[2:20:46 - 2:20:53] ▶
Is, and this is, again, available to anyone, is there a security classification guide for UAP or NHI?
[2:20:53 - 2:21:00] ▶
I was, I remember in the 2003 or 2023 hearing, it was stated that all UAP-related material is classified secret or above.
[2:21:00 - 2:21:16] ▶
I have a name for you.
[2:21:16 - 2:21:21] ▶
Another question for you, Mr. Knapp.
[2:21:26 - 2:21:29] ▶
What is, in your view, having investigated this issue for so many years, what is the long game with respect to disclosure of this information to the public?
[2:21:29 - 2:21:39] ▶
Because with the advent of essentially a video camera and a high megapixel phone in everybody's pocket, at some point this information is going to be impossible to withhold from the public.
[2:21:39 - 2:21:53] ▶
What do you think is the long game here?
[2:21:53 - 2:21:56] ▶
Well, the secret's out. I mean, how many videos have there been already?
[2:21:56 - 2:22:00] ▶
You know, videos that are leaked from within the military and intelligence agencies and contractors and censor platforms, it's out there.
[2:22:00 - 2:22:06] ▶
But they have the high ground, the people that don't want us to take it seriously dismiss it, discredit the witnesses, come up with a cover story.
[2:22:06 - 2:22:14] ▶
I mean, it's been out there a long time. The public senses that it's real and the people in authority dismiss them.
[2:22:14 - 2:22:21] ▶
It's a game that's been going on a long time, and I don't think they're ever going to release it.
[2:22:21 - 2:22:27] ▶
I think that there's an attitude among the people that have been involved in this for a long time that the public doesn't deserve to know and that the public probably can't handle it, but they can.
[2:22:27 - 2:22:37] ▶
Final question, and again, this one's open to anyone who'd like to answer it.
[2:22:37 - 2:22:41] ▶
Describe your understanding of the org chart or lines of control within the executive branch with respect to these topics.
[2:22:41 - 2:22:48] ▶
And if you'd like to address that in a SCIF, feel free to say so.
[2:22:53 - 2:22:56] ▶
That could work as long as I'm legally allowed to and you are legally allowed to receive it.
[2:22:56 - 2:23:01] ▶
I think these programs are in the executive branch, the National Security Council and over on that side.
[2:23:01 - 2:23:12] ▶
That seems to be what some of our witnesses have told us over the years.
[2:23:12 - 2:23:16] ▶
So you can, you know, Congress can file all kinds of requests.
[2:23:16 - 2:23:19] ▶
The FOIAs can be filed with the Department of Defense, Department of War now, and they can honestly say, well, we don't have it because they don't have it.
[2:23:19 - 2:23:27] ▶
Thank you. Is there anything in my remaining 30 seconds that that you'd like to share on any of these questions that that I've asked you today?
[2:23:27 - 2:23:38] ▶
I applaud the committee for trying to tackle this monster of an issue.
[2:23:42 - 2:23:46] ▶
I really appreciate that. It's actually it might be the only bipartisan issue in Washington where everybody can agree.
[2:23:46 - 2:23:51] ▶
We've watched multiple hearings now. Everyone is asking the same kind of questions whether right or left and and honestly want the answers.
[2:23:51 - 2:24:00] ▶
And, you know, Chairman Luna, Chairwoman Luna, you're I appreciate your dedication to this.
[2:24:00 - 2:24:05] ▶
Tim Burchett and the other members for sticking with it because, you know, it's come up in Congress before and they had hearings and then they dropped it for 50 years.
[2:24:05 - 2:24:14] ▶
So it's going to take a time, a lot of time to get to the bottom of this. And I applaud your your commitment to getting to the truth.
[2:24:14 - 2:24:21] ▶
Thank you, Mr. Knapp. Pursuant to Committee Rule 9.
[2:24:21 - 2:24:23] ▶
Madam Chair, can I have a part of ask a parliamentary question of you?
[2:24:23 - 2:24:28] ▶
Yeah, sure. Does this subcommittee have the authority to do subpoenas?
[2:24:28 - 2:24:33] ▶
Task force. So the task force to answer that question has to do it through full committee.
[2:24:33 - 2:24:37] ▶
Okay. So and also in regards to immunity, which to Mr. Borland's point, we are going to be doing a motion to ask for immunity for you and a few other people to come into a skiff and tell us what you know without being subject to the Espionage Act, etc.
[2:24:37 - 2:24:54] ▶
Thank you, ma'am. So that's just kind of an update. But as a task force, because we're not a full subcommittee and there are certain authorities that haven't been granted to us probably because they don't want us to have it.
[2:24:54 - 2:25:05] ▶
But there are ways to work around it. So we're kind of figuring that out.
[2:25:05 - 2:25:09] ▶
Pursuant to Committee Rule 9. See the majority and minority will have an additional 30 minutes each to ask questions of the witnesses without objection.
[2:25:09 - 2:25:17] ▶
So ordered. With that being said, if you guys want to jump in the queue, I know Representative Crane, Burleson and likely Burchett have a few more questions.
[2:25:17 - 2:25:25] ▶
I'll just start out with two and then I'll pass the buck to Burleson. Burchett, do you have anything?
[2:25:25 - 2:25:30] ▶
Yeah. I'll brush it and then Crane. Just real quick, Mr. Knapp, I'm going to ask you,
[2:25:30 - 2:25:34] ▶
real quick, Mr. Knapp, and short answers, please, because of time. How much of these alleged Russian crash retrieval documents have already been physically out there?
[2:25:34 - 2:25:43] ▶
So, I mean, percentage wise of the documents that you submitted to Congress, what was public already and what was not newly released?
[2:25:43 - 2:25:48] ▶
Maybe 1%. Okay. So the rest of it should be predominantly new information.
[2:25:48 - 2:25:51] ▶
Yep. Also, can you just elaborate real quick? I know you had, I think, mentioned a Thread 3 program, but also alleged in those documents, I got through maybe half of them last night.
[2:25:51 - 2:26:00] ▶
There's a lot and I don't speak Russian, contrary to what my people might allege. What does the Thread 3, was there any specific programs that existed within the Soviet government or groups to specifically investigate this by name real quick?
[2:26:00 - 2:26:15] ▶
It's a number. There's a number in those documents I gave you. There was a larger program that actually had three sub-programs that was, Thread 3 was the name I got, and then the DIA guys who looked at it figured out there was a much larger organization.
[2:26:15 - 2:26:29] ▶
And it's listed in those documents? Yes. Okay. Thank you. Real quick, I'd like to ask the committee to replay that video that Burleson had played earlier. I want to ask every witness here, specifically ones that have sensor training or have been able to recognize some of this movement real quick. So if you guys can please roll that real quick.
[2:26:29 - 2:26:44] ▶
Okay, let me just roll that real quick.
[2:26:44 - 2:26:45] ▶
While this is still rolling, Mr. Nusitelli, real quick yes or no answers.
[2:27:14 - 2:27:17] ▶
Are you aware of anything in the government, United States government arsenal that can
[2:27:17 - 2:27:22] ▶
split a hellfire missile like this?
[2:27:22 - 2:27:24] ▶
And do whatever blob thing it did and then keep going?
[2:27:25 - 2:27:27] ▶
How about you, Chief Wiggins?
[2:27:30 - 2:27:31] ▶
Nothing to my knowledge, ma'am.
[2:27:31 - 2:27:32] ▶
And how about you, Mr. Borland?
[2:27:33 - 2:27:34] ▶
I prefer to answer that in a skiff.
[2:27:34 - 2:27:37] ▶
Does this video scare you guys?
[2:27:38 - 2:27:42] ▶
I had a different reaction.
[2:27:47 - 2:27:49] ▶
I was really happy that it got out.
[2:27:49 - 2:27:51] ▶
Thanks for providing that.
[2:27:51 - 2:27:52] ▶
Curiosity comes to that.
[2:27:52 - 2:27:53] ▶
That is the end of my questioning.
[2:27:59 - 2:28:02] ▶
I'd like to now recognize Mr. Crane.
[2:28:02 - 2:28:05] ▶
Chief, I was on a ship for a little bit.
[2:28:07 - 2:28:10] ▶
I was a gunner's mate on the USS Gettysburg for a couple years.
[2:28:10 - 2:28:14] ▶
My question to you is when you saw, had your encounter and you saw it on the screen, you
[2:28:14 - 2:28:21] ▶
were in the CIC, is that correct?
[2:28:21 - 2:28:23] ▶
On an LCS ship, the CIC is on the bridge, so it's called ICC-1, but yes, same.
[2:28:24 - 2:28:31] ▶
Did a bunch of the other folks in the CIC come and check out what you were looking at?
[2:28:31 - 2:28:37] ▶
The tactical action officer, myself, the RCO, and two others that were on watch.
[2:28:39 - 2:28:48] ▶
We were all in the same space, so we were all looking at the sapphire screen all at the
[2:28:48 - 2:28:52] ▶
Because in the other couple instances with the witnesses, you guys just saw it by yourself,
[2:28:53 - 2:28:57] ▶
Mr. Borland, you saw it by yourself?
[2:28:59 - 2:29:00] ▶
Mr. Nesitelli, you saw this by yourself?
[2:29:01 - 2:29:04] ▶
No, there were multiple witnesses in every case at Vanderbilt.
[2:29:04 - 2:29:07] ▶
So, Chief, did that spread like wildfire throughout the ship in the next day or two, what you guys
[2:29:08 - 2:29:14] ▶
It didn't spread throughout the ship, but it spread throughout ICC-1 conversation.
[2:29:16 - 2:29:21] ▶
As you'd do your turnover, we'd talk about it.
[2:29:21 - 2:29:24] ▶
But it didn't go further than just the watch standards that stood watch on the bridge and
[2:29:24 - 2:29:29] ▶
So, it did move around there throughout a few days.
[2:29:30 - 2:29:34] ▶
I'm kind of surprised.
[2:29:34 - 2:29:35] ▶
I was wondering if you were in the ship, stuff usually spreads around the ship pretty fast.
[2:29:35 - 2:29:38] ▶
Why do you think the rest of your fellow sailors on the boat didn't hear about it?
[2:29:38 - 2:29:43] ▶
Potentially uninterested.
[2:29:43 - 2:29:45] ▶
Possibly, you know, with engineers or combat systems like yourself.
[2:29:45 - 2:29:50] ▶
Don't make their way up to the bridge enough to get within sight of the circle of talk about the incident.
[2:29:50 - 2:29:57] ▶
Was it hard for you to get permission from the Navy to bring that video?
[2:29:57 - 2:30:01] ▶
I, myself, didn't bring the video.
[2:30:01 - 2:30:04] ▶
I just saw the video.
[2:30:04 - 2:30:05] ▶
When I saw the video, I got in touch with Admiral Gallaudet.
[2:30:05 - 2:30:10] ▶
That's how I wind up knowing about the video itself when I first talked to the Admiral.
[2:30:10 - 2:30:16] ▶
And you can hear my voice at the back end of the video and that's, I was like, hey, that's my voice.
[2:30:16 - 2:30:20] ▶
And I wanted to talk about it.
[2:30:20 - 2:30:22] ▶
How long did that encounter take place, Chief?
[2:30:22 - 2:30:25] ▶
So, the encounter itself from the time I recognized on my radar to the time after the video ends
[2:30:25 - 2:30:35] ▶
was probably about five to seven minutes.
[2:30:35 - 2:30:38] ▶
What speed was the object moving at?
[2:30:38 - 2:30:42] ▶
When I first witnessed off the port bridge wing the object moving out of the water, what I thought was originally just a light on the water,
[2:30:42 - 2:30:52] ▶
something on the horizon, and surfacing and going into the air, I then knew it was an air contact.
[2:30:52 - 2:30:59] ▶
But as an air controller myself, I started thinking and going through kind of like my checklist in my mind,
[2:30:59 - 2:31:07] ▶
could it be a helo, but it's not blinking lights.
[2:31:07 - 2:31:10] ▶
So, I then realized this is something I've never seen before.
[2:31:10 - 2:31:13] ▶
So, the speed itself just going from the horizon to about maybe three, four thousand feet in the air was very slow, slowly rising.
[2:31:13 - 2:31:24] ▶
And then it sped up.
[2:31:24 - 2:31:27] ▶
I'm not an expert at, you know, knowing specific speeds of aircraft just by visual eye,
[2:31:27 - 2:31:34] ▶
but I would say probably one, two mock instantly into the rest of the formation.
[2:31:34 - 2:31:39] ▶
I didn't notice visually with my own eyes the other three objects until I went back to my radar and also utilized SAFIRE to see that, in fact, there were four total.
[2:31:39 - 2:31:51] ▶
And then again, when they all left after a certain amount of time, it was nearly instantaneous.
[2:31:51 - 2:31:58] ▶
So, you spotted it visually first, Chief, and then went back to your radar, or did you guys find it on, spot it on radar first?
[2:31:58 - 2:32:04] ▶
Radar first, because that was my watch station, was.
[2:32:04 - 2:32:07] ▶
And then you went out to the port bridge wing, is that correct?
[2:32:07 - 2:32:10] ▶
Correct, to verify what I saw in my radar.
[2:32:10 - 2:32:12] ▶
What range was it at, Chief, when you weren't able to see it visibly?
[2:32:12 - 2:32:15] ▶
I would say about seven nautical miles, seven to eight nautical miles of a light from the ship.
[2:32:15 - 2:32:25] ▶
Wow. Thank you. I yield back.
[2:32:25 - 2:32:28] ▶
I now recognize Mr. Burleson.
[2:32:28 - 2:32:31] ▶
Thank you, Madam Chair.
[2:32:31 - 2:32:33] ▶
Mr. Chief Wiggins, you said that it was, it emerged from the ocean. Is that right?
[2:32:33 - 2:32:39] ▶
And before it did, it was glowing, it was a glowing object under the water?
[2:32:40 - 2:32:44] ▶
That part I couldn't tell, because it was nighttime, 1915 approximately, and it was also at a distance.
[2:32:44 - 2:32:54] ▶
So it's very hard to tell the difference between something on the horizon and something surfacing from the water.
[2:32:54 - 2:32:59] ▶
My personal thoughts after seeing what I saw is that it did, in fact, come from the water, but I don't have visual evidence showing exactly, you know, that it did, in fact, come from the water.
[2:33:00 - 2:33:13] ▶
But I had, again, I had to go through my process of elimination and try to figure out, was this a ship on the horizon just showing its lights at night?
[2:33:13 - 2:33:25] ▶
But to see its surface, then it made me question, okay, where did this come from?
[2:33:25 - 2:33:30] ▶
If it's flying and it's not a drone or anything like that, where was its origin? Where did it start?
[2:33:30 - 2:33:36] ▶
Mr. Knapp, in your testimony and in this document, you detail an event that happened in Russia where their nuclear missiles were activated.
[2:33:36 - 2:33:49] ▶
And we were close to a World War III at that time, which is startling to hear.
[2:33:49 - 2:33:54] ▶
It's also good to know that, as we have investigated the JFK files as well, that we're learning that there was a document that was sent between Russia.
[2:33:54 - 2:34:06] ▶
There was an agreement between Russia and the United States that if they were to see some unidentified objects over sensitive sites, that they would report it to each other.
[2:34:06 - 2:34:15] ▶
Are you familiar with that document?
[2:34:15 - 2:34:20] ▶
Yes. I'm also familiar with the rhetoric, public rhetoric, between President Reagan and Gorbachev at the time, too, that they traded statements about,
[2:34:20 - 2:34:30] ▶
wouldn't it be something if we were threatened by something from way outside, how we might work together?
[2:34:30 - 2:34:35] ▶
I know for sure that they had conversations about it, and I know we did reach an agreement to try to lessen the possibility that us detecting a U.S.
[2:34:35 - 2:34:45] ▶
UFO or group of UFOs would not be mistaken for a bunch of Russian missiles.
[2:34:45 - 2:34:49] ▶
There were exchanges of that sort that went back and forth.
[2:34:49 - 2:34:51] ▶
Yeah, and I can imagine this is, to me, the validity of this document is underscored by the fact that Russia would not want this to be known.
[2:34:51 - 2:35:00] ▶
They absolutely would not want the public to know or the United States to know that there was a vulnerability in their missile systems.
[2:35:00 - 2:35:07] ▶
Absolutely. And, you know, we had many similar incidents at our nuclear weapons facilities here that have all been sort of swept under the rug, but it's pretty scary when you take down 10 missile silos during tense times and you don't have a better explanation for it than it was a special test of security mechanisms or using EMPs, which is a preposterous explanation.
[2:35:08 - 2:35:31] ▶
Real quick, we're going to cut to Mr. Ogles. He just got back. So we're in a special kind of lightning round. So five minutes and then we'll go back to our line of questioning.
[2:35:31 - 2:35:39] ▶
Thank you, Madam Chair. You know, at this point, I think it's clear from the hearing that there's advanced technologies that are taking place in our airspace.
[2:35:39 - 2:35:52] ▶
You know, the question is, and I posed it in one of the previous hearings, is that ours? Is it theirs? Or is it otherworldly?
[2:35:52 - 2:35:59] ▶
There may not be a silver bullet at the moment. But when you look back through the hearing and the evidence that's been presented, if you're going to point the American people to one piece of evidence to start their journey on this topic, what would you suggest, sir?
[2:35:59 - 2:36:16] ▶
One piece of evidence. I would start with this hearing and the first hearing. There is no evidence.
[2:36:16 - 2:36:32] ▶
But is there a specific evidence or footage or document that you think lends extreme credibility to what we're discussing today?
[2:36:32 - 2:36:42] ▶
I would say this new video we're seeing today is exceptional evidence that we're dealing with something.
[2:36:42 - 2:36:47] ▶
Sir, I'd have to say that if just the average person here in America looked at absolutely everything that has come across television, the Internet, et cetera, you can't tell yourself that 100% of what's being recorded is fake or false.
[2:36:50 - 2:37:07] ▶
You have to at some point understand that there's something else out there.
[2:37:07 - 2:37:12] ▶
Well, I mean, and you bring an interesting point. You know, in the law enforcement community, anytime you're conducting an investigation, you're always looking at the totality of the circumstances.
[2:37:12 - 2:37:20] ▶
You're looking at all the evidence and how they piece together.
[2:37:20 - 2:37:23] ▶
And so that would be my, you know, advice to the American people that this is a journey that is just beginning from a congressional perspective.
[2:37:23 - 2:37:34] ▶
But you have decades of data. Some of it not real. Much of it is.
[2:37:34 - 2:37:39] ▶
But thanks to Chairwoman Luna, we're now presenting this to the American people.
[2:37:39 - 2:37:43] ▶
And I think this latest video from Mr. Burleson is something that should get everyone pause when you think when you see the three orbs that drop.
[2:37:43 - 2:37:52] ▶
Was that in a defensive posture or is that in an offensive posture?
[2:37:52 - 2:37:56] ▶
And what capabilities did those orbs have that we, quite frankly, may not have?
[2:37:56 - 2:38:00] ▶
As I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks, what hooked me on the story was the paper trail.
[2:38:02 - 2:38:08] ▶
These documents that shouldn't exist. We've been told for decades over and over.
[2:38:08 - 2:38:12] ▶
There's nothing to it. It's not a threat. You can go about your business.
[2:38:12 - 2:38:16] ▶
And then when FOIA becomes the law of the land, thousands of pages to the contrary leak out.
[2:38:16 - 2:38:21] ▶
There's a memo by General Nathan Twining in 1947 when the country was being overflown by dozens of UFOs, hundreds of UFOs,
[2:38:21 - 2:38:31] ▶
in which he said, look, this is not visionary or fictitious. It's real. These things are craft.
[2:38:31 - 2:38:37] ▶
They're not ours. They outperform anything we've got.
[2:38:37 - 2:38:39] ▶
I mean, if you follow the paper trail of documents that they wrote before the military got wise and realized that FOIA really exists
[2:38:39 - 2:38:47] ▶
and changed their tune and not put things in writing, it spells it out pretty clearly.
[2:38:47 - 2:38:52] ▶
I'll go refer back to Russia. One incident I did not mention to Representative Burleson is there was Colonel Sokolov in that Ministry of Defense,
[2:38:52 - 2:39:01] ▶
the U.S. program, said there were 40 incidents where Russian warplanes were sent to intercept UFOs.
[2:39:01 - 2:39:07] ▶
And they were ordered to fire on them. And for the most part, the UFOs would zip away.
[2:39:07 - 2:39:11] ▶
Three of the pilots, though, did fire at these things. Those three planes stalled out, crashed.
[2:39:11 - 2:39:17] ▶
Two of those pilots died. And after that, the Russians changed the standing order.
[2:39:17 - 2:39:21] ▶
If you see a UFO, leave them alone. No country in the world wants to say and admit that these objects are flying around in our airspace,
[2:39:21 - 2:39:27] ▶
and there's nothing we can do about it. I mean, who wants to say that? The U.S. certainly doesn't.
[2:39:27 - 2:39:31] ▶
And the Russians didn't either.
[2:39:31 - 2:39:33] ▶
And I've got to be almost out of time. But, Mr. Berlin, then you, sir, real quickly.
[2:39:33 - 2:39:37] ▶
Yeah, to be honest with you, I think Bob Lazar, and not for the reasons that most would talk about,
[2:39:37 - 2:39:43] ▶
mainly because Bob Lazar was immediately discredited. They said he never worked where he worked.
[2:39:43 - 2:39:47] ▶
They said he never did what he did. But yet, Bob Lazar showed up with a bunch of friends in a video camera
[2:39:47 - 2:39:53] ▶
and was filming these test flights in the middle of the desert. So clearly, he knew something.
[2:39:53 - 2:39:57] ▶
Madam Chairman, if I'm out of time, I yield back.
[2:39:57 - 2:40:01] ▶
Thank you very much, Representative Ogles. I'd like to go back now on our lightning round of questioning to Representative Burchett and then Burleson.
[2:40:01 - 2:40:07] ▶
Burchett always number one.
[2:40:07 - 2:40:13] ▶
That's what I should be. Number one in your heart, number 435 on the chart. That's me.
[2:40:13 - 2:40:22] ▶
Dylan, knowing you testified to Arrow, are they obfuscating when they claim to have discovered no evidence of extraterrestrial beings, activity, or technology,
[2:40:22 - 2:40:34] ▶
and are they lying to the American public?
[2:40:34 - 2:40:36] ▶
As I said before, it's a manipulation of the public perception.
[2:40:36 - 2:40:41] ▶
The statement, scientific evidence of extraterrestrials is a true statement. It is not the truth about what is happening and what we have.
[2:40:41 - 2:40:50] ▶
Any of y'all like to comment on that further? Mr. Knapp, you're getting edgy.
[2:40:50 - 2:40:56] ▶
Well, it's splitting hairs. No proof that they're extraterrestrials. What would that proof look like? A piece of kryptonite? What would it be?
[2:40:56 - 2:41:04] ▶
I mean, we could be talking about different forms of nonhuman intelligence. I think the dominant paradigm is that they come from outer space somewhere else, and they have some way that they can cross those vast distances that we can't even imagine doing.
[2:41:04 - 2:41:17] ▶
But that's not necessarily the answer. So asking for proof of extraterrestrials might not be the answer at all. It's splitting hairs. You know, we don't know where they're from.
[2:41:17 - 2:41:26] ▶
I don't know anyone who knows the answer for sure. They call them aliens just as a placekeeper kind of a word. But no one in all these programs who've studied this stuff for years, people with much bigger brains than mine, knows the answer for sure.
[2:41:26 - 2:41:38] ▶
I've talked to Navy folks that some of the deep sea areas, they think there might be something there that they're here. And I don't know when they got here.
[2:41:38 - 2:41:47] ▶
Another point that needs to be made is every time, you know, we say we're going to back engineer or whatever you want to call it, these craft, I always say like it'd be like if you took a, I ride motorcycles, but if you took like an Indian or a Harley to the people that came over here on the Mayflower, you know, they'd see a bright, shiny object.
[2:41:47 - 2:42:07] ▶
They might polish it. You know, they might, they might get it started. I doubt they could. They couldn't, they couldn't work on it. They couldn't put fuel.
[2:42:07 - 2:42:16] ▶
They wouldn't be able to have the capability of putting fuel in it. I just think that that's, you know, we're just, we're scratching at something that we don't have any knowledge of.
[2:42:16 - 2:42:25] ▶
And that's why it's just taken so dadgum long, but they do know first one that cracks that code. It's, it's over. I mean, it's, it's, it's energy, it's power, it's everything.
[2:42:25 - 2:42:37] ▶
And I worry too that in the wrong hands that they do that. They keep it from the rest of us because they're so invested in whatever energy sources we have here that their billionaire buddies are going to profit.
[2:42:37 - 2:42:49] ▶
And they can't, and they can't retool because they know once it's out on the internet, it's over. And so I think there's a lot of things going after.
[2:42:49 - 2:42:58] ▶
And I think that's why the, the move to discredit folks is so rapid too. I think, you know, they're just, they point to them and they, they put the dogs on them. And it disgusts me.
[2:42:58 - 2:43:08] ▶
There's a price to be paid for that too. The Russians and Chinese are trying to figure this, this out as well, but they're, they don't have the same kind of stigma.
[2:43:08 - 2:43:15] ▶
They tell their best scientists and engineers get in there and work on it. And they've been doing it for a very long time. Might have a headstart on us here.
[2:43:15 - 2:43:22] ▶
We don't have our best scientists and engineers working on it because they've been told it's nonsense. The stigma is very real for people like that.
[2:43:22 - 2:43:29] ▶
I agree. Yield back to your lady.
[2:43:29 - 2:43:31] ▶
Thank you. And I'd like to rep, uh, recognize representative Burleson.
[2:43:31 - 2:43:35] ▶
Mr. Nusitelli. Um, when you heard the testimony of Mr. Knapp talking about, um, the, the, these missiles were shut down or turned on in Russia.
[2:43:35 - 2:43:50] ▶
Um, does that, does that remind you, when you hear these stories, it's got to remind you of the event that happened on your base.
[2:43:50 - 2:43:59] ▶
Absolutely. There are many, many, um, accounts of incursions of the,
[2:43:59 - 2:44:05] ▶
this type of taking place. I believe in the sixties, we had a similar incursion in new England.
[2:44:05 - 2:44:10] ▶
That's right. I will tell you. And, uh, same thing happened. There were these objects coming over the base at low altitude, 200 feet over the base security police.
[2:44:10 - 2:44:18] ▶
And they were scrambling fighters. And then the objects would just fly off. And that went on for weeks.
[2:44:18 - 2:44:24] ▶
So the historical record is laid out that there's a pattern that our, our installations are visited by these craft.
[2:44:24 - 2:44:31] ▶
You know, they, they come in and do whatever they're doing and then they leave. And we don't know how to respond.
[2:44:31 - 2:44:38] ▶
We don't know how to protect the installation. So that's why we're here.
[2:44:38 - 2:44:43] ▶
When you first heard, and we're having to report on the, these incidents that were being witnessed by other individuals.
[2:44:43 - 2:44:49] ▶
Did you, did you find, did you believe them? Did you yourself believe it would be true until you saw it?
[2:44:49 - 2:44:55] ▶
Yeah. These are people I've worked with for years, deployed with, um, you know, I was in some of the weddings.
[2:44:55 - 2:45:01] ▶
These are people that I, I worked with every day of my life. Uh, usually when the events were occurring, we were all together.
[2:45:01 - 2:45:07] ▶
You know, there'd be 40, 60, a hundred people on duty during these encounters.
[2:45:07 - 2:45:12] ▶
Really? Yeah. All seeing it at the same time.
[2:45:12 - 2:45:14] ▶
Yes. These were, these encounters were playing out while we were on duty. Um, and, and we were responding and investigating in real time as they,
[2:45:14 - 2:45:25] ▶
really occurred. And as you said, the importance of, of your operation was highly important because, um, they said it's the most important in 25 years.
[2:45:25 - 2:45:33] ▶
Um, the, the, the, the research that you were conducting.
[2:45:33 - 2:45:36] ▶
For that particular launch, we had 500 Air Force police officers guarding the launch.
[2:45:36 - 2:45:42] ▶
500 people. It was that critical. Wow.
[2:45:42 - 2:45:45] ▶
But had this thing showed up, we wouldn't have been able to do anything to prevent it showing up.
[2:45:45 - 2:45:50] ▶
Real quickly, can you just re-describe size and whether or not you heard anything?
[2:45:50 - 2:45:54] ▶
It was, how big wise?
[2:45:54 - 2:45:56] ▶
The two square objects were at least as large as a football field.
[2:45:56 - 2:46:01] ▶
Um, the, the second encounter, they think it was much larger than a football field.
[2:46:01 - 2:46:06] ▶
We're talking like build, flying buildings.
[2:46:06 - 2:46:08] ▶
The object I saw was about 30 feet in diameter.
[2:46:08 - 2:46:11] ▶
And to confirm you were not the only person that saw this.
[2:46:11 - 2:46:13] ▶
I think I was also told, um, that there was also, uh, reports of this in a police blotter in the area.
[2:46:14 - 2:46:20] ▶
Can you confirm that?
[2:46:20 - 2:46:21] ▶
Yes, that's the, uh, the, the documentation that I maintained from the original event.
[2:46:21 - 2:46:26] ▶
And, uh, turned into Arrow and the FBI.
[2:46:26 - 2:46:29] ▶
Do you have any more Burleson?
[2:46:30 - 2:46:32] ▶
No, I'm, Madam Chair, I just want to reiterate to the American people that, um, if you're frustrated, so are we.
[2:46:32 - 2:46:39] ▶
We're extremely frustrated.
[2:46:39 - 2:46:40] ▶
We've been, you know, the two, three years.
[2:46:40 - 2:46:42] ▶
I can only imagine how frustrated Mr. Knapp is or, or Danny Sheehan is.
[2:46:42 - 2:46:47] ▶
And the amount of time that you guys have poured into this to try to get answers.
[2:46:47 - 2:46:51] ▶
I mean, Masson is back there.
[2:46:51 - 2:46:52] ▶
He's been pouring to try to get answers into this.
[2:46:52 - 2:46:55] ▶
Um, we're, I hope that you all see that we're committed to this.
[2:46:55 - 2:46:59] ▶
And, um, we're going to be scrappy about it.
[2:46:59 - 2:47:02] ▶
We may not have the direct authority, but, uh, I can assure you Representative Luna is about as scrappy as it gets.
[2:47:02 - 2:47:09] ▶
I wouldn't want to scrap with her.
[2:47:09 - 2:47:12] ▶
But that being said, I think that if, if the American people want to see answers, we need to action.
[2:47:12 - 2:47:18] ▶
We've had the hearings.
[2:47:18 - 2:47:19] ▶
It's time to take action.
[2:47:19 - 2:47:21] ▶
It's time that we pass Tim Burchett's UA, uh, whistleblower act.
[2:47:21 - 2:47:26] ▶
It's time that we pass the UAP disclosure act.
[2:47:26 - 2:47:29] ▶
And, and, um, I think that we've had a lot of talk about this.
[2:47:29 - 2:47:32] ▶
It's time for action.
[2:47:32 - 2:47:34] ▶
Thank you, Burleson.
[2:47:34 - 2:47:35] ▶
I would now like to yield 30 minutes to Representative Crockett.
[2:47:46 - 2:47:50] ▶
Um, in closing, I want to thank our witnesses once again for their testimony today.
[2:47:52 - 2:47:56] ▶
I now yield to ranking member Crockett for closing remarks.
[2:47:56 - 2:48:00] ▶
No, I just want to say thank you so much to each and every one of you, um, for being
[2:48:02 - 2:48:08] ▶
here today, for staying committed to this and for your courage.
[2:48:08 - 2:48:12] ▶
Um, I truly believe that courage is contagious.
[2:48:12 - 2:48:15] ▶
And right now we need more courage than ever, whether it's UAPs or whether we're dealing with
[2:48:15 - 2:48:21] ▶
any other form of government where people are afraid to come out and speak their truth.
[2:48:21 - 2:48:27] ▶
Um, the American people are relying on amazing public servants like you to speak up on their
[2:48:27 - 2:48:33] ▶
behalf, to be the watchdog and to make sure that we are as safe as possible.
[2:48:33 - 2:48:40] ▶
Um, and so thank you so much again for conducting a bipartisan hearing on such an important matter.
[2:48:40 - 2:48:48] ▶
Um, I now like to recognize myself for some closing remarks.
[2:48:49 - 2:48:52] ▶
Uh, this is obviously something that doesn't just affect everyone in this room.
[2:48:52 - 2:48:56] ▶
I can tell you that specifically for where I represent in Pinellas County, Tampa Bay, and
[2:48:56 - 2:49:00] ▶
Florida as a whole, there's many sightings, um, many questions, people reporting this, but
[2:49:00 - 2:49:04] ▶
I'm not the only one.
[2:49:04 - 2:49:05] ▶
I was also told by Representative Biggs as well as, um, uh, you know, our great representative
[2:49:05 - 2:49:10] ▶
from Alaska that these are not isolated instances.
[2:49:10 - 2:49:13] ▶
And so it does bring, um, give us reasoning to provide investigative inquiry into these
[2:49:13 - 2:49:19] ▶
topics, but also to, um, I would also like Mr. Spielberger, if you could actually review
[2:49:19 - 2:49:24] ▶
and see if your organization would endorse the whistleblower protection act that Representative
[2:49:24 - 2:49:28] ▶
I can tell you that I will be signing on to a letter as well as I'm sure many other members
[2:49:29 - 2:49:33] ▶
And we hope that the ranking, um, chairwoman or my co- my colleague here, uh, Representative Crockett,
[2:49:34 - 2:49:39] ▶
uh, Representative Crockett as well as the, our Democrats that were here today consider also
[2:49:39 - 2:49:42] ▶
signing onto that as we do feel that it is time to ensure that our whistleblowers are given
[2:49:42 - 2:49:46] ▶
adequate protections and that people like Mr. Borland are not facing retribution in the way
[2:49:46 - 2:49:51] ▶
that they have been.
[2:49:51 - 2:49:52] ▶
Um, with that being said, with all that and without objection, all members have five legislative
[2:49:52 - 2:49:57] ▶
days within to submit materials and additional written questions for the witnesses and, uh,
[2:49:57 - 2:50:02] ▶
which will be also forwarded to those witnesses if there are no further business without objection.
[2:50:02 - 2:50:06] ▶
I'd like to now recognize Representative Burchett for closing remarks.
[2:50:06 - 2:50:11] ▶
I would just like to thank the ranking member and the chairlady for their courage.
[2:50:11 - 2:50:15] ▶
This is a tough issue.
[2:50:15 - 2:50:17] ▶
We all catch hell for it.
[2:50:17 - 2:50:18] ▶
Um, and it's, uh, but it's, but it's gratifying that we're here in a bipartisan nature and the
[2:50:18 - 2:50:25] ▶
way this meeting was conducted and I want to thank you all for your courage.
[2:50:25 - 2:50:28] ▶