1,637 segments
Can't say what this is. Okay. Oh wow. Oh wow. Imagine if I released that.
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Lot of tea right here. That is not what I was expecting to see.
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I don't know if this is kosher to talk about on air, but I mean we can start in a second if it's not, but you're building a bunker out there in Wyoming.
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You know the rule to fight club is never talk about fight. So if you're building a bunker, you don't tell people because everybody knows where to go when when everything goes south.
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So, but you know, I it would be a remiss of me to not say that I think people look being prepared is not a bad thing. Now being paranoid.
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A bunker feels a little paranoid. Well, look, there's an old saying right just because your paranoid doesn't mean they're not out to get.
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What is a bunker? Wait, I mean, we hear all about these billionaire bunkers last I checked though the Pentagon doesn't pay billionaire contracts to its employees.
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No, it's not. So what is your bunker look like?
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Like allegedly, allegedly. So, so how about this, the same general term if you want a bunker. And by the way, it's not just for, you know, into the world situation.
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And it could be for things environmental like even tornadoes, right? We have a lot of tornadoes out in Wyoming. So, and people who live in Florida will say, yeah, we have these hurricanes, we just get to 110, you know, category one category two storm.
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Maybe once every 10, 15 years in Florida, this is like almost every other weekend where I live in Wyoming. We have wins. It's not uncommon to have a 90 mile an hour wind or 100 mile an hour just to win.
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So, so homes have to be built a certain way. They just will not survive the environment. So, if you have, for example, a tornado rolling through, you know, maybe you want to use the bunker for that just in case, right?
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So, a lot of people out there in Wyoming are there for several reasons. A lot of people just want to disappear and out in Wyoming, we're a constitutional state. So you can build whatever you want on your property.
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So, yeah, people build bunkers. And typically what you want in there is enough rations and food and water, right? That can sustain you for a prolonged period of time. Now, how long that is depends on the size of your bunker and whatnot.
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You also need ventilation, you know, people think, oh, I'm just going to seal myself underground. Well, you just built a coffin, congratulations.
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It's not going to do you very much good. You also want medicine. And you also, when I say medicine, everything from antibiotics to how to do field, expedient surgery, you know, pain medication, if you need it.
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Everything you would need to sustain yourself if you didn't have any type of medical resource or communications or food or any other type of logistics, you have to be able to survive by yourself.
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Now, if you go back a hundred years, you know, in human history, most people knew how to do that automatically. They were, you know, scratching out a living on the land and whatnot.
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If they were living in a rural community, and it's not a big deal, but nowadays, a lot of people have forgot, you know, what it takes to survive a situation.
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They're too busy tweeting.
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Yeah, and other things, you know, and I think some of these skill sets have been lost. You know, how do you tie a tourniquet?
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When do you tie a tourniquet? Right? Under what circumstance? Look, we've got snakes out there, you know, it's people can get bit by rattlesnakes. What do you do?
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Right? Let's say it's 11 o'clock at night, you're walking out to your horse, stable barn, and you get bit, you know, hospital may be 40, 50 miles away.
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Yeah, not in my case, but in some cases, yeah, I mean, people live off the grid way out there. So what are you going to do? You know, and if there's a snowstorm, ambulance can't get there.
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Does even have cops out there? We do. Actually, you know what? I got to tell you, Julian, I got a buddy of mine who was a, he was a cop in Baltimore when I was, I was still fed.
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And long story short, we went out to Wyoming a few years later, and we, he was there. We met him there, and he retired immediately after coming out to Wyoming, and is now the chief of police in my small hometown.
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Super, super guy. And, and you know, this is Baltimore to Wyoming. Yeah. I mean, right. Talk about a change, right? Yeah.
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You know, some may argue that it's, you know, maybe not as exciting, but you've probably extended your lifespan a little bit.
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Yeah, I guess you, I guess you go from like street drug stops to like potential, I don't know, oligarch families built in bunkers under the ground, not you, but you know, yeah, people doing crazy out there in the wilderness.
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Look, it's, it's, they call it God's country for, for a reason. It is really amazing. I mean, you have Yellowstone, you have Devil's Tower out there. You've got the Crow Nation out there. You've got these beautiful, beautiful mountain ranges that are just stunning.
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Everything you would have, like for example, if you're a skier, we've got ski resorts pretty much in all the mountain towns. Oh, yeah. And it's cheap. It's not expensive.
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And it's a constitutional state and you know, our crime rates low and people are actually friendly there. People will say, well, Wyoming is, it's not very diverse. Is it? How do you feel as a Cuban? I'm like, look, guys, we are this state literally of black cowboys and white rappers.
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So we are extremely diverse. You know, it's, I think people have a misnomer about what Wyoming is about. It's a wonderful, wonderful place. I will never leave that place. Yes, I might wind up traveling a lot.
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Never. Brother, it's incredible. Come on out. You'll see it. I, yeah, I will. But I'm just saying you say never like it. You're not angling for a little DC or job in the new administration. I'm just saying. I don't know if you're building a bunker in DC. It's got to be a little harder there. You know, more regulations.
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We call that the Pentagon actually.
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It's a great place to be if you guys ever want to come out. It's it really is sometimes people come on vis-a-ming. And you know, it hasn't been only one time someone has actually bought property after visiting.
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I've heard people go out there and they fall in love and they don't want to leave. I've heard that story. Wyoming, Montana, all these different places. And I've never been. But you just see the pictures and how grand and beautiful it is, especially in like the post-COVID error and everything where people are like, let me.
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It's not uncommon to go through a drive-through and see two people on a horseback going through the drive-through. Wow. And ordering. That's right.
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Some next level. I think. Yeah. I mean, it's like, wow. We are not in Kansas anymore. Right. No pun intended.
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And you got a bar downstairs too. You're showing us. I do. I do. You know, those winners get cold, right?
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So, you know, you need something to keep you warm at night. I made the mistake a long time ago when I so look, I had every.
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Every crap job you can imagine growing up as a kid. So every job that nobody wanted to do, I did. So whether it's construction and roofing,
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a track and a dancer and, you know, whatever, every crap job you can have, I had it. And so I made the mistake when I first met my wife, letting her know that, you know, it was a little handy. I could do plumbing and electrical.
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And so now, anytime anything needs to be done, I get stuck doing it. And so. That's how it goes. Yeah. So my wife was like, you know, I'd love an Irish bar down here in the basement.
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Oh, it was your wife's idea. Yeah. So I was like, yeah, that would be great. She's like, getting party enough in here.
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So what? She, well, it really, it really turned out really nice and turned out really bougie and some friends of ours took the idea and decided to create an English pub in their entire basement. So I have like one room. That's a bar.
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Buddy, mine turned, he actually run security for me, actually turned the entire half of his basement into a huge, he's got like a dart alley, he's got the secret door like a speaking. It is the coolest thing. It's all done in English tutor style. And he did it himself. Right.
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So that's the one thing about Wyoming. If you want to get work done out there in the show of injection, you might have to wait a while to get, you know, some some talent to come in to do specialized work. So you're kind of stuck doing it yourself.
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So yeah, I built a an Irish pub in the basement. Yeah, we're going to have to check that out at some point. But I don't want to get off the buried lead here about the move back east to DC. What is happening?
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We got a new administration in here. Apparently allegedly they're taking the whole threat in our sky's thing a little more seriously than say some past administrations, including I guess the past one that Trump had.
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So what's what's going on? I know you don't want to reveal all behind the scenes things because I know there's some professional aspects of that. But you know, are you are you getting a role here? What are we doing?
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I look first of all, if my if my country asked me to serve again, I will. Those decisions are mine to make.
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Are there people out there that might be more qualified than me to assume certain roles? I hope so. Yeah, I don't go work for them. I have no problem doing that.
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There are people in this new administration that are much, much more proactive on this topic of UAP and aerodomane awareness. If there's one thing I've been trying to tell people for the last seven years, UAP aside, we have no clue what's in our skies.
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We don't and we just saw a horrible horrible tragedy to them. One, possibly because we did not have complete aerodomane awareness, had a helicopter crashing with a little regional jet and lost a lot of lives because of it.
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That's problematic. We simply do not know everything that's in our skies, whether it's drones, Chinese balloons, or UAP, or even helicopters.
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We need to do something. If you look at what Tulsi Gabbard, who is now being considered for the position of the Director of National Intelligence, which by the way she has my full vote of confidence, she's incredibly smart, also a veteran and served her nation honorably.
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And then of course, was a representative in Congress, right? So very, very, very achieved woman. And she's not be considered for the Director of National Intelligence.
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She said one of the very first things she's going to do as the DNI is look into these drone and UAP issues. Now, this is this is potentially a cabinet level position that she is now saying for the record, these are going to be some of our priorities.
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You also have RFK Jr. that's had a long history in this topic and once increased transparency. He has a long history in this topic, unless aware of that.
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Yeah. What's what's the story? You know, you'd have to ask him. I tend to we'll get him in here right after you. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.
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He also have people like Marco Rubio, who was on the Senate Select Committee for Intelligence, the CISI, who's now Secretary of State, right?
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It was going to be and then you've got other individuals, Ratcliffe, who is now the Director of CIA, who's already said for the record that, yeah, looks like UAP, whatever they are, are real. We got to figure these things out.
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So you've got folks like Don Jr., who have been really, really championing the idea of transparency for the American people.
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Now, I want to say something here because people are going to say, oh, lose a Trump lover. Look, I love anybody who's willing to make a difference, a positive difference for this nation.
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I don't give a damn if you're Democrat or Republican or anything in between. What I care about is, can you walk the walk when the time comes?
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Are you willing to do what's necessary? And I think we're seeing that. We're seeing a lot of changes here.
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So again, politics aside, because people will sit there and accuse me of all sorts of things.
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They think, oh, he's always willing.
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Yeah, it's crazy. The bottom line is proof is in the pudding.
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Can you make the changes that you said you're going to make? And we're beginning to see some of those changes.
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Now, are there other candidates on the Democratic side who've done the same? Yeah, of course, there were some great presidents as well.
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So you know, let's, we've got to stop being so myopic and say, well, you know, this administration or that administration.
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Look, all administrations have their advantages and all have their challenges.
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Right? It's up to us as the American people to let the administration know what our priorities are.
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And also Congress, right? If you don't like the person, there's an old saying that bad people are,
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bad politicians are voted in by good people who don't vote. Right? If you don't like it, then look at America.
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I don't want to tell you. You know, I didn't like it. So I didn't vote. Well, okay. There's a result.
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Right. So I'm extremely optimistic about this new administration.
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They seem very proactive, very serious about transparency and getting to the bottom of this.
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Again, politics aside, if you follow the UAP topic, you'll see that I think we are postured like we have never been before.
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For true, true transparency with the American people.
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So we would toll see though to go back to that one. So she's nominated at more recording this on Sunday.
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This is going to come out on Friday. I believe so I don't think she's confirmed yet. She's not confirmed yet.
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Right. But that would have apparently happened this week.
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But she as DNI for people out there who are less familiar with, I guess, the organizational structure of government.
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Can you just explain the full scope of that? Obviously she has full oversight of all intelligence agencies.
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Yeah. But how much does that mean that she's they can read her in and everything versus like keep things hidden within each agency?
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Well, theory and reality are two different things. Okay. And theory she should be a super user be read on to everything.
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Both Title 15, Title 10 program. So covered action, clandestine, everything in between.
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The reality is that doesn't always occur. And so that's a problem. That's a dysfunction of the system.
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Now if you want to for people who don't understand what the DNI is, everybody knows who the director of the CIA, right? What they do.
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But the DNI position is kind of a new position. And it really didn't it didn't start until probably the intelligence reform and terrorism prevention act of 2004.
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I believe that established the position of a DNI. So why do we need a DNI? What does it do? And so you need to really look back like 80 years in American history to understand
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how this all precipitated after World War II right on the heels of World War II. Congress realized that after looking at the lessons learned of War War II that there was some dysfunction in our national security.
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So they created the National Security Act of 1947 that really established your your secretary of war, which now we call it Secretary Defense.
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And basically says, okay, whereas before doing World War II, maybe the person who's running the Navy operations and the Pacific isn't really coordinating with Army guy who's running the ground operations and the Philippines, right?
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So there's a disconnect there. We need kind of a daddy bearer, a mommy bear to haunch you and coordinate all these efforts. And over time you had the services, Army and Navy and you know, be a Air Force later on becoming becoming from Army or court Air Force.
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And it started to work. We started realizing, okay, now we're now becoming more functional as a government, military and national security apparatus.
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So what happens 50 some years later, 9-11? And all of a sudden we realized crap. We had a huge intelligence failure. CIA and FBI both had pieces of information and department events, also had information but they weren't sharing it.
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And as a result, 9-11 happened and it was part of the 9-11 Commission reports that Congress had commissioned to say what, what failed, how did this happen?
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So they realized we need to do the same thing with the intelligence community as we did with the Department of Defense and our national security apparatus.
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And we're going to create a daddy bearer, a mommy bearer, if you will, a headhunt show for intelligence. And so we create this position called the director of national intelligence.
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That is basically going to be the ringleader of all the 17 organizations in the intelligence community. People who know, there's a lot of organizations out there that do intelligence.
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It's not just the military, it's not just the CIA, it's not just the FBI.
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Yeah, these organizations.
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NGA, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, NRO, National Reconnaissance Office, right? NSA, National Security Agency, all these organizations that have their own intelligence mission.
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So you need somebody that can coordinate all these on behalf of the nation and then report directly to the president.
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So this is the position that Tulsi Gabbard has gone through these hoops to be considered and Senate confirmed.
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It's not easy. I mean, you are responsible if anything goes wrong, you're responsible, right?
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So you need the best and brightest.
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And so that's why you have this creation of the DNI and in theory, she should be read on to everything.
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The reality is operationally speaking, there's not enough time in the day. There's so many programs that are out there.
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It's like, look, I'm going to hire people, managers, like for example, we call them National Intelligence Managers, NIMS.
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So you have different, if you will, Bubba's and Bubbets that work for the DNI, managing certain functional areas, like NIM Aviation or maritime domain awareness.
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The National Intelligence Manager for, you know, fill in the blank China or whatever you want.
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And they, in theory, should be read on to everything as well within their portfolios and then bring that information up to the DNI.
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So then that he or she can then inform the president.
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And so that's really, I know it's a long-winded way to explain what is the DNI, but if you really want to answer, you really need to start 70 years ago to have that conversation.
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People are saying, oh, now you see why we have a DNI.
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What makes you like Tulsi for that position so much?
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Oh my gosh. Well, I'm always, you've probably realized by now, I'm not a kiss and tell kind of guy.
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I don't like explaining to people, you know, who I know, who I've talked to.
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So let's just look at it at face value. She's veteran.
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She has been on both sides, both Democrat and Republican, right? And people criticize her for that. I think it's great.
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Look, when facts change, what happens? I change my mind, right? And that's okay.
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You know, you're not stuck and wedded to a particular allegiance of a political party just because you feel obligated.
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Look, we're human beings. I have situations changes. And a lot of people are also politically fluid.
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They kind of, they're kind of in the mountain, melt or middle, right? And maybe they're socially liberal, but fiscally conservative and whatnot.
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So, you know, I think it's dangerous to pigeonhole people. And Tulsi's been one of those people who've told people, look, I, I don't agree with certain politics and policies.
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And I think from a national security perspective, we need to do this. She's been there and done that.
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She's highly decorated military officer lieutenant, Colonel, right? So she's no dummy.
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And by the way, in a system, in the ecosystem, military system, that really has not been very good to females.
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That's fact. That's true. Look, and they can tell you, we're all equal now and all. That's horse crap. It's not.
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Women are still not given the same, even though we like to think they are. They're not given the same advantages and opportunities that their male counterparts are in the military.
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Unfortunately, and there's a lot of sexual harassment. So if you want to survive the military, you really got to be, be a hardcore sister to do it.
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I mean, you got it, you got to have your shit straight. And then on top of that, she entered the world of politics and became a congresswoman, right?
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And then after that still becomes an advocate trying to help her country long before she was ever considered for a position of D and I, she was still trying to make a difference.
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So I try to look at someone's heart as much as I can. People say, she's a Russian sympathizer. First of all, you don't know that you're getting that crap from some sort of mainstream media outlet.
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That's an echo chamber giving you the information that you want to hear. So before you jump to conclusions, you know, I always recommend know the person you're talking about.
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Right? Yeah. And and break bread with them. Look them in the eye. And then if you have that same opinion, great. But give them an opportunity.
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You don't just, well, I read an article that says someone is someone and they do this with Russia. Well, you know, there's also a lot of misinformation out there and ask me how I know because I face it all the time.
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So, you know, my recommendation to people to give somebody a break, give them the benefit of the doubt, you know, listen to their words and their actions and see where that takes you.
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And if at the end of the day, you still feel that way, then okay, but at least you've done your due diligence.
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That's all I'm asking. So I think I think Tulsi has got tremendous potential.
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You know, I, I've always been an advocate to see her go where she wants to go. How long have you known her?
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You know what? I, that's a question you probably need to ask her. I don't even even to say no, right? How long have I known of her or how long have I?
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You know, I don't, I don't want to, you don't want to call someone a friend if like you've talked with them a few times. Yeah, right. Exactly.
[0:21:36 - 0:21:43] ▶
You know, my definition of frame, maybe a different definition than you have, right? Yes. Yes. You know, there's a lot of people who throw around names and act like they want to college with them. Yeah, we're right. No, I did not go to college with Tulsi or RFK or any of these folks. But I have seen enough from the periphery to, to have my own opinion. Sure.
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And, you know, I think, I think she is a very qualified candidate. And again, I know people are going to be all pissed off at me and I'm not following anymore.
[0:22:03 - 0:22:12] ▶
You know, I don't know what to tell you. You know, have you been in the military? You know, you might have a different appreciation for what she's had to endure.
[0:22:12 - 0:22:20] ▶
And I think, so anyways, that's that's how I answer that question. Yeah. So it's interesting to hear you breaking it down because you come from deep in the Pentagon.
[0:22:20 - 0:22:32] ▶
You come from what some people would look at on the internet and say, oh, it was a little part of the deep state or whatever. Right.
[0:22:32 - 0:22:37] ▶
And Tulsi, I mean, you took the words out of my mouth. They were like throwing around this like Russian asset thing with her starting back when she like ran in 2020, which to me, I'd never heard any evidence on that. It seemed totally ridiculous.
[0:22:37 - 0:22:48] ▶
But that was this tag that got put on her by, I don't know, the mainstream media, Hillary Clinton or political political. It's a wonderful political cancellation. Yes.
[0:22:48 - 0:22:58] ▶
It's just like we have right now with with this the woke, wokeness in our nation, which I do believe we should have fair opportunity for everybody, but I don't believe in special privilege.
[0:22:58 - 0:23:07] ▶
And there's people that have been trying to do the same thing by canceling individuals, but do it politically. Right. I call that administrative terrorism.
[0:23:07 - 0:23:16] ▶
Administrative terrorism. By writing little notes or little things or thing. Like for example, someone tried to have my security clearance.
[0:23:16 - 0:23:23] ▶
Uh, revote some time ago actually. Oh, yeah, I was under investigation. And I wound up winning because it was completely BS.
[0:23:23 - 0:23:31] ▶
How do you win that? I thought they could just do that. The president can. But what happens is that your for example, there'll be an anonymous complaint sent through IG, do you see I a or the intelligence community saying, I saw Lou,
[0:23:31 - 0:23:44] ▶
um, I know we're pink two two and combat boots and run around this house, you know, seeing a cappella. And you know, just as an example, right, a visual.
[0:23:44 - 0:23:56] ▶
Yeah, yeah, yikes. Um, and then all of a sudden that anonymous complaint goes up, they look, say, hmm, is he mentally able to have encyclodically able to have a security clearance. Let's see here.
[0:23:56 - 0:24:07] ▶
And then they'll go ahead and they'll suspend your clearance. Then it's up to the person based upon a completely erroneous accusation to have to defend themselves. And that's hard because now you're, you're, you're, you're defending yourself from a position where you're already kind of being accused as being guilty. Right.
[0:24:07 - 0:24:22] ▶
It's not innocent till proven guilty. And this is after government service. Even after you have security clearance. Yeah. And so I had to come back and basically read them the riot. Actually, look guys. Don't tell me about the law. I know what the law says and here. Boom, boom, boom, boom. And I helped write some of the policy for security clearances.
[0:24:22 - 0:24:36] ▶
And because of this section and this section, this section, you know, write some of the policy. Yeah, long time. It's not a comment. Look policy is not a comment. That sounds like so. It's really now we're called, we call them policy wonks or policy folks. It's really not a glamorous job.
[0:24:36 - 0:24:50] ▶
You promote yourself to the point out of the out of the, you get promoted out of the field to the point where now you're, you want to go flying a desk, right? You get behind your, your, your handling budgets now and, and you're in your cigar. Yeah, you trade in your nine millimeter for a pen. And, and that's what you do. So, um,
[0:24:50 - 0:25:05] ▶
writing policy is, is something that's very important. I had spent a good, a good portion of my life trying to figure out ways around policy. So they finally gave me said, okay, you know where all the loo polls all loo, you're going to fix them. Right. So I was several my positions. I was the director of policy. So we wrote policy, uh, and drafted policy coordinated policy on behalf of the department, the intelligence community.
[0:25:05 - 0:25:26] ▶
And security clearance is one of those. Well, among many other policies like, for example, polygraph examinations or policies on how we conduct counter intelligence under these circumstances. Right. And so every government organization uses policy for very specific reasons.
[0:25:26 - 0:25:42] ▶
People don't understand how that's how the American government actually works. Yeah. And policy is really, if you look at, and this is actually kind of interesting. I don't want to bore anybody in your audience. But you're not boring me at all. So keep going.
[0:25:42 - 0:25:55] ▶
Okay. So, um, let's, let's take, for example, um, a law that Congress decides to pass Congress says we are going to pass the law that says x, y, z. And here is an act of congressional act, right. Like I said, National Security Act of 1947 or the CI enhancement act of 2002 or the IR TPA of 2004, right. There's these, these acts that are passed by Congress. Then it's up to the executive branch to pass direct is because member.
[0:25:55 - 0:26:23] ▶
Congress's function is to make laws. It's executive branches responsibility to enforce laws. So to enforce those laws, you have things like executive orders, like executive order, E 12, triple three on United States intelligence activities. You have all these orders, maybe a national security directive and NSD that comes out. Then you have, DOD will put out their DOD directive based upon an executive order.
[0:26:23 - 0:26:46] ▶
The CIA will put out what they used to call desks, their old DCI directives, um, for kind of enforcing that executive order. And so eventually get all the way down to the subordinate levels of light, for example, the army where the army will say, okay, here's DOD directive 5240.1, we're kind of up with our army regulation 3d 112 3d 110, right. On how we the army conducts intelligence activities. And then you have all the way down to the unit level where they can't really write policy.
[0:26:46 - 0:27:15] ▶
But they can write what S O P's standing operating. Oh yeah. So all those things start cascading down as a result of Congress passing a law and people don't understand that that policies are there to basically how does my organization, my office, implement.
[0:27:15 - 0:27:34] ▶
Congress's law and the president's desire and that's why all these policies and rules and regulations are important because that's how government works. You have, you have to codify and writing for it to be real. Otherwise, it's just hearsay. So there's a whole process to do that. And if you write the wrong policy, you can find yourself in a really bad situation because policy is basically the decree on how we're going to do something as an organization. And if you have bad policy, then you can make bad decisions.
[0:27:34 - 0:28:02] ▶
Sure. Now what does that look like though to go back to people trying to revoke your security clearance. And you said like you have to come in and defend yourself without revealing exact people or groups.
[0:28:02 - 0:28:12] ▶
I need an attorney. I had Danny, Danny Shean really had to be absolutely the old shit, the old she and he did. And he, he boy, he read them the right act. He put it down. He's like, bring it on. And you know, magically about about a month later, oh, sorry. Guess what? Everything's okay. Everything's fine. You know, you still have your T.S. security clearance and what not.
[0:28:12 - 0:28:32] ▶
Basically, the Jesuit illuminati went in there. Yes. And it was a result of the admin admin terrorism that that we were I was enduring. And others, by the way, like me as well, who've come forward decide to quote unquote blow the whistle.
[0:28:32 - 0:28:47] ▶
Have also had these these type of things done to them. And so I knew that if I didn't make a stand to it, then they would steamroll me and other people. And they would make an example out of me and other people then would wouldn't want to come out and talk.
[0:28:47 - 0:28:59] ▶
So we fought it and we succeeded. What do you think the motives of the people who were trying to get that to happen? What do you think those motives? Oh, I know what they were. In fact, there was a comprehensive newspaper article on an individual.
[0:28:59 - 0:29:12] ▶
You know, my mother used to say, have nothing kind of say, don't say it at all. But anybody can look it up. There was an article done, believed by the debrief. It was called sex lies and UFOs.
[0:29:12 - 0:29:22] ▶
And in there is a very comprehensive story about how the government, particularly the Department of Defense, tried to conduct retribution on me. Yeah, that's it.
[0:29:23 - 0:29:34] ▶
As the Pentagon's director for defense intelligence and a senior executive, let's say, I know senior executive in the office of the Undersecretary Defense for Intelligence and Security OUSD.
[0:29:34 - 0:29:43] ▶
Gary Reed was in charge of all counterintelligence security and law enforcement operations within the Department of Defense, this in addition to heading the Afghanistan crisis action group, the office test with the back of an Afghan refugees, during America's withdrawal from Afghanistan, let's go down.
[0:29:43 - 0:29:56] ▶
Now an exclusive the debrief has learned that Reed was recently dismissed from his responsibilities when the US government before his outsting as director of defense intelligence. So he was high up.
[0:29:56 - 0:30:06] ▶
Reed, Reed had been the subject of a nearly two year long investigation by the debrief speaking on the condition of anonymity, multiple current and former Pentagon employees told the debrief Reed had engaged in wide ranging misconduct and corruption for years.
[0:30:06 - 0:30:19] ▶
In the past four years, the DOT's Inspector General's Office had investigated read on numerous allegations, including maintaining a sexual relationship with the subordinate employees, sexual harassment and fostering a hostile work environment.
[0:30:19 - 0:30:30] ▶
Actually, I see your name coming up right here. So in 2020, the IG office found that Reed had violated joint ethics regulations by creating an appearance of an inappropriate relationship or preferential treatment with a female subordinate and is handling of controlled classified information.
[0:30:30 - 0:30:43] ▶
I hope she was hot, dude, hope was worth it. In May 2021, Reed was named and yet another former IG complaint this time involving former director of national program special management staff at OUSD, Louise, Elizondo. All right. So I got you.
[0:30:43 - 0:30:57] ▶
So this is the guy in the middle of some things that for whatever.
[0:30:57 - 0:31:01] ▶
Tell me keep going. No, no, no, that's just what you can know. It's really about my involvement in a tip. And so this is what what caused this IG complaint.
[0:31:01 - 0:31:10] ▶
And also a lot of my headaches. This is this was the pivotal time when the Pentagon went from saying, yeah, a tip was real.
[0:31:10 - 0:31:17] ▶
So Lou ran it to all of a sudden. This guy got but hurt. And so they started changing their tune before this before this paper, this article came out where they're like, Oh, it wasn't real. And Lou had nothing to do with it. Right.
[0:31:17 - 0:31:30] ▶
Well, even though we had we had all the receipts. We had we had the goods we knew it. And so did Congress and so did everybody else. But it started there where they started lying about me.
[0:31:30 - 0:31:38] ▶
And they tried to change the narrative. And they also tried to launch an investigation against my security clearance, which fortunately I want guys.
[0:31:38 - 0:31:48] ▶
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Well, let's let's clear that up right now because this makes sense. So basically people who were enemies like maybe this guy within the Pentagon had some reason or motive to say that, you know, we want
[0:33:22 - 0:33:33] ▶
to do something else and over over the years, one of the things that's been used where people will take a lot of your words and try to overlap them or twist them apart is when it comes to the
[0:33:33 - 0:33:45] ▶
thing. So let's clear that up right now. You the way I understand it, you were brought into the program called at the ending days of what was
[0:33:45 - 0:33:55] ▶
you were not necessarily a part of awesome. Yes, that's fair to say think of awesome as a big umbrella, right? And then think of think of awesome as New Jersey and think of.
[0:33:55 - 0:34:03] ▶
I don't know how broken as being a tip it's a smaller umbrella under a much bigger umbrella.
[0:34:03 - 0:34:08] ▶
Awesome was investigating a lot of stuff. They were had the ranch skin walker ranch and the people know about and some other stuff they were doing.
[0:34:08 - 0:34:15] ▶
Not my place to really discuss because that wasn't really involved in the awesome piece.
[0:34:15 - 0:34:19] ▶
Then you had this little umbrella called a tip, which was really from my focus nuts and bolts. You know, these are these are men and women in uniform flying aircraft that are coming up close and personal to these UAP.
[0:34:19 - 0:34:30] ▶
Sometimes we have to worry about you know air flight safety issues. That was my focus. And so a tip and then when all SAP ran out in 2012, the contract a tip continued.
[0:34:30 - 0:34:41] ▶
What does that mean ran out? So there was a five year contract period. If you look at the original all SAP contract, it was for five years.
[0:34:41 - 0:34:48] ▶
So eight nine 10 11 and 12 when that funding ran out, they needed more funding or the program went away in this particular case, the program kind of went away.
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And what remained was a tip, which we continued to run at the office of the Secretary of Defense. And I ran that with my colleagues in mind and I until about 2017 late 2000.
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Excuse me. Approximately late 2017. And so that's kind of the history of of a tip. But there's been many articles since that have then uncovered a lot of stuff.
[0:35:07 - 0:35:17] ▶
Yeah. That have actually shown some malfeasance by.
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What kinds of things? Well, you know, for example, my work I had two jobs the last several years. I was part of a tip. And I was also running.
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I can say, I guess, a covert action. So I was running some very sensitive operations for the White House and the National Security Council.
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And there was there was some discussion there while we were doing what we're doing that.
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Kind of say, how do I keep myself from getting in trouble? Take your time.
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There was some concerns there that we had inside the department that there might have been some people that were not friendly to what we were doing.
[0:35:57 - 0:36:08] ▶
Even though we were asked to do it. And we were we had money and funding to do it. So in 2014 and 2013 after all SAP funding died, we requested another $10 million from then Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid.
[0:36:08 - 0:36:24] ▶
And it was approved. The problem is is that the way that it was written for that for that funding because we didn't want to say UAP and UFOs.
[0:36:25 - 0:36:33] ▶
We said ISR intelligence surveillance reconnaissance of some sort of extreme futuristic potentially technology that conduct ISR on us, right?
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And so what wound up happening is that the ISR task force, which was actually being run by a colleague of mine, assumed that money was from them for them. And so they took it.
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Yeah. They can just do that.
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Well, when they outrank you absolutely.
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So we were outvoted. And so I had to go back and have the conversation, very uncomfortable conversation with that person and say, look, that money wasn't intended for us.
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And they're like, well, too late. You know, we took the money and we spent it on a bunch of academic studies and doing this and doing this.
[0:37:11 - 0:37:16] ▶
And then you take it gun out and hold it to their head and say, you're going to give it back, right?
[0:37:16 - 0:37:20] ▶
Well, not exactly. But it was it was a very frustrating time for us.
[0:37:20 - 0:37:27] ▶
So that's, you know, people say, well, you weren't funded. Yeah, we were. And actually had other dual funding as well, sources. That's how I paid people.
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A lot of people on A-tip and contractors that were doing work for us. And we had academic studies done. But the problem is the government has been fully honest about it.
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And then you have the issue where in my job running some sensitive missions, there is a court order by the Office of Military Commission's OMC, the Department of Defense who's now handling the nine to the 9-11, you know, the 9-11-5, right?
[0:37:43 - 0:37:58] ▶
The Fab-5, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi Ben-Oshi, Ben Atash, all those those those knuckleheads.
[0:37:58 - 0:38:04] ▶
There is a court order preservation order in places that if you work any aspects of Guantanamo Bay, your emails are an everything correspondents you write has to be preserved forever because it's considered evidence in a 9-11 trial, a military commission's trial.
[0:38:04 - 0:38:22] ▶
There were actually two of those orders that were put out. So the department knew that all my files needed to be maintained and retained. And they didn't what happened is well, they said they didn't. So what happened is about a year later, there was a FOIA request through the Pentagon.
[0:38:22 - 0:38:38] ▶
What year are we in 2019 maybe 20. And the Pentagon said, oh, we deleted all loose files within a year, everything.
[0:38:38 - 0:38:48] ▶
And you had an official role quite ton of them. Yes, I it was a nice little nickname for that role too. Just saying.
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Yeah, I'm I'm sure if anybody had to listen to my audio book, they'd probably agree with that.
[0:38:58 - 0:39:03] ▶
But it's it's it's very frustrating. So the government said, no, depending on said, no, no, we don't have any of his files are all gone, they're deleted knowing that that's where they're going to find everything right showing that he took was real and everything else.
[0:39:03 - 0:39:17] ▶
And then it wasn't for another couple years later when someone said, well, I've got this email in my hand dated 2017 and it's an email between Lou and another guy talking about the transfer of a type of authorities and responsibilities.
[0:39:17 - 0:39:29] ▶
What do you say to that? Who was the other guy or you not allowed to say, you know, it's it's it's out. If you do enough digging, you'll see exactly the email correspondence. And all of a sudden, the Pentagon said, oh, yeah, that email, you know what, we did find one. And they submitted it.
[0:39:29 - 0:39:44] ▶
But when they submitted it, they redacted the name a tip. So everything where I'm talking about a tip and about the transfer of authorities from me to it to another individual.
[0:39:44 - 0:39:52] ▶
They be tacked because they knew it went against their narrative where they told people know he tip wasn't real. Well, here's an email that saying it was real, right. And by the way, another senior official in the department of defense, assuming responsibility.
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Oh, by the way, there's this conversation between none other than the secretary of defenses direct staff and Lou, Elizondo and this other guy saying, yes, right.
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So it was it was pretty, it was kind of a kind of a cathartic moment for me. Yeah. And then, you know, how does no one go down for deleting all those emails, though, by the way, I mean, that's that's a separate issue. But that's like a
[0:40:11 - 0:40:23] ▶
exactly my point. You're lying to the American people. And this is what drives me. You want breaking the law. You want damn right. It is. You want to know what what drives Lou, Elizondo. It's that. That is an abuse of power. Someone making a decision and breaking the law, because they simply don't want to get
[0:40:23 - 0:40:41] ▶
caught. So that is, you know, to guys like me who actually took an oath to defend this country from all enemies foreign domestic, when it turns out that the enemy is a bureaucracy and some middle level manager. Yeah, that's trying to lie to the American people. You know, look out, because I'm going to be all over you. I'm not quitting. And what you see is now, you know, what happened.
[0:40:41 - 0:41:05] ▶
Sounds like this is the kind of thing that unfortunately happens far too often and nothing happens. It does. And if somebody didn't understand the system like I did, they would have been steamrolled. Somebody didn't have the legal protection that I did. They would have been steamrolled. If someone didn't have the savvy and the friends inside the government that I had, they would have been steamrolled. Yeah. And that's crap. You know, that's that you have people that are trying to do their patriotic duty.
[0:41:05 - 0:41:26] ▶
And what are you doing? You're lying about them. You're trying to destroy their credibility. You know, exactly the thing the same thing that people are accusing the government of doing. And you're actually doing it.
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In front of everybody for everybody to see you're doing it unapologetically.
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You know, hmm. So anyways, that's that's kind of a long winded answer. No, no, it's it's towards stuff. It's important for context because it unfortunately, a lot of it then wraps into your stories. We see there's obviously some attacks that come against you. We know that online.
[0:41:39 - 0:41:55] ▶
It's like there's team Lou and team anti-Lou and all that. And you know, a lot of it is a team's man. I wish we were just all one team. It's very stupid.
[0:41:55 - 0:42:02] ▶
But you are, I'll say this off camera as well, whenever any names come up, and I'm I won't send you them at the moment. But whenever any names that were anywhere near a tip or I have talked about it before or would be in the know in the government in some way, surrounding these programs.
[0:42:02 - 0:42:20] ▶
Like at least with me, you've always just been nothing but complimentary of people never said a bad word about anybody.
[0:42:20 - 0:42:27] ▶
And yet there seems to be an and I hate that this happens, but we got to address it just because it's unfortunately this topic exists online. There seems to be a fuck ton of like high school drama that happens among some of these people where on the one hand.
[0:42:27 - 0:42:42] ▶
Some of you will be like friends. And then on the other hand, you will.
[0:42:43 - 0:42:47] ▶
Some of those people will then just throw shit into the fire. I undermine and now I am going to give a name example. There's some hilarious shit like literally can't make this up.
[0:42:47 - 0:42:56] ▶
About like discord messages involving J Stratton's wife because he's got like a book coming out and J is a guy that you've worked within the past. You've been complimentary of him off air with me before highly intelligent.
[0:42:56 - 0:43:08] ▶
But it seems like there is now like this little high school fucking lunch fight or middle school lunch fight that's going on where he were someone's trying to say no I did that. And he didn't do this.
[0:43:08 - 0:43:18] ▶
And they're trying to sell books out of it. Now you obviously wrote a book as well. So let's be fair there. But what do you think that is because to me part of it could look like it's almost a distraction. Like this is a part of some, you know, not to paint you as like some deep state guy or whatever.
[0:43:18 - 0:43:35] ▶
But this could be your giant stage that y'all are playing in laughing and we got to sit here and watch and argue about it in Twitter spaces.
[0:43:35 - 0:43:40] ▶
Well, I'll tell you that my book was reviewed by several people inside a tip before is published. It was also a lot of people were interviewed directly for it.
[0:43:41 - 0:43:50] ▶
So it was there accounts that are in the book. And I don't want to look. I'm not here to plug a book right. I feel slimy doing that. That's not my motivation for being here. But you brought it up.
[0:43:50 - 0:44:00] ▶
So I'm not really worried about that as far as the childhood drama. You know, it is. It's like it's like a middle school, not even high school middle school, you know, lunch room.
[0:44:00 - 0:44:09] ▶
I try not to be distracted by that. There's a lot of really good people out there.
[0:44:10 - 0:44:14] ▶
You know, I I don't know what motivates people. I'm not a trained psychologist.
[0:44:15 - 0:44:21] ▶
I hope for whoever out there has some sort of bad feelings towards me. I hope to find their peace at whatever, whatever, however they have to do that. If it takes me, you know, putting my arm in their shoulder and be like, hey, it's okay. We're one team, one team, one fight.
[0:44:23 - 0:44:38] ▶
I don't know. I mean, maybe you know better than I do, right? I mean, let's let's look at it. The social media world we live in today, you know, the advantages. You allow everyone to have a voice.
[0:44:39 - 0:44:52] ▶
But when you allow everybody to have a voice, you mean that means anybody has a voice. Right. And some of those people are motivated by personal agendas.
[0:44:52 - 0:45:02] ▶
And no, I can't believe that. Yeah. So I try my best.
[0:45:03 - 0:45:08] ▶
To not engage in that type of non-constructive conversation. Like I said before, my mother used to say if I have nothing nice to say about somebody, don't say it at all.
[0:45:09 - 0:45:19] ▶
But with people you work with, can't you call up like a J and be like, what the fuck, bro? Like, off air, not on a camera or anything. Like, isn't there like a human element to this too?
[0:45:19 - 0:45:28] ▶
I think it's unfair just to, you know, to call one person out. Yeah, it's it's it's there's other people. There's and it's and it's human dynamics. Right. There's things that you and I can agree on.
[0:45:29 - 0:45:38] ▶
99% of the time, but then there's one hot button issue where maybe we don't, right? And and maybe people's emotions and and whatnot get the best of them. I don't know.
[0:45:38 - 0:45:48] ▶
You know, Jay's a very honorable man. He has done great things for his nation. Very good things for his nation. I personally witnessed his work ethic. He was very, very good both in A tip and all set.
[0:45:49 - 0:46:00] ▶
Both his role in which specifically, remember, he became the UAP task force director. So after a tip, he became he fleeted up and became the UAP task force director, which by the way, did some really good stuff. I mean, really, really good stuff that hopefully he'll talk about in his book. But
[0:46:00 - 0:46:15] ▶
within within a tip. Well, he was one of the founders of all set, believe it or not, him and Lakatsky him and Lakatsky and a few others and big.
[0:46:17 - 0:46:24] ▶
Lakatsky is the guy that brought you in, right? Yes. Well, actually, it was believing it was Jane another person and Lakatsky was was a director at the time of all set.
[0:46:24 - 0:46:32] ▶
And so, so Jay was from, you know, he was one of the guys who actually built all set. So he deserves a tremendous amount of credit for that. Folks like Bigelow and folks like Eric Davis, how put off. I mean, just absolute giants in our world.
[0:46:34 - 0:46:50] ▶
Yeah, I don't know. I mean, bring bring some in here and ask him. I don't know. I can't answer for them. I can tell you folks like Chris Melon also did a tremendous amount of work behind the scenes.
[0:46:50 - 0:47:03] ▶
People don't realize how much credit he deserves. There's other individuals, the pilots, multiple pilots, many, many that we discussed and had conversations with eyewitnesses and radar operators. So as far as the
[0:47:04 - 0:47:17] ▶
middle school drama, man, I don't get involved. It's not helpful. And all it does is create a distraction. You know, you don't want your president, vice president, you know, getting in a dumb tit for tap. You just for sure.
[0:47:17 - 0:47:32] ▶
Not productive. I think it's totally unproductive because I think we should all be interested in the same type of answers here, which is what the fuck is going on. And what can the government say about it? And what do we, what do we deserve as like a human right to know?
[0:47:32 - 0:47:44] ▶
That's what it is. Right. I mean, look, bottom line is we're part of a program that discovered some pretty interesting stuff. And we think the American people have a right to know. That's that's the issue. You know, all this other stuff is people trying to create drama and distractions and clicks and likes. And I'm going to go ahead and create artificial drama. So therefore people will click on mine. And you know, it's here's the irony. Here's the irony.
[0:47:44 - 0:48:04] ▶
Julian, the accused someone of being a grifter. And yet they're actually grifting on accusing someone else of being a grifter, meaning if I call you a grifter and I start writing posts of your grifter. And now people are clicking and liking mine. And now I'm getting advertisement revenue for it. I'm the one actually grifting, right off of you by accusing you as being a grifter. And that's the irony or those that are accusing folks, some folks of being of being grifters are themselves the biggest grifters of all.
[0:48:04 - 0:48:33] ▶
And that irony they don't see and people don't realize that. And it's it's
[0:48:33 - 0:48:38] ▶
Sometimes a little disappointing that you know, we don't have people that are a little bit more critical thinkers.
[0:48:39 - 0:48:44] ▶
But then again, when everybody has a voice on social media, anybody has a voice. And so we have to be
[0:48:45 - 0:48:50] ▶
As much as we might not like it or agree with it, we have to be respectful of that. Meaning everybody gets a vote. Everybody has has an opinion. And my only concern is,
[0:48:52 - 0:48:59] ▶
as long as those opinions aren't opinions and motivated simply for clicks and likes, I'm okay with that.
[0:48:59 - 0:49:06] ▶
But when you create manufacturer artificial drama that doesn't exist for the sole purposes of just creating trauma and drama, you know,
[0:49:06 - 0:49:16] ▶
I think I think we can do better. I think we deserve better. And by the way, look mainstream media is no better sometimes.
[0:49:17 - 0:49:23] ▶
You know, they thrive off of off of drama. That's how you get that's how you get advertisers, right?
[0:49:23 - 0:49:29] ▶
It's a business. I remember in my school, we had a person from a major network come over and explain to us.
[0:49:29 - 0:49:34] ▶
This was by the way of the biggest at the time explaining, you know, hey, look, don't forget,
[0:49:34 - 0:49:38] ▶
media is a business. We get paid by advertisers to provide content. We are content providers.
[0:49:38 - 0:49:44] ▶
And in some cases can be content manufacturers, right? Holy crap. Now, right?
[0:49:45 - 0:49:49] ▶
And by Pfizer, you know, that's right. So we need to recognize that.
[0:49:49 - 0:49:55] ▶
Not bad. We live in a capitalistic society, but we just need to be cognizant of that, right?
[0:49:55 - 0:49:59] ▶
And then be able to formulate our own opinions, at least recognizing that fact.
[0:49:59 - 0:50:04] ▶
Yeah. I think sometimes the whole grifter argument turns into like that Spider-Man meme, where all the Spider-Man's are like pointing at each other.
[0:50:04 - 0:50:11] ▶
Because it is just like if you're going to define grifters, anyone who makes money on anything that has to do with something that they could be interested in or have some level of expertise in them,
[0:50:12 - 0:50:22] ▶
fucking everyone's a grifter. But the actual definition is supposed to be, you know, more towards people who really don't know anything about some particular whatever and see it as an opportunity based on where there's interest.
[0:50:22 - 0:50:34] ▶
To capitalize, right? Yeah. Be a Charlotteson or whatever. But, you know, there's where people get
[0:50:34 - 0:50:41] ▶
more interested in the nitty gritty with the drama around this one is that all you guys were talking about, you're all government involved.
[0:50:41 - 0:50:48] ▶
So already people's like, you know, there's spidey senses are going off and going, why are they telling us this stuff?
[0:50:48 - 0:50:55] ▶
You do see how that could be.
[0:50:55 - 0:50:57] ▶
I can understand that. Like I said, I'm not, I don't.
[0:50:57 - 0:51:01] ▶
I take a playbook from a colleague of mine, Gary Nolan, Dr. Gary Nolan.
[0:51:02 - 0:51:06] ▶
He says, block early and block often.
[0:51:07 - 0:51:09] ▶
So I don't necessarily see a lot of that hate because my wife does a good job of blocking agent provocateurs, people that are just trying to, you know, create drama.
[0:51:10 - 0:51:19] ▶
And I prefer not to see that simply because it's not productive.
[0:51:20 - 0:51:24] ▶
I'm not asking people to agree with me. If you disagree with me, that's great. We can have a great conversation about that. Just, just be respectful. Yeah.
[0:51:24 - 0:51:31] ▶
Stop, stop going out there and using, you know, four letter obscenities to describe your hatred for something.
[0:51:31 - 0:51:37] ▶
Speak like an adult, right? And then we can have an adult conversation. But if you're just going to be like a four year old pet, she'll look child and throw a temper tantrum.
[0:51:38 - 0:51:44] ▶
I don't have time for that. I don't have the bandwidth for it. I got way too many fish to fry.
[0:51:44 - 0:51:48] ▶
So to focus on it is counterproductive because there's only so many hours in the day, right? And so I can choose what I decide to apply my time towards.
[0:51:49 - 0:51:56] ▶
I was telling you this last night off air, but it's relevant to bring up right now, you know, regarding guys like you who worked in like the intel side of government for 20 plus years, your job was to make everything a secret. Yeah, you literally couldn't even go home and tell your wife. That's right. That's right.
[0:51:56 - 0:52:13] ▶
And so now you come out and maybe it's maybe you're still working for the government. Maybe you're still doing a little something with them. But assuming you're not even for a second and you're coming out and now your job is to be public and say,
[0:52:13 - 0:52:25] ▶
you know, reveal information about what's going on. And now you're on social media, you you are going from knowing one thing your whole life secrecy and no one even knows that I exist.
[0:52:25 - 0:52:35] ▶
To now not only do I exist and I'm on TV and everyone knows my name and they're talking about what I'm doing.
[0:52:36 - 0:52:40] ▶
But now all the people can come at me because I exist. And in a way, it's almost like you're ripping off this insane bandaid.
[0:52:40 - 0:52:48] ▶
Okay, you're not helping with a paranoia. Well, I'm just saying like you know, like you're right. Like I look at you. And I mean, no offense.
[0:52:48 - 0:52:54] ▶
But it's almost like you're coming from that world of darkness. And now you're like in the light. And it's like being a 14 year old girl all over again, freaked out at every.
[0:52:54 - 0:53:03] ▶
It's one of these is why live in Wyoming where I live. I'm on the gay man. Truth be told. I mean, it's it's I'm a creature. The shadows. I spent my entire life.
[0:53:06 - 0:53:14] ▶
In fact, your life could depend on it, right? And an enmity. And now all of a sudden, you know, I tell people like, what's it like to go from that life to to a public life?
[0:53:14 - 0:53:22] ▶
I said, for me, it's very some people thrive off. Somebody beloved it. It for me, it's
[0:53:23 - 0:53:28] ▶
it's traumatic. It's like it's like imagine being an albino cave new living in an albino cave newt.
[0:53:30 - 0:53:38] ▶
Pull it out with that is a lousy and albino cave newt. Yes.
[0:53:38 - 0:53:42] ▶
There are they've gone blind because they've been living their life in the back recesses of caves.
[0:53:43 - 0:53:48] ▶
And I often tell people if you want to know what it's like, imagine being an albino cave newt and all of a sudden, a
[0:53:48 - 0:53:56] ▶
a bunch of school children come in for a field trip. All of a sudden, one puck, she right out of the your comfortable little cave.
[0:53:56 - 0:54:02] ▶
And now is poking at you with all the other kids under the hot desert sun.
[0:54:02 - 0:54:06] ▶
That's what it's like. Yeah. Oh, there you go. Yeah.
[0:54:07 - 0:54:10] ▶
And so this is an animal, not a person. No, no.
[0:54:10 - 0:54:13] ▶
I'm like picture in the guy in the defense. She code. Come on. Go no, so told no, no, no, it's a little it's a little
[0:54:15 - 0:54:21] ▶
Okay, I got a little amphibian that lives kind of cute. Well, yeah, unless you're poking at him, then he probably doesn't like very much.
[0:54:23 - 0:54:30] ▶
Okay. But yeah, I mean, that's kind of what it feels like.
[0:54:30 - 0:54:34] ▶
You know, it I I don't know how else to explain it.
[0:54:35 - 0:54:39] ▶
You know, I'm not. I grew up as a kid very, I would consider myself an introvert. Everybody says, no, you're an extrovert.
[0:54:41 - 0:54:47] ▶
Lou, no, not. I'm actually very introverted. That doesn't surprise me. Yeah, I am very introverted.
[0:54:47 - 0:54:51] ▶
You know, whenever the guys were going out and going to the sports bars and whatnot, I was at home, you know, inventing stuff,
[0:54:52 - 0:54:58] ▶
but providing patents. That's that's writing patents. Yeah. What kind of patents?
[0:54:58 - 0:55:03] ▶
I've, yeah, I, I hate talking about myself, man. I'm just well, that's why I'm giving you an example. I have a few patents.
[0:55:03 - 0:55:10] ▶
I am, it's maritime industry. I just my wife says I'm like a like a puppy. If I get bored, I get destructive.
[0:55:10 - 0:55:18] ▶
And I pee on the furniture and tear up the sofa. So makes a maritime patents.
[0:55:18 - 0:55:22] ▶
So I, I try to keep myself busy, you know, but your head, I've just like cocaine submarines. Is that where you don't?
[0:55:22 - 0:55:28] ▶
No, if you type in my name, you'll, you'll, you'll see some of the patents. Just type in my name and type in patent and pull up.
[0:55:30 - 0:55:35] ▶
But, you know, I, I never did these patents to make money or to sell them. Just, I don't know, just, I was interested.
[0:55:35 - 0:55:43] ▶
I like seeing how things work, right? Probably why I got into intelligence to begin with. So, no shit.
[0:55:43 - 0:55:50] ▶
Patents by inventor, Louis Daniel, Elizondo March 24, 2014 interchangeable superstructures and holes for ocean going vessels.
[0:55:50 - 0:55:59] ▶
All right. Can we take that out of Japanese?
[0:55:59 - 0:56:01] ▶
Well, yeah. You don't really want to go there. Do you?
[0:56:03 - 0:56:07] ▶
I do want to hear about that. I got a, we're down this.
[0:56:07 - 0:56:10] ▶
Yeah, your audience is good. Okay. Now, there's like, fucking 20.
[0:56:10 - 0:56:15] ▶
Yeah, I know. I, I get bored. God. Not enough going on. Aquantanamo.
[0:56:16 - 0:56:21] ▶
You're sitting around me like, shut up, KSM. I'm, I'm building a fucking superstructure here.
[0:56:21 - 0:56:26] ▶
This is embarrassing. I'm sorry.
[0:56:26 - 0:56:28] ▶
You know, look, I, I improve positive. You don't have to be smart to be an inventor. Okay.
[0:56:30 - 0:56:34] ▶
And anybody can be an inventor. Trust me.
[0:56:34 - 0:56:36] ▶
Yeah, you just, you know, I, I find things interesting. Okay. So.
[0:56:38 - 0:56:42] ▶
All right. Louis, Elizondo, the patent king.
[0:56:42 - 0:56:44] ▶
Learn something new every day. So anyway, we've been going down some really good tangents here.
[0:56:45 - 0:56:49] ▶
It's good to get clarity on a lot of that though. Because obviously, you know, whether we like it or not,
[0:56:49 - 0:56:53] ▶
people talk about this stuff. Sure. It's important. The only other thing I can think of there,
[0:56:53 - 0:56:57] ▶
I think you've pretty much addressed everything, which, you know, people will still criticize.
[0:56:57 - 0:57:00] ▶
But I thought that was pretty good. The only other thing that some people try to claim that I've never seen
[0:57:00 - 0:57:06] ▶
evidence for is the Harry Reid letter. They try to say like Harry Reid just signed it. He didn't write it
[0:57:06 - 0:57:12] ▶
or whatever. Where did that come from? It came from him. I mean, I never even talked to him.
[0:57:12 - 0:57:17] ▶
Apparently, there was a news reporter at Gatti Schwartz, who was doing an article and knew that,
[0:57:17 - 0:57:23] ▶
I guess, Pentagon was up to some shenanigans and reached out to him. And he on his own volition,
[0:57:23 - 0:57:28] ▶
that I had nothing. I didn't even know. It's surprised like everybody else. I'm like, wow.
[0:57:28 - 0:57:31] ▶
Because I never wanted to ask the boss because I thought, you know, it'd be an appropriate.
[0:57:31 - 0:57:34] ▶
It's like, look, you know, he's got enough on his plate. And, you know, he doesn't need to be thrown
[0:57:34 - 0:57:37] ▶
into the mix of this crap. And all of a sudden, Gatti's like, here it is. Wow. I was like, holy crap.
[0:57:37 - 0:57:42] ▶
But, you know, I can show you something else if you really want to see it, but you can't,
[0:57:42 - 0:57:46] ▶
you got to promise me, I'll show it to you. Can't put it on there.
[0:57:47 - 0:57:50] ▶
You can't put on there, but I have a way to go. I've got something for you. You want to see?
[0:57:50 - 0:57:54] ▶
Yeah. Yeah. Let's get this intermission while you see it. I will know the straight to my face
[0:57:54 - 0:58:00] ▶
and not to the camera. Is this like, am I going to, can you tell people what I'm looking at?
[0:58:00 - 0:58:05] ▶
I'd rather not. I'd just rather you. So you are aware of the Harry Reid memo, right? So that's it.
[0:58:05 - 0:58:10] ▶
I'm so curious. John Kury-Occus, the last guy that did this and he held up, he held up like a body
[0:58:12 - 0:58:17] ▶
of like KSM or Abu Zubatem. I'm sorry. On the floor. Can't say what this is. Okay. Oh wow.
[0:58:17 - 0:58:29] ▶
Oh wow. Imagine if I released that. A lot of tea right here. That is not what I was expecting to see.
[0:58:32 - 0:58:40] ▶
You just blew balled the entire internet. That is, if whatever you're thinking, I just saw it is not
[0:58:42 - 0:58:51] ▶
what you're thinking. I'll put it that way. But you can see why. Yes. I can now it makes sense. Whoa.
[0:58:51 - 0:58:56] ▶
Yeah. They got the holsters out for you, man. Sometimes you just have to walk the high road.
[0:58:56 - 0:59:04] ▶
And it's good for you. And you know, there have been times I could, I could settle a discussion
[0:59:05 - 0:59:10] ▶
very quickly if I wanted to, but it would be at the cost of other individuals. And I'm not a sellout.
[0:59:10 - 0:59:14] ▶
Never happened. Never, never, ever. I will never throw anybody under the bus to protect my own skin.
[0:59:14 - 0:59:20] ▶
Never have, never will. See, I can't ask a follow up question on that because we'll get too close to that.
[0:59:20 - 0:59:26] ▶
But off air, I'm going to ask you about that. Good for you. I mean, that's, that would be the,
[0:59:26 - 0:59:31] ▶
what do you call it? Like the canary and the coal mine, if you will. Something like that.
[0:59:32 - 0:59:36] ▶
For sure. Okay. All right. Yeah. Sorry, everyone. That's just, that is what it is. But I saw what I saw.
[0:59:37 - 0:59:42] ▶
Anyway, so we started this off where we were talking about Tozi Gabbard and DNI position,
[0:59:42 - 0:59:47] ▶
what they have to do. And we were talking about the new administration and some of them like
[0:59:48 - 0:59:52] ▶
taking this whole written sky thing seriously. But going back to the last administration,
[0:59:52 - 0:59:56] ▶
because obviously you've been involved publicly with discussing all this stuff since like 2017.
[0:59:56 - 1:00:01] ▶
You've lived through the first Trump administration and the Biden administration.
[1:00:01 - 1:00:05] ▶
Was there any real communication with the Biden administration on this?
[1:00:05 - 1:00:09] ▶
Were there, was there anyone in the national security council didn't even want to bring it up to him?
[1:00:09 - 1:00:13] ▶
Really? Yeah, we had, you know, to protect, that's it was very, very senior individual. That was
[1:00:13 - 1:00:19] ▶
part of the Obama administration. I won't say who, because I don't have a permission to say it.
[1:00:19 - 1:00:22] ▶
And he wound up getting a position with the Biden administration in a very specific capacity.
[1:00:23 - 1:00:29] ▶
And he was going to champion this cause up at the national security council, a long story short.
[1:00:29 - 1:00:35] ▶
National security council did not want to have this conversation at all. And in fact,
[1:00:35 - 1:00:39] ▶
said, we're not even going to bring it up to the president. Now, maybe there's reasons for that.
[1:00:40 - 1:00:43] ▶
Okay, maybe there's medical reasons, maybe there's cognitive reasons, maybe there's operational
[1:00:44 - 1:00:50] ▶
functional reason. I don't know. But the bottom line is you're not going to tell the president,
[1:00:50 - 1:00:54] ▶
you are just as guilty, you are guilty of the exact problem we've been saying, that the president
[1:00:54 - 1:00:58] ▶
is not being informed of certain programs. And you are part of that problem. You, you just,
[1:00:58 - 1:01:04] ▶
you, you on the national security council are not telling the boss what's going on. Who the hell are you?
[1:01:05 - 1:01:10] ▶
You're not the president, you know, that's, that's, wait a minute. If you're making those decisions
[1:01:11 - 1:01:16] ▶
on behalf of the president and you don't have that authority, dude, don't look now, but you got problems.
[1:01:16 - 1:01:22] ▶
Oh, yeah. Big problems, right? I mean, that's treason. That's, that's, that's how
[1:01:22 - 1:01:28] ▶
who's start? Kude Taz, when, when people in governments start making unilateral decisions outside
[1:01:28 - 1:01:34] ▶
of, of, of legal avenues? You mean like Kennedy? I'm just saying, look, man, it's, it, anybody in
[1:01:34 - 1:01:42] ▶
government, you, we all have an oath, we all take an oath to serve our country and to support and
[1:01:42 - 1:01:48] ▶
defend the constitution and whatnot. No one has the right to not tell the president something.
[1:01:48 - 1:01:55] ▶
No one has a head, a chief executive of our nation, right? For someone to make a unilateral
[1:01:55 - 1:02:02] ▶
decision, say, I have this national security issue, but I'm not going to form the president.
[1:02:02 - 1:02:05] ▶
That's a problem. That's, I completely agree. That's criminal. I completely agree with you. Not
[1:02:05 - 1:02:10] ▶
one bar of that is wrong. But do you not see why people like me and probably everyone listening
[1:02:10 - 1:02:15] ▶
would assume that still happens all the fucking time? It does, that's exactly why we need good people
[1:02:15 - 1:02:19] ▶
in government. Exactly. Again, politics aside, you need people that are, that are willing
[1:02:19 - 1:02:25] ▶
to have, to speak truth to power. That is your job. And if you don't want to do that, or you can't
[1:02:25 - 1:02:30] ▶
do that, or you're afraid to do that, get the hell out of there, do something else. All right,
[1:02:30 - 1:02:33] ▶
let's, let's look at this the other way though, less sinisterly. Okay. You had, you had given the
[1:02:33 - 1:02:38] ▶
example earlier when you were talking about DNI about all the possible things that you'd have to
[1:02:38 - 1:02:42] ▶
read them in on, it's not even possible to do, you know, on a read, meaning before you even go
[1:02:42 - 1:02:47] ▶
to do something, your job with whatever agency you're with or whatever team you're on within that
[1:02:47 - 1:02:52] ▶
agency to brief on this one thing, you already have to take, I don't know, just use round numbers,
[1:02:52 - 1:02:56] ▶
a thousand things and get it down to the top four. Right. Maybe even without anything sinister,
[1:02:56 - 1:03:02] ▶
there were more important things in the 996 things that you eliminated. Sure.
[1:03:02 - 1:03:07] ▶
Didn't put in the top four just human error. Sure. And then it looks like you're not reading in
[1:03:07 - 1:03:12] ▶
whoever it is, the president's. But if it's a once, you know, a one Zinedine Tuzzi, I got it. But
[1:03:12 - 1:03:17] ▶
when a week after week after week, look, you got Chinese Spiabalones, right? Going over,
[1:03:17 - 1:03:20] ▶
wafting over North American, you're telling people there's nothing to worry about. You have drones
[1:03:20 - 1:03:24] ▶
that have been encountered all over the place, even over politicians houses and their responses,
[1:03:24 - 1:03:28] ▶
no, they're, we don't know what they are, but they're legal. What? What? Yeah. You know,
[1:03:29 - 1:03:32] ▶
it's there is, there's a fundamental problem when you have over and over again, the same thing.
[1:03:34 - 1:03:38] ▶
Will you have a priority? If you start having something happening over and over and over again,
[1:03:38 - 1:03:41] ▶
that all of us now rise to the top of the list. I can understand if you're number 480 in priorities
[1:03:41 - 1:03:46] ▶
and you're only briefing the top 10 priorities. But over time, you keep having this happen,
[1:03:46 - 1:03:50] ▶
you start going up 100% right? And so how are you not having the conversation? I don't understand
[1:03:50 - 1:03:56] ▶
and then trying to ignore it on top of that. It's how the nothing you see here, folks.
[1:03:56 - 1:04:00] ▶
That's egregious. You already have elected members of Congress having these things,
[1:04:02 - 1:04:06] ▶
they have governors of states saying, look, it's over my house, right? You have the military
[1:04:06 - 1:04:11] ▶
closing down military bases. You don't close out a military base or something's being lawfully flown
[1:04:11 - 1:04:16] ▶
over your airspace. It's complete BS and it's very frustrating to see. And this is why
[1:04:17 - 1:04:23] ▶
I remain much more optimistic with this administration on their stance on UAP disclosure and
[1:04:23 - 1:04:29] ▶
and drone disclosure and transparency. Because look, America deserves to know the truth. Absolutely.
[1:04:29 - 1:04:33] ▶
You know, stop, stop treating us like children, even though some of you behave like children.
[1:04:33 - 1:04:38] ▶
There's a responsibility to inform the American people about what's going on.
[1:04:40 - 1:04:44] ▶
And I don't believe it's in anyone's best interest in government to keep that information sequestered
[1:04:45 - 1:04:53] ▶
from the American people. I agree with you. Back on, I believe it was Friday 13th, Friday, December 13th,
[1:04:53 - 1:04:59] ▶
when this was really suddenly like, whoa, what the fuck is going on? Because we live here in
[1:04:59 - 1:05:02] ▶
Jersey and all this stuff was above. I'm going to have a lousy chime in in a minute because he lives
[1:05:02 - 1:05:06] ▶
out where it was really happening. But like, I got a bunch of guys on the phone. Unfortunately,
[1:05:06 - 1:05:11] ▶
a lot of them were off record completely understanding why. Yeah, yeah, it's the can't come on the
[1:05:11 - 1:05:16] ▶
podcast, but I've been connected to and I had multiple, I think it was three different people who
[1:05:16 - 1:05:22] ▶
don't work together in different phases. Tell me some version of like the same thing. I'm not
[1:05:23 - 1:05:28] ▶
going to say exactly what that was. But the common theme across them and then the other three or
[1:05:28 - 1:05:33] ▶
four people I talked to outside them was that this turned into something. It's going to be fine,
[1:05:33 - 1:05:39] ▶
but the fact that it even got here is disgrace because this could have been nipped in the body.
[1:05:40 - 1:05:45] ▶
Absolutely. Absolutely. Absolutely. So that's an online with what you ask. And the fact that for two
[1:05:45 - 1:05:51] ▶
months, we had no idea what the hell is going on. And then finally, come on, Bill, well, no, but it's
[1:05:51 - 1:05:57] ▶
not not a threat. Just made the problem even worse, right? Then people say, all right, dude, you
[1:05:57 - 1:06:02] ▶
know, this is how can you say that? How can you say something's not a threat? And yet still say,
[1:06:02 - 1:06:06] ▶
we have no idea it's origin to capabilities and who's behind. I mean, that is the last thing
[1:06:06 - 1:06:12] ▶
you'd want to do as a government to try to instill faith and confidence. 100%.
[1:06:12 - 1:06:17] ▶
Now, I do want to bring in Alessie here because like I said, he lives out in Bedminster. So
[1:06:18 - 1:06:22] ▶
Alessie's got a great YouTube channel called his name, Alessie Alamon. And you did, let's make
[1:06:22 - 1:06:27] ▶
sure we put the link to it down below. You did a one hour investigation video. The featured James
[1:06:27 - 1:06:31] ▶
Fox, Jim Deoreo. And actually, in this case, more importantly, people on the ground there who
[1:06:31 - 1:06:37] ▶
had witnessed this. And why don't you tell people like what they were saying? Yeah. So I was a
[1:06:37 - 1:06:43] ▶
witness. And then there was like at least 10 to 15 people I spoke to a lot who didn't want to go
[1:06:43 - 1:06:49] ▶
on camera that just saw what they saw. And when it started happening after Thanksgiving, when most
[1:06:49 - 1:06:56] ▶
people started seeing these things, everyone in like the ring app and neighborhood app was like,
[1:06:56 - 1:07:00] ▶
are you guys seeing this? Are you seeing this? And you would look up and a lot of people I will say
[1:07:00 - 1:07:05] ▶
had no idea what planes look like for the most part. Like there were so many that were literally
[1:07:05 - 1:07:10] ▶
planes. And it was like, that is a plane going to this app. You can see the play coming across.
[1:07:10 - 1:07:14] ▶
That's a 737 to LaGuardia. Exactly. Like almost 90% of them were like that. But then you definitely
[1:07:14 - 1:07:21] ▶
had images and videos of drones. And they how low would they be? Oh, very low. Like
[1:07:21 - 1:07:25] ▶
less than a hundred feet. Like, yeah, that's what I'm saying. You can see them very low. And from what
[1:07:26 - 1:07:32] ▶
I saw the few times I saw them, it was like, there was two types. There was the DG prong ones that
[1:07:32 - 1:07:38] ▶
aren't the DG that people think, but they were for prong. And they were making a noise, a slight buzz.
[1:07:38 - 1:07:44] ▶
But you could see they were going slow enough where you're like, that's out of plane. A plane is
[1:07:44 - 1:07:48] ▶
going to go way faster. And you have to have lift. You have to have a certain velocity in order to
[1:07:48 - 1:07:53] ▶
maintain lift or you crash. Exactly. Exactly. And there was one witness, this one lady who had
[1:07:53 - 1:07:58] ▶
the best account where she was about five minutes from Trump's golf course. And she said every night
[1:07:58 - 1:08:04] ▶
for two weeks, she would see the same pattern of the drones showing up in the same place going
[1:08:04 - 1:08:10] ▶
into pattern where it's like one. And then they said a minute, half later, another one would show up
[1:08:10 - 1:08:14] ▶
right when it hit dark. And she would see this pattern. And she captured, she showed me the video.
[1:08:14 - 1:08:18] ▶
They call that a racetrack. Yeah. A racetrack? Racetrack pattern. Yeah. And in fact, if you,
[1:08:19 - 1:08:23] ▶
now, I'll add something here. If you get on Google and type in mysterious drones and type in
[1:08:23 - 1:08:30] ▶
Nebraska or Colorado 2019, look what pops up. Interesting. Because she also had it down to the
[1:08:30 - 1:08:37] ▶
second, right? Yeah. It was. It was new. We've been 88 seconds or something. Yeah. She was
[1:08:37 - 1:08:42] ▶
timing. People think this is new. We've been dealing with this. There you go. 2020 to the
[1:08:42 - 1:08:46] ▶
son of a bitch. Yeah. So in 1920 Colorado drone sightings. And it's been local law enforcement
[1:08:47 - 1:08:53] ▶
was involved. FBI was involved. Can I read this, Lou, for people to have? It's the
[1:08:53 - 1:08:57] ▶
competing. Yeah. I mean, I fire you. I would probably go ahead and look at actually a news media.
[1:08:57 - 1:09:01] ▶
This is Wikipedia, which tends to be sometimes water. Good man. You mean Wikipedia?
[1:09:01 - 1:09:07] ▶
Swarm by the CIA? Is that what we're saying? Sometimes worse.
[1:09:07 - 1:09:11] ▶
So all right, go back a lesson because there was an article right there. I like that our
[1:09:12 - 1:09:16] ▶
intel guys telling us not to go on. What a guardian. All right. A tack of the drones. Yeah,
[1:09:16 - 1:09:20] ▶
or even war zone. Whatever. This, you know, this is a lot of people. Okay. So this is from July 16th,
[1:09:20 - 1:09:26] ▶
2020. What did the headlines say, Lussi? Newly released FAA documents. Give
[1:09:26 - 1:09:30] ▶
I'm pressing and look into Colorado drone swarm mystery. Now let's go down. Perfect.
[1:09:30 - 1:09:34] ▶
All right. So as covered in previous reports by the war zone law enforcement agencies in
[1:09:35 - 1:09:39] ▶
numeral rural counties in eastern Colorado and adjacent areas into Brasca and Kansas. This was
[1:09:39 - 1:09:44] ▶
widespread. Okay. Received an influx of reports of large drones flying in formations at night
[1:09:44 - 1:09:49] ▶
for a period of several weeks during December 2019 and early January 2020. Isn't that interesting?
[1:09:49 - 1:09:54] ▶
Yeah. Many law enforcement personnel were among the reporting witnesses in short order. The mystery
[1:09:54 - 1:09:59] ▶
drone wave also elicited serious expressions to concern from at least two US senators and attention
[1:09:59 - 1:10:04] ▶
from Colorado's governor and state public safety agency. The activity soon drew the attention
[1:10:04 - 1:10:09] ▶
of regional and later later national news media as well. I don't really remember that though.
[1:10:09 - 1:10:13] ▶
So it didn't get that loud. Oh, it did. Oh, it's a lullia. It did. I mean, it was 2019. A lot of people,
[1:10:13 - 1:10:18] ▶
you know, forget what happened yesterday. Yeah. It was all over the. It was all over the place.
[1:10:18 - 1:10:25] ▶
And you can see they had trained observers law enforcement, even the FBI was involved and still
[1:10:25 - 1:10:30] ▶
came up being go have no idea what what it was. Lussi, we're a lot of these people reporting the
[1:10:30 - 1:10:35] ▶
drones as being in the range of SUV size. Yeah. So the one I saw and what these people saw,
[1:10:35 - 1:10:43] ▶
they were s u they were massive. Like you looked at the scene, you're like that thing if it fell
[1:10:43 - 1:10:47] ▶
out of the sky and you know, well, you could comment however you want about this. But when people say
[1:10:47 - 1:10:52] ▶
and shooting them down, I understand the point of view where it's like if they shot it down,
[1:10:52 - 1:10:55] ▶
this thing could like crush someone. They could kill multiple people. They had the same setting to
[1:10:55 - 1:11:00] ▶
those large drones in this and they were actually kicking off smaller drones. So think about that
[1:11:00 - 1:11:05] ▶
capability for a minute, right? And there were there were autonomously controlled flying in a very
[1:11:05 - 1:11:09] ▶
specific grid pattern. As you see here, it says here, however, to to conclude that there is high
[1:11:09 - 1:11:16] ▶
confidence, these are not covert military activities. This is coming from senior FAA officials, right?
[1:11:16 - 1:11:23] ▶
So all right, then who's is it? And who's got the money and the resources and logistics to coordinate
[1:11:23 - 1:11:27] ▶
something like this where you have drones that frankly at the time were straight to the art
[1:11:27 - 1:11:33] ▶
and then you have loiter capability. Let's let's take these let's take, you know what, let's pretend
[1:11:33 - 1:11:37] ▶
these glasses are a drone. Okay. If and you guys, you know, being in the YouTube generation, what
[1:11:37 - 1:11:42] ▶
not you guys know, you can buy drones anywhere commercially available, right? And they can fly maybe
[1:11:42 - 1:11:46] ▶
15 minutes, little quad, then you got it land and you got to recharge them. And maybe they fly a
[1:11:46 - 1:11:50] ▶
couple miles. Imagine now the technology it takes to fly a large drone, the size of an SUV. Now,
[1:11:50 - 1:11:58] ▶
do we have them? We do. Most of them are fixed wing because they have to loiter to have one the
[1:11:58 - 1:12:03] ▶
size of a SUV that's using propellers helicopter like propellers, right? For lift requires a
[1:12:03 - 1:12:09] ▶
tremendous amount of energy because you have to not only maintain movement forward, but you also
[1:12:09 - 1:12:13] ▶
have to maintain lift, unlike a fixed wing drone that as long as you're moving forward, the air kind
[1:12:13 - 1:12:18] ▶
of does the work for you and you stay aloft, right? So think of a predator drone. That's why a
[1:12:18 - 1:12:22] ▶
predator drone looks like it does because it's got to, it's got to stay on station. It's got a
[1:12:22 - 1:12:25] ▶
loiter for hours and hours and hours. So if you're looking at an SUV-sized drone, there's only two types
[1:12:25 - 1:12:31] ▶
of fuel you could consider. One would be liquid fuel like let's say gasoline or, you know,
[1:12:31 - 1:12:37] ▶
jet A fuel, which is very heavy, about seven and a half pounds per gallon. So, you know, you now
[1:12:37 - 1:12:43] ▶
talking something super robust or it's going to be electric, right? Which is also very heavy. You
[1:12:43 - 1:12:47] ▶
know, if you're own a Tesla, you know, they're they're not super light cars because the battery
[1:12:47 - 1:12:51] ▶
weighs a lot. And so now that limits a lot of things that you can do. Now, you can have more range
[1:12:52 - 1:12:57] ▶
and you can have longevity, right? You can fly further and for longer, but it's really, really
[1:12:57 - 1:13:04] ▶
expensive. Meaning you have to have an entire infrastructure there to do it. Then if you're flying in
[1:13:04 - 1:13:09] ▶
some cases like some of these drones for flue for 10, 12 miles, now you're talking over the horizon,
[1:13:09 - 1:13:14] ▶
right? So what does that mean? Here's our little drone here. If I want to communicate with this
[1:13:14 - 1:13:18] ▶
drone and control it, I have to be lying aside because it's radio frequency controlled. If I want
[1:13:18 - 1:13:23] ▶
to fly this over the horizon where I don't have a signal, now I need more infrastructure. I either
[1:13:23 - 1:13:27] ▶
need an aircraft airborne that will retransmit my signal to the drone or I need some sort of space-based
[1:13:27 - 1:13:34] ▶
capability or some sort of repeater capability to amplify my signal and send it over the horizon
[1:13:34 - 1:13:40] ▶
to control the drone and vice versa. And then I have an issue of launching it without people seeing
[1:13:40 - 1:13:46] ▶
me, right? Where am I going to launch an SUV-sized drone? Then I've got to recover it. I've got to go
[1:13:46 - 1:13:51] ▶
out and actually pick it back up. And oh, by the way, I got to maintain it as well. And I've got to
[1:13:51 - 1:13:55] ▶
give it its fuel source whenever I want to fly it, right? So you're talking about a very big endeavor.
[1:13:55 - 1:14:01] ▶
This is not just, hey, somebody making a car-sized drone and they're a hobbyist and they're
[1:14:01 - 1:14:05] ▶
garage and flying it. This would take a lot of people to do. Just to fly one, let alone a fleet of
[1:14:06 - 1:14:13] ▶
them, right? And then there's reports where some of these may even have some sort of counter drone
[1:14:13 - 1:14:17] ▶
capability or technology. There was some- Yes, there were some reports that somebody would fly their
[1:14:17 - 1:14:22] ▶
own drone to try to get a closer look at the drone and would get disabled and fall to the ground.
[1:14:22 - 1:14:27] ▶
Woo, I didn't hear about this. Oh, yeah. Yeah. Yeah. No shit. So now you're talking about a level of
[1:14:27 - 1:14:34] ▶
sophistication here that really at this point can only be state sponsored, right? There's only a few
[1:14:34 - 1:14:38] ▶
countries in the world that know how to- how to have that type of capability and get away with it and
[1:14:38 - 1:14:43] ▶
no one has any idea who's behind it, right? Where are you launching it from? How are you recovering it?
[1:14:43 - 1:14:48] ▶
How many do you have? Do you have a big boat out in the ocean that you're launching it from? Well,
[1:14:48 - 1:14:52] ▶
we would see that. So okay, well, maybe you're launching it from a submarine. Well, okay, so now you
[1:14:52 - 1:14:56] ▶
have a submarine in US territorial waters. That's a problem. Yeah, that's scary. So you see, it's a
[1:14:56 - 1:15:02] ▶
very slippery slope here. And that's why it's probably for some people better to have the
[1:15:02 - 1:15:07] ▶
conversation saying, yeah, don't pay attention, folks. Nothing, no big deal here for handling it.
[1:15:07 - 1:15:12] ▶
But again, to go to the front end of it, it's like this was the cap that got out of the bag that
[1:15:12 - 1:15:18] ▶
it sounded like based on the people I spoke to. It should have been- this should have been nipped
[1:15:18 - 1:15:22] ▶
in the bud at the beginning, but it wasn't. Correct. Who- who failed there? A lot of people. So I'll
[1:15:22 - 1:15:32] ▶
tell you when I was 2013, 2014, I was part of what they call the US Air Domain Awareness Working Group.
[1:15:32 - 1:15:38] ▶
And it was co-sponsored by DHS Department of Homeland Security and FAA. And it had all the folks
[1:15:38 - 1:15:45] ▶
there from the Intel community and whatnot because they realized that the emerging threat of drones
[1:15:45 - 1:15:49] ▶
was real. And when you asked somebody, okay, so who's responsible for this? Everybody did this.
[1:15:49 - 1:15:54] ▶
Everybody pointed at you. No, say it isn't so. Like, oh, I'm not my responsibility, you know,
[1:15:55 - 1:16:01] ▶
and clearly we're still in the same position. So that's why one of the reasons why I really applaud
[1:16:02 - 1:16:09] ▶
Tulsi Gabbard doing what she's doing, she said, look, we're going to get to the bottom of this.
[1:16:10 - 1:16:13] ▶
The American people deserve to know. We're going to let him know what's going on.
[1:16:13 - 1:16:15] ▶
Now, Trump had said when he got into office because he was during his transitional period when
[1:16:16 - 1:16:21] ▶
this was going on, that he was like, we're going to let you know exactly what it was. They should have
[1:16:21 - 1:16:25] ▶
told you. And then I don't know like five days in the office. They did say at the, I guess,
[1:16:26 - 1:16:33] ▶
like the press secretary briefing that, oh, nothing to see here. It was just regular.
[1:16:33 - 1:16:39] ▶
What did she say exactly unless he was like, it was regular?
[1:16:39 - 1:16:42] ▶
Yeah, she said, basically, it's all authorized airplanes and drones.
[1:16:42 - 1:16:47] ▶
The reality is two things. First of all, let me caveat this. I was certainly never
[1:16:48 - 1:16:52] ▶
to say anything against the administration, but I think there's two.
[1:16:52 - 1:16:55] ▶
You want to, I want to help anybody who is who is president.
[1:16:55 - 1:17:03] ▶
I got to see you. Let me wrap you up.
[1:17:03 - 1:17:05] ▶
Look, first and foremost, in the five days that they had actually been in office,
[1:17:07 - 1:17:13] ▶
they were using information from the old administration. That's that's a fact. It's the
[1:17:13 - 1:17:17] ▶
information that the last administration had. And they're like, well, this is what we found.
[1:17:17 - 1:17:20] ▶
Well, that's true. Okay. This, right. And then the second issue is that these folks were only
[1:17:20 - 1:17:26] ▶
in office for five days. Now think about that five days. There is a whole lot you have to do when
[1:17:26 - 1:17:31] ▶
you're coming in as a new administration. You haven't even kept the seats warm yet, right? I mean,
[1:17:31 - 1:17:37] ▶
everything isn't flexed. I haven't even moved in your furniture yet. So I think we need to give
[1:17:37 - 1:17:41] ▶
them a break. I think we need to give them, you know, unlike the last administration,
[1:17:41 - 1:17:44] ▶
it had four years to figure this out. This was five days, you know, what, 96 hours, maybe a little
[1:17:44 - 1:17:50] ▶
more. That's how to hold out of time. And you're relying on information from a previous administration.
[1:17:50 - 1:17:55] ▶
So it's a little unfair. I think people get critical and say, you know, this is bull crap. Hold on,
[1:17:55 - 1:18:00] ▶
you know, chill your jets for a second. Give them some time. Let the people look at the cabinet.
[1:18:00 - 1:18:06] ▶
Has it even been confirmed yet? But they already took, so here's the devil's advocate to that. They
[1:18:06 - 1:18:10] ▶
already don't trust the last administration. So five days, I understand like you made a promise
[1:18:10 - 1:18:15] ▶
that they wanted to give some information, whatever they could when they came in, wouldn't it be good
[1:18:15 - 1:18:19] ▶
then to caveat that statement with luck? We're working off with the old administration said,
[1:18:19 - 1:18:23] ▶
but we are still looking into this ourselves because it's weird shit. So I would, again,
[1:18:23 - 1:18:27] ▶
let me be really careful here. I would never, ever, ever make a recommendation to administration
[1:18:27 - 1:18:34] ▶
on how they, how they employ their strategic communications, right? There's a whole calculus
[1:18:34 - 1:18:39] ▶
that goes into what we say and how we say it, right? Because you have to understand that
[1:18:39 - 1:18:44] ▶
words have an impact and they can create action. That's right. Some of that actions good, some of
[1:18:44 - 1:18:48] ▶
that action is not good. I'd be in a crowded movie theater and screaming, fire, right? You got
[1:18:48 - 1:18:52] ▶
to understand there's a responsibility there. So I think what they were doing is a fulfilling a
[1:18:52 - 1:18:56] ▶
promise to basically saying, okay, we're going to go ahead and give the American people what we are
[1:18:56 - 1:19:03] ▶
being told with the understanding that we can go back anytime we want as information changes,
[1:19:03 - 1:19:07] ▶
right? What do we talk about in the beginning of this conversation as facts change? I change my mind,
[1:19:07 - 1:19:12] ▶
and I think that is probably where this conversation will eventually go. And again, let me just
[1:19:13 - 1:19:20] ▶
caveat again, I am not nor will I ever speak on behalf of the administration or any administration
[1:19:20 - 1:19:25] ▶
without their approval to do so. And I can only imagine what they have under play, right? So we have
[1:19:25 - 1:19:30] ▶
to be, I think the average American doesn't really appreciate what a new administration has to go
[1:19:30 - 1:19:35] ▶
through when they first come in. It's monumental. It's almost mind boggling. This stuff you're now
[1:19:35 - 1:19:41] ▶
responsible for, oh my god, I'm responsible for this. And by the way, that guy was in the middle of
[1:19:41 - 1:19:44] ▶
doing that and holy crap. Now, how do I, you know, how do I, how do I unwind four years of policies
[1:19:44 - 1:19:51] ▶
that, you know, maybe I'm not, I don't agree with. And at the same time, move the country forward
[1:19:51 - 1:19:57] ▶
in a direction that I think we need to go in. And then do that all the while while everybody's
[1:19:57 - 1:20:02] ▶
sniping at the early head. I hit, I cried and moan and complain about the haters online. I
[1:20:02 - 1:20:06] ▶
could not imagine as a political figure what they have to endure. I mean, the visceral hatred,
[1:20:06 - 1:20:13] ▶
right? And vitro that is in social media and mainstream media to some degree. I, I don't know if
[1:20:13 - 1:20:21] ▶
I can handle it. I have a tough enough time right now with with the with the few haters that I
[1:20:21 - 1:20:25] ▶
have. I couldn't imagine it, you know, constantly being attacked every single day by everybody in their
[1:20:25 - 1:20:29] ▶
mind. So I, I get it. I guess what I'm trying to say is I'm very optimistic. The American people
[1:20:29 - 1:20:38] ▶
are going to get at least in this topic of UAP and drones and airspace domain awareness. We're
[1:20:38 - 1:20:44] ▶
going to get some significant progress in the next four years on this topic. That was a really
[1:20:44 - 1:20:53] ▶
good tryout speech right there. You're speaking well. Kill me, man. We got all in camera too. We
[1:20:53 - 1:20:58] ▶
can send them the real feel like, yo, the picture this, but on CNN. No, you know what? First of all,
[1:20:58 - 1:21:04] ▶
I've got this. I've got tattoos and I've got too many skeletons in my closet. That makes you
[1:21:04 - 1:21:08] ▶
relatable. No, no, listen, I, you know, when I was with my long time ago when I was a kid,
[1:21:08 - 1:21:13] ▶
like I said, I did every crap job you could to earn money. And one of those jobs was,
[1:21:14 - 1:21:18] ▶
um, a little embarrassing. So I, let's just say I don't fit. I don't, well, not quite.
[1:21:18 - 1:21:29] ▶
Yeah. Um, man, you know, you're dumb kid. You got to do what you got to do to get through school.
[1:21:33 - 1:21:39] ▶
You know, and anyways, let's just say I probably don't fit the mold of a, you know,
[1:21:39 - 1:21:45] ▶
senior executive in the US government. Okay. TBD too many tattoos and this weird facial hair
[1:21:45 - 1:21:53] ▶
that I have, you know, and TBD, maybe if you teach them out of build a bunker, you know,
[1:21:53 - 1:21:57] ▶
they'll, they'll, they'll want that expertise and overlook the old stuff. But let's not get off
[1:21:58 - 1:22:02] ▶
the topic here as to what we're talking about with what these drones are and trying to break it
[1:22:02 - 1:22:06] ▶
down because like you are someone who you studied, what's in this guy and things like that. First
[1:22:06 - 1:22:11] ▶
question would be through your sources without revealing people, are you aware of conversations
[1:22:11 - 1:22:18] ▶
that may have happened at it? I don't know, some sort of official level within the government itself,
[1:22:18 - 1:22:23] ▶
not at the Intel, meaning like maybe Intel briefing people in Congress or things like that,
[1:22:23 - 1:22:28] ▶
prior to these drones becoming a news story. Yeah. Was it known that it was going to be okay. Yeah.
[1:22:28 - 1:22:34] ▶
Yeah. So they knew it was coming. Well, no, what I would I meant to say is that the people knew
[1:22:34 - 1:22:40] ▶
that this was a problem. US air domain awareness has been a problem forever and we've just ignored it.
[1:22:40 - 1:22:46] ▶
And now the technology has caught up to the point where now we're behind the April.
[1:22:46 - 1:22:50] ▶
What do you think it was? Look, let me give you an example here. Type, you got to Google again.
[1:22:53 - 1:22:56] ▶
Type in 1999 FBI investigation White House remote controlled airplanes.
[1:22:57 - 1:23:03] ▶
1999 FBI investigation White House remote controlled airplanes. Let's see what pops up.
[1:23:03 - 1:23:10] ▶
JFK Jr. There's a it might have been is late 1990s. So it might have been actually 1998. There's
[1:23:16 - 1:23:23] ▶
a 9-11 commission report. There was a plan that the FBI foiled by two individuals who were arrested,
[1:23:23 - 1:23:29] ▶
who were going to fly remote controlled airplanes that had explosives on board. Top one,
[1:23:29 - 1:23:36] ▶
top one, LSE. And they were going to try that one, scroll down. There was fence shumpers.
[1:23:36 - 1:23:44] ▶
Now there's a remote controlled. Yeah, hit back. Type in takeaway. Yeah, 1990s White House investigation
[1:23:44 - 1:23:54] ▶
scroll down to a study of 1990s helicopter may have to prove why did the world's most advanced
[1:23:54 - 1:24:03] ▶
electronics now. Here I'll pull up. Yes, it's a type of type in FBI investigation White House
[1:24:03 - 1:24:11] ▶
remote controlled airplanes. And that should be it. That should pull it up. Okay.
[1:24:13 - 1:24:15] ▶
So I actually use this in a briefing when I was in the government to explain
[1:24:16 - 1:24:20] ▶
on how they were going to use remote controlled airplanes. Terrorist threat confronting
[1:24:21 - 1:24:27] ▶
United States. I'll pull up here. This is a tough one. Okay. Yeah, it was a while ago,
[1:24:27 - 1:24:34] ▶
but we used it. It was an FBI investigation. I'll pull it up here.
[1:24:34 - 1:24:37] ▶
Yeah, it's interesting to me just while you're pulling this up to comment that
[1:24:39 - 1:24:43] ▶
you know, we've had drones around now like just within mom and pop being able to use in the air
[1:24:44 - 1:24:49] ▶
for so long and people you'll just see people randomly fly it. I'll walk out here on a long
[1:24:49 - 1:24:55] ▶
thoughts and river and motherfuckers are putting drone up in the air and it's usually a small little
[1:24:55 - 1:24:59] ▶
thing obviously, but they'll fly up pretty high into what is quite literally airspace.
[1:24:59 - 1:25:04] ▶
And to this point, I mean, you pointed out the 19 or the 2019, 2020 thing in Colorado,
[1:25:04 - 1:25:10] ▶
which is interesting. I was less familiar with that. But to this point, we don't have a ton of
[1:25:10 - 1:25:13] ▶
examples, Lou, where like this really interfered and became like a national headline yet the
[1:25:13 - 1:25:20] ▶
technology's been around for so long. Well, here you go. So here's FBI.gov. This is on the FBI's website.
[1:25:20 - 1:25:25] ▶
Massachusetts man charged with plotting attack on Pentagon,
[1:25:25 - 1:25:28] ▶
using remote controlled aircraft filled with C4 plastic explosives. So I will pull that up for
[1:25:29 - 1:25:35] ▶
you right now so you can see it. This is in the 90s. Here you go. FBI web. Well, there goes all
[1:25:35 - 1:25:40] ▶
the way back to the 90s. That might be even a more recent one. All right. I'm going to read this off
[1:25:40 - 1:25:43] ▶
the phone because Lou found this here. This is from September 28, 2011, a 26 year old Ashland man
[1:25:43 - 1:25:49] ▶
was arrested and charged today in connection with his plot to damage or destroy the Pentagon and
[1:25:49 - 1:25:54] ▶
US Capitol using large remote controlled aircraft filled with C4 plastic explosives. Reswan Ferredaus,
[1:25:54 - 1:26:00] ▶
a US citizen was also charged with attempting to provide material support and resources to a
[1:26:00 - 1:26:04] ▶
foreign terrorist organization specifically to al-Qaeda in order to carry out attacks on US soldier
[1:26:04 - 1:26:09] ▶
station overseas. Our top priority is to protect our nation from terrorism, national security threats.
[1:26:09 - 1:26:13] ▶
The conduct alleged today shows that Mr. Ferredaus had long pledged. It's the long US attorney comment.
[1:26:13 - 1:26:19] ▶
Okay, I got you. But this just gets to show you in even a decade before that we were dealing with it.
[1:26:19 - 1:26:24] ▶
So, you know, the technology may have changed and evolved, but the application
[1:26:24 - 1:26:30] ▶
of tactics have not. This is nothing new. And so this is a big concern for us. It really is because
[1:26:30 - 1:26:36] ▶
drones now can be used to do all sorts of stuff. We're seeing in the Ukraine and Russia where they're
[1:26:36 - 1:26:40] ▶
literally hunting down soldiers and blowing them up. That's great. Those videos are nuts.
[1:26:40 - 1:26:46] ▶
Right. So, and that is that is just field expediency using commercial drones. You can imagine
[1:26:46 - 1:26:51] ▶
with a little bit of an only be really careful. We'll never say this over here. But if you have an
[1:26:51 - 1:26:55] ▶
imagination, you could do some really bad things for very cheaply against the American people. So,
[1:26:55 - 1:27:00] ▶
this is why this is a national priority for us. This is why I think one of the reason why Tulsi
[1:27:00 - 1:27:04] ▶
Gabber realizes we need to get to the bottom of this drone issue. We need to have good policy.
[1:27:04 - 1:27:08] ▶
We've ever talked about policies. We need to have good policies in place now on how we're going to
[1:27:08 - 1:27:14] ▶
go ahead and regulate the use of drones using FAA and maybe pre-cordated flight plans and
[1:27:14 - 1:27:20] ▶
transponders. Right. So, you can squawk friendly. So, you know, if it's a helicopter or a plane using
[1:27:20 - 1:27:24] ▶
your app or a drone, right. Or if you're just going to be a commercial drone, that commercial drone,
[1:27:24 - 1:27:29] ▶
so the probiest drones can only be so big. So, you can't put a huge payload on them. And, you know,
[1:27:29 - 1:27:33] ▶
you geofensive, right. So, they can only be flown maybe a mile from your location. Unless you
[1:27:33 - 1:27:38] ▶
have special permission, maybe if you're in the film industry, you can get a license to, you know,
[1:27:38 - 1:27:42] ▶
where you go through a background check, maybe like DHS does when you want to
[1:27:42 - 1:27:44] ▶
TSA, right. You want to get on a TSA pre-list so you can fly through security. Maybe you do the same
[1:27:46 - 1:27:50] ▶
thing with drone pilots, right. You say, okay, for those of you who use this as a business, you're
[1:27:50 - 1:27:54] ▶
going to go through a quick background check and you'll be authorized to fly these drones. But,
[1:27:54 - 1:27:59] ▶
you're not going to have a 10-year-old kid be able to go to Hobby Lobby or anywhere else and buy a
[1:27:59 - 1:28:03] ▶
drone and now be able to fly completely unregulated. That's an issue. You know, you don't let a 10-year-old
[1:28:03 - 1:28:09] ▶
drive a car. Why would you let them drive a drone, right. You can do just as much damage. So,
[1:28:09 - 1:28:14] ▶
there's things that we can do, I think, that can certainly low-hanging fruit to solve this problem
[1:28:14 - 1:28:21] ▶
quickly. Do you think that... And this is why we need it, by the way, national strategy that I've
[1:28:21 - 1:28:28] ▶
been advocating for. What does that look like? Well, it's a comprehensive approach. Hopefully,
[1:28:28 - 1:28:33] ▶
done by someone, either at the National Security Council or someone like Tulsi Gabbard,
[1:28:33 - 1:28:36] ▶
as a Director of National Intelligence, whoever that is, that says, okay, as a New Intelligence
[1:28:36 - 1:28:41] ▶
community, here are the vulnerabilities we have. These are what we need in order to fix the problem,
[1:28:41 - 1:28:47] ▶
whether it's operational, whether it's policy, whether it's whatever it may be. These are the five,
[1:28:47 - 1:28:53] ▶
six objectives, enterprise objectives, mission objectives, milestones, deliverables, benchmarks,
[1:28:53 - 1:28:58] ▶
all the things that healthy governments use to make sure that they are executing the will of
[1:28:59 - 1:29:06] ▶
the American people. And it's not that hard. It's really not that hard. There's a couple of
[1:29:06 - 1:29:11] ▶
levers that would probably low-hanging fruit that we could do immediately that would help solve
[1:29:11 - 1:29:16] ▶
80% of the problem, and then the next year spend the rest fixing the rest. Seeing how...
[1:29:16 - 1:29:21] ▶
Like, this article you had pulled up was from 2011, and it's some guy that was obviously
[1:29:21 - 1:29:25] ▶
plotting to use C4 on the White House or whatever. But C4, think about that. Yeah, it's crazy.
[1:29:25 - 1:29:29] ▶
Not just a bunch of M80s and Firecrackers. Yeah. C4. Right. So, obviously, that could have been
[1:29:29 - 1:29:37] ▶
an insane breach right there that a lot of people's lives could have been lost. But seeing as this
[1:29:37 - 1:29:42] ▶
technology, like I said, has now been around for so long, and everyone's using it. Do we have,
[1:29:42 - 1:29:47] ▶
I don't know, like at the Pentagon, for example, outside the building itself, not necessarily an iron
[1:29:48 - 1:29:54] ▶
dome, like Israel has, but something in that type of family to where if anything comes within a
[1:29:54 - 1:29:59] ▶
mile, that airspace... So, I'm not going to speak on what capabilities the Pentagon or any other
[1:29:59 - 1:30:04] ▶
government organization might or might not have. We do invest in counter-drone technology,
[1:30:04 - 1:30:08] ▶
actually government, to protect our personnel overseas. And one may infer that maybe we've even
[1:30:08 - 1:30:15] ▶
used some of that technology here domestically. You know, I don't want to... I don't want to
[1:30:15 - 1:30:22] ▶
address specific either capabilities for vulnerabilities. But if you do go to the Pentagon,
[1:30:22 - 1:30:26] ▶
you see these signs that say no drone zone for a very specific reason. There's several ways you
[1:30:26 - 1:30:31] ▶
can kill a drone. You can do it kinetically. So, you can think of shooting an object at it and
[1:30:31 - 1:30:37] ▶
disabling it. You can also do it electronically. You know, these things fly with servos and
[1:30:37 - 1:30:44] ▶
the electronics. And if you understand their frequencies, you can, in some cases, jam it. What we call,
[1:30:44 - 1:30:49] ▶
you know, electronic countermeasures. So, there are ways to do that as well. The science isn't really
[1:30:49 - 1:30:57] ▶
perfect, but it's pretty good. Now, of course, if you're for an adversary, then what do you do? Well,
[1:30:57 - 1:31:02] ▶
you harden it. So, now you start make... You shield it. So, now you can't use electronic
[1:31:02 - 1:31:06] ▶
capabilities, right? And it's kind of this cat-and-mouse tit for tatware. Okay, you do this. Well,
[1:31:06 - 1:31:10] ▶
I'll do that. Well, you do this. I do that. You know, my concern is that if you have a fox in the
[1:31:10 - 1:31:15] ▶
henhouse situation, there are... When I was growing up, radar detectors as a kid were really...
[1:31:15 - 1:31:21] ▶
You bought them because you were speeding, unfortunately, and you don't want to pay the ticket. So,
[1:31:21 - 1:31:26] ▶
a lot of kids, my age, we all had radar detectors in our vehicles. We didn't realize that a lot of
[1:31:26 - 1:31:31] ▶
those radar detectors were actually being manufactured by the radar manufacturers, that the police
[1:31:31 - 1:31:35] ▶
use. And so, what wound up happening is that the same companies that were selling you the radar
[1:31:35 - 1:31:39] ▶
detector would then develop a new capability to outfox it, right? With the radar. And then they
[1:31:39 - 1:31:44] ▶
turn around and sell you another radar detector that could detect laser and X-band and K-A-band,
[1:31:44 - 1:31:49] ▶
right? And so, it planned up to listen. Yeah. So, you want to make sure... There's a couple other
[1:31:49 - 1:31:56] ▶
examples that I won't use. You want to make sure that's not the situation here, right? Where drone
[1:31:56 - 1:32:01] ▶
manufacturers are also creating the counter-drone capabilities. And then, maybe they're not...
[1:32:01 - 1:32:07] ▶
Again, I want to be very careful because I'm not accusing anybody of doing that. But we just need
[1:32:09 - 1:32:13] ▶
to make sure that's not happening. For sure. That would be a huge problem.
[1:32:13 - 1:32:16] ▶
Let's speak hypothetically, right here. I'm going to emphasize this is hypothetically.
[1:32:18 - 1:32:23] ▶
Hey, hypothetical. Yes. What do you think these drones were? Well, I think there are many things.
[1:32:23 - 1:32:29] ▶
It's pretty clear that you listen to the eyewitness testimony, which I don't think most of
[1:32:31 - 1:32:34] ▶
the people are rational, sane human beings. They know what a plane is and they know what a drone is.
[1:32:34 - 1:32:38] ▶
Some of these drones were recorded and they have the worrying sound of a typical little quadcopter.
[1:32:39 - 1:32:45] ▶
It's a drone and it's blinking and it's what not. The lights on it are consistent with the drone.
[1:32:46 - 1:32:51] ▶
Then you have other reports where these things are the size of an SUV. These things don't have the lights
[1:32:51 - 1:32:56] ▶
that normal drones have and the frequency in which they're blinking. They're not blinking navigational
[1:32:56 - 1:33:02] ▶
lights in green and red like aircraft, but they're blinking different colors and not in a consistent
[1:33:02 - 1:33:08] ▶
pattern with navigational lights. People don't realize this. Navigation lights are just like an
[1:33:08 - 1:33:14] ▶
automobile. When you turn on your blinker, the reason why you're Honda versus your Chevrolet versus
[1:33:14 - 1:33:20] ▶
your Ford or your Ferrari all have that same blinker period is because it's regulated. If you want to
[1:33:20 - 1:33:26] ▶
build a car and have a be a car manufacturer, when you turn the blinker on, that little relay in
[1:33:26 - 1:33:32] ▶
there and the resistor are calibrated to blink at a certain frequency. The same is true with navigation
[1:33:32 - 1:33:36] ▶
lights. They're regulated. That's why we can tell when something's an airplane. When you have
[1:33:37 - 1:33:42] ▶
something the size of an SUV that's flying silently, no worrying sound, we might be dealing with a
[1:33:42 - 1:33:49] ▶
different type of technology. Also, you might be dealing with something if it has a counter drone
[1:33:49 - 1:33:54] ▶
capability, that's even more problematic because that's new. We're not used to drones having
[1:33:54 - 1:34:00] ▶
counter drone capability. Then you have these things in some cases miles out in the ocean
[1:34:00 - 1:34:06] ▶
that are in some cases following US Coast Guard vessels. That's not a quadcopter. That's
[1:34:06 - 1:34:11] ▶
something different. Then you also have people misidentifying. I saw one with her. This is a drone.
[1:34:11 - 1:34:18] ▶
No, it's not. It's actually a helicopter. It's a Belgium helicopter. It's clear. There's a lot of
[1:34:18 - 1:34:23] ▶
misidentification. Then you've got the possibility that if I was a Ford adversary and I saw what was
[1:34:23 - 1:34:30] ▶
going on, he now's the time to test my stuff because everybody's in a panic mode. Let's see what I can
[1:34:30 - 1:34:35] ▶
get away with. Meaning after the fact that they sneak it in. Then you've got the other issue where
[1:34:35 - 1:34:40] ▶
if some of these are really exotic, then maybe you're dealing with a hypothetical, right? We're talking
[1:34:40 - 1:34:46] ▶
hypothetical. Let's say you have a military base. You're the commander of a military base.
[1:34:46 - 1:34:49] ▶
You'll base you had helicopters. If something kind of breached the perimeter, you could send out a
[1:34:49 - 1:34:53] ▶
security force and a helicopter too. We realize we can use drones a lot cheaper and a lot more
[1:34:53 - 1:34:58] ▶
effectively than two helicopters. I can send out a fleet of these things, have my entire base
[1:34:58 - 1:35:02] ▶
geofence and if something crosses the border, these things can automatically deploy and you know
[1:35:02 - 1:35:07] ▶
prosecute the target if you will conduct the surveillance for me and much more efficiently than
[1:35:07 - 1:35:12] ▶
a helicopter crew. So imagine let's say hypothetically again, you have this UAP, some unidentified
[1:35:12 - 1:35:18] ▶
thing coming over your military base. In response, you send out a fleet of drones to start doing
[1:35:18 - 1:35:24] ▶
the race track and start looking at the okay, what are we dealing with here, right? So some people
[1:35:24 - 1:35:28] ▶
report to something the size of an SUV that's silent, that's not blinking, that can disappear
[1:35:28 - 1:35:33] ▶
into thin air and then all of a sudden somebody reports 20 minutes later, no, no, no, it was a quadcopter,
[1:35:33 - 1:35:38] ▶
I heard it roaring, it was over my house, I hear it's a video, here's a blinking light.
[1:35:38 - 1:35:41] ▶
That's also a possibility that one could be predicating something else or response. So what people
[1:35:41 - 1:35:46] ▶
are seeing are both, that's a possibility as well. And then there's other possibilities, you know,
[1:35:46 - 1:35:50] ▶
we could go down for hours and hours on the what ifs. I'm very careful not to say what something
[1:35:50 - 1:35:56] ▶
is or is not because we need more data, but all these are possibilities. And it certainly wouldn't
[1:35:56 - 1:36:03] ▶
be outside the realm of logic. Your example of potentially while this is going on in the
[1:36:03 - 1:36:10] ▶
mass hysteria starting over it, if foreign adversary sneaking a little one in there, that could
[1:36:10 - 1:36:15] ▶
make a lot of sense to me. The one that didn't make sense to me was that when people were saying
[1:36:15 - 1:36:21] ▶
at the front end of this, the whole thing was like, oh, you know, some Iranian submarine released all
[1:36:21 - 1:36:25] ▶
these drones and they're over New Jersey now because we didn't know they were, that seems
[1:36:25 - 1:36:29] ▶
ridiculous to me because it feels like those would have been taken out quietly and without any fan
[1:36:29 - 1:36:34] ▶
fare immediately because it was so obvious. It's not like some of those videos you'll see of like
[1:36:34 - 1:36:38] ▶
Chinese drones where it's like a fucking bird, like a literal bird or something like that, it's like
[1:36:38 - 1:36:43] ▶
undercover, these things were, you could see what they were. Like something that overt being,
[1:36:43 - 1:36:48] ▶
you know, some foreign country doing it. Well, but it took us to shoot down the Chinese
[1:36:48 - 1:36:54] ▶
spy balloons. Yeah, and what were like, let's go back to that. That was February 2023.
[1:36:54 - 1:36:59] ▶
Like, is that all they were? They were just Chinese spy balloons? Well, that's all, that's a
[1:37:00 - 1:37:05] ▶
pretty big deal because if I could put intelligence equipment on it, I could put anything on it.
[1:37:05 - 1:37:09] ▶
Yeah. Right. You know, I have a problem with that. You know, it's like people say, well, you know,
[1:37:09 - 1:37:15] ▶
I don't mind people videoing me. Okay, fine. Or taking a picture, but what about in your bathroom?
[1:37:15 - 1:37:20] ▶
Yeah, you had a problem, right? Or sucking up all the data. Right. So, you know, the fact that we,
[1:37:20 - 1:37:25] ▶
we didn't know about them. And then it turns out later that maybe we did, we just never told the
[1:37:25 - 1:37:28] ▶
president and that's going to, I mean, right. Again, this is my point. Who are you to, not make,
[1:37:28 - 1:37:37] ▶
who are you to make the decision to not tell the president what the hell's going on? Right? That's
[1:37:37 - 1:37:42] ▶
a problem. Well, tell someone, I don't know if he would even interpret it, but, you know,
[1:37:42 - 1:37:46] ▶
he was kind of going at that point, but tell somebody like get it, like, like that stuff was floating
[1:37:46 - 1:37:50] ▶
up there while you're right. There were, if I remember correctly, though, there were maybe I'm wrong
[1:37:50 - 1:37:55] ▶
about this two or three of them, something like that. With these drones, we're not talking about
[1:37:55 - 1:37:59] ▶
two or three. No, we're not just like a fucking arm. We're talking. That's right. Something very
[1:37:59 - 1:38:03] ▶
well for weeks for weeks. And then you have the other theories of, well, maybe they were trying to
[1:38:03 - 1:38:08] ▶
sniff out radioactive type material. And people say, oh, that's a bunch of hogwash. But it's not.
[1:38:08 - 1:38:13] ▶
Can you explain that? Sure. Some folks had speculated that these drones actually were sponsored by
[1:38:13 - 1:38:20] ▶
the US government. And there are some sort of secret mission that may be perhaps there was a,
[1:38:20 - 1:38:24] ▶
chemical or biological or a nuclear device that was, you had gone, wrote basically broken
[1:38:25 - 1:38:31] ▶
arrow situation where we have a loose weapon, like a dirty bomb or maybe not dirty, you know,
[1:38:31 - 1:38:39] ▶
could be, could be the real deal. And so the idea is to try to, to use drones in a manner at night,
[1:38:39 - 1:38:47] ▶
so you're not being seen too much in panicking the public to go ahead and sweep and see if you can
[1:38:47 - 1:38:51] ▶
pick up traces. Now, sniff, sniff. Now people say, well, that technology doesn't work. Take a look
[1:38:51 - 1:38:56] ▶
on Google once again, that technology has had it for a long time. There are certain capabilities
[1:38:56 - 1:39:01] ▶
we've had in the past to monitor nations development of nuclear weapons. I'm not going to go into
[1:39:01 - 1:39:07] ▶
detail here, but there is stuff in the open source where you can see where you can actually
[1:39:07 - 1:39:11] ▶
detect if a country is developing a particular capability because of air particles. And that's
[1:39:12 - 1:39:19] ▶
something that's been been, been discussed at length. It's all over the fact. If you get on Google,
[1:39:19 - 1:39:24] ▶
you'll see it. Again, I don't want to say anything really much more than that, but
[1:39:24 - 1:39:27] ▶
type in maybe type in nuclear sniffer.
[1:39:30 - 1:39:34] ▶
You want the word drawn in there too? Nope. Just nuclear sniffer.
[1:39:37 - 1:39:41] ▶
All right, the WC-15 constant Phoenix, also known as the Newk Sniffer is United States Air Force
[1:39:41 - 1:39:47] ▶
aircraft that detects nuclear explosions by collecting samples from the atmosphere. So
[1:39:47 - 1:39:53] ▶
case in point, right? We have that technology. It's not new. So my point to this whole conversation
[1:39:53 - 1:39:58] ▶
regarding this is that yes, you can actually detect trace amounts of nuclear material
[1:39:58 - 1:40:05] ▶
through air particles. And it's a mission that we, even the Air Force admits we do.
[1:40:05 - 1:40:11] ▶
All right. I want to play another hypothetical here because this is very, well, I mean, let's
[1:40:12 - 1:40:17] ▶
call it what it is. We have multiple wars going on around the world right now. All kinds of like
[1:40:17 - 1:40:21] ▶
potential, you know, boiling kettles of shit happening where, you know, the wrong spark goes
[1:40:21 - 1:40:27] ▶
off and suddenly kaboom. No pun intended. But there was a piece of not fabricated information,
[1:40:27 - 1:40:36] ▶
but fabricated with the context information that was happening on Twitter back when this was
[1:40:36 - 1:40:40] ▶
going on where someone took a screenshot from, I don't remember the name of the organization,
[1:40:40 - 1:40:45] ▶
but it's like, it's something that it's like the national, it's where they track any nuclear
[1:40:45 - 1:40:50] ▶
threats or whatever nationally. And basically the way I understand it is you're required to report
[1:40:50 - 1:40:57] ▶
anything on there, like literally anything. So the screenshot that they were pointing around,
[1:40:57 - 1:41:01] ▶
they're like, oh my god, there's a nuke in New Jersey or something like that. Oh, you talk about
[1:41:01 - 1:41:04] ▶
the medical equipment. Yeah, it was actually like medical equipment. It had no, but it had some sort
[1:41:04 - 1:41:09] ▶
of waste material with it. So they were required. And you know, some fucking doctor dropped it on
[1:41:09 - 1:41:13] ▶
the side of the road. It wasn't like a big deal. So that wasn't the actual thing. But on that idea,
[1:41:13 - 1:41:17] ▶
if for example, a foreign adversary is some sort, doesn't matter who we're able to get not even
[1:41:18 - 1:41:24] ▶
necessarily like a full blown nuke, but something crazy, something powerful through the
[1:41:24 - 1:41:29] ▶
port of Elizabeth right here where there's, I don't know, God knows thousands and thousands of
[1:41:29 - 1:41:33] ▶
containers that are coming in every day. What a nightmare situation. Okay. You pay off some
[1:41:33 - 1:41:37] ▶
fucking guy name Vinnie pays off another guy named Carmine, money's green suddenly got a little
[1:41:37 - 1:41:42] ▶
bomb in New Jersey. If you had that type of breach and you were any administration, doesn't matter
[1:41:42 - 1:41:47] ▶
who you are. That is such or Intel that is such an embarrassment that this would have gotten in.
[1:41:47 - 1:41:52] ▶
And also the type of situation that I call the Joker scenario, right? If you come around like
[1:41:52 - 1:41:57] ▶
member in the dark night when the Joker's like, if everything's going according to plan,
[1:41:57 - 1:42:02] ▶
no one freaks out. You say you're going to blow up a grocery store. Okay, you clump a bus
[1:42:02 - 1:42:06] ▶
load of soldiers. But if you say the what? Little isn't there. It's going to be blown up. Everyone
[1:42:06 - 1:42:10] ▶
loses their mind, right? Like that whole thing. If you had that scenario happen, we're suddenly
[1:42:10 - 1:42:15] ▶
said to people, we don't know where we don't know when we don't know how, but there's some sort of
[1:42:15 - 1:42:19] ▶
fucking potential dirty bomb floating around. We don't think they're going to use it. But just keep
[1:42:19 - 1:42:23] ▶
going about business as usual. The nuclear sniffers are here. Then there's mass panic in society.
[1:42:23 - 1:42:28] ▶
Meaning you already let the Canada out of the bag by letting it in. That's right. And now you're
[1:42:28 - 1:42:32] ▶
in a situation where you actually can't be transparent because you need people to know like, all right,
[1:42:32 - 1:42:36] ▶
probably nothing's going to happen. But we can't have people freaking out so that it's like fucking
[1:42:36 - 1:42:40] ▶
mad Max Ferry road. Get out of here. Correct. There was a, if you want to see something really
[1:42:40 - 1:42:47] ▶
scary, I believe it was Lebanon and I believe it was maybe. Yeah, let's say, right? It was it
[1:42:47 - 1:42:55] ▶
wanted to be fertilizer. What is this? It wasn't even a bomb. And you know, you've seen it. Okay,
[1:42:55 - 1:43:00] ▶
it literally looks like like an atomic weapon going off. And it's just it's fertilizer on a on a
[1:43:00 - 1:43:06] ▶
boat. Oh, yes. Yeah. Let's see show me this. Yeah. Yes. Now look at that. Right? Whoa.
[1:43:06 - 1:43:12] ▶
That is one hell of an explosion. Do we know like this spread of that? I mean, it looks huge
[1:43:17 - 1:43:22] ▶
on camera. But like it was huge. It was huge. It, I mean, look what it does. It decimated what's
[1:43:22 - 1:43:27] ▶
this? Right. Right. And that's that fertilizer, guys. That's just fertilizer. From my understanding,
[1:43:27 - 1:43:36] ▶
if I remember correctly, it was it was due to a ship that had come into port. And the fertilizer
[1:43:37 - 1:43:42] ▶
had ignited. And look at that shockwave. Right. Right. And so that's that is just that is not even
[1:43:42 - 1:43:50] ▶
someone deliberately trying to blow something up. That's just a bonehead mistake that was done. And
[1:43:50 - 1:43:55] ▶
you can see what happened, right? So yeah, you're right. That's terrifying. And we, you know, we've
[1:43:55 - 1:44:00] ▶
got to be we've got to be careful. That's part of the reasons why we have the safe act. SAF in
[1:44:00 - 1:44:07] ▶
the and the DHS had created a law that they were going to go ahead. And at one point inspect
[1:44:07 - 1:44:12] ▶
something like 99 or 100% of all cargo. Congress passed a law actually. And finally, DHS said we
[1:44:12 - 1:44:17] ▶
can't we can't port authorities. We just don't have the manning to inspect all our cargo.
[1:44:17 - 1:44:21] ▶
You know, to talk scary. Yeah, scary. Right. So, you know, yeah, we've got to we've got to pay
[1:44:21 - 1:44:28] ▶
attention to stuff. There's bad actors out there that will do bad things at any opportunity.
[1:44:28 - 1:44:33] ▶
Kenan. So that's why, you know, one of the reasons why I'm always very pro government people,
[1:44:33 - 1:44:37] ▶
they've a naive pro government because everyone's every day doing their job, you know,
[1:44:37 - 1:44:42] ▶
busting their ass to save yours. That's what they're doing every day. And the fact that you can go
[1:44:42 - 1:44:46] ▶
around and bitch and moan about, you know, the government shows you that it works as the best
[1:44:46 - 1:44:52] ▶
country in the world because you have that right and privilege. You didn't even have to go to war.
[1:44:52 - 1:44:56] ▶
You didn't have to join the army. You didn't know you weren't conscripted into the military, you know,
[1:44:56 - 1:45:01] ▶
you know, unlike North Korea where I guess men can have something like 17 haircuts that are
[1:45:03 - 1:45:07] ▶
authorized by the government and have like 22 something ridiculous like that. I mean, here you're
[1:45:07 - 1:45:12] ▶
free. And the cost of freedom is that you'd have to have, you know, you have to have
[1:45:12 - 1:45:16] ▶
vigilance on the on the on the fence line, you know, there's the imagine, imagine a,
[1:45:17 - 1:45:24] ▶
and this not meant to be derogatory at all, this is just an analogy. Imagine you have, you know,
[1:45:24 - 1:45:28] ▶
some peaceful sheep all within a little fence in area. Make no mistake outside that fence,
[1:45:28 - 1:45:34] ▶
there's walls that want to eat the sheep. And they're always there, right? So you need, you need
[1:45:34 - 1:45:40] ▶
these protectors, these dogs that maybe look a little funny to the sheep and maybe sound a
[1:45:40 - 1:45:46] ▶
little funny and maybe smell kind of funny, but that's the your line of defense between the wolves
[1:45:46 - 1:45:50] ▶
and the sheep. That's that they're there doing that job to protect the rest of us, right? And so
[1:45:50 - 1:45:57] ▶
that's why, you know, I'm not anti-government. I'm super pro-art government. I think we have
[1:45:57 - 1:46:03] ▶
the best country in the world. This country gave opportunities to my family that no other country
[1:46:03 - 1:46:07] ▶
could. My father was in the Bay of Pigs. He was a revolutionary. He was in prison, right?
[1:46:07 - 1:46:11] ▶
And this country gave us all the opportunity to be who we are today. So I'm fiercely, unapologetically
[1:46:12 - 1:46:19] ▶
loyal. This is the greatest nation in the world. But we have to do our part. Freedom isn't free.
[1:46:19 - 1:46:27] ▶
Freedom requires sacrifice. It's another reason why I don't like to talk about my military
[1:46:28 - 1:46:33] ▶
experience because, you know, people say, oh, you're a hero. No, I'm not. Because the real heroes I've
[1:46:33 - 1:46:37] ▶
talked to aren't here to tell their story. Yeah, we were talking about that off camera. And
[1:46:37 - 1:46:41] ▶
because I asked you right before we got on, I asked you about that. Like, why you don't like delving
[1:46:41 - 1:46:47] ▶
into that. And if you don't mind me saying you said you said part of it is like, and I can cut this
[1:46:47 - 1:46:52] ▶
out after if you don't know. No, no, it's a posture syndrome. Right. Yeah, don't cut it out. This
[1:46:52 - 1:46:56] ▶
is it. The reality is that look, you know, there's there's there's men and women out there who have
[1:46:56 - 1:47:01] ▶
done more for their country and paid the ultimate sacrifice. So for me or anybody else that I work
[1:47:01 - 1:47:08] ▶
with in colleagues of mine to come, oh, you know, I'm a big hero. No, you're not. Because the real
[1:47:08 - 1:47:13] ▶
heroes are the ones that never came back. The real heroes are the are the single moms or husbands
[1:47:13 - 1:47:19] ▶
that had to be left behind and raise a child and go to PTA meetings and put food on the table and
[1:47:19 - 1:47:23] ▶
do homework while the other service member was out fighting war, right? And try to keep a normal
[1:47:23 - 1:47:28] ▶
life. Or as I said before, it's the it's the female pilot who's running low on fuel for her helicopter.
[1:47:28 - 1:47:34] ▶
But instead of abandon her little ducklings behind, she stays on target. She stays there until her
[1:47:34 - 1:47:40] ▶
the helicopter runs out of fuel and crashes, right? Those are the heroes. And so those are the ones
[1:47:40 - 1:47:47] ▶
that I pay much difference to. And that's why one of the reason I don't like to talk about my
[1:47:47 - 1:47:50] ▶
military service or my government service because frankly, there's a lot of people out there that
[1:47:50 - 1:47:55] ▶
deserve a hell of a lot more credit than I do. Well, I always, you know, this this argument or
[1:47:55 - 1:48:02] ▶
topic of what is the government's role and how does it, you know, when people talk about it
[1:48:03 - 1:48:10] ▶
leaning towards totalitarianism and things like that, yeah, it's interesting that you say,
[1:48:11 - 1:48:16] ▶
I don't mean this in a derogatory way. When you give the example, like the sheep and the dogs
[1:48:16 - 1:48:20] ▶
protect them. And I know why you say that, obviously, because of what people say about like us being
[1:48:20 - 1:48:24] ▶
sheep and things like that. But to me, the dog or the dogs being warmongers, right? Right. Right.
[1:48:24 - 1:48:29] ▶
You can't win. You can't win. But the book stops somewhere, right? It either stops with the
[1:48:29 - 1:48:36] ▶
government or it stops with the people who pay off the government or both. And there are there are
[1:48:36 - 1:48:41] ▶
severe downsides to all those things. Like there's no answer. Whenever I look at this question,
[1:48:41 - 1:48:46] ▶
there's no zero or a hundred answer that makes everything right or everything wrong. And part of
[1:48:46 - 1:48:52] ▶
the job in society is when things do get out of control, including like, of course,
[1:48:52 - 1:48:55] ▶
that starting with the government, like we got to be vigilant and we got to use our first amendment
[1:48:55 - 1:48:59] ▶
rights and protect them to be able to speak against that. But, you know, I do, like I do sit here
[1:48:59 - 1:49:06] ▶
and ponder sometimes when I'm out there walking along the skyline or when I'm sitting in here looking
[1:49:06 - 1:49:10] ▶
at the picture of just this skyline right here of Manhattan with these millions of people in this
[1:49:10 - 1:49:14] ▶
one little speck within this country. And all the technology that I even know of exists around the
[1:49:14 - 1:49:20] ▶
world, the same nothing of all the technology that I don't know exists. And the eight billion people
[1:49:20 - 1:49:23] ▶
with all different types of fucking motivations that exist around this world that that anything can
[1:49:23 - 1:49:29] ▶
happen and pop off at any moment, it's like I have such an appreciation for how fragile society is.
[1:49:29 - 1:49:35] ▶
And it kind of blows my mind. Can I share something with you? Yes. Yes. Can you pull up on Google
[1:49:35 - 1:49:41] ▶
type in the word pale blue dot? Pale blue dot? Pale blue dot. I'd like to like to walk you through
[1:49:41 - 1:49:45] ▶
something here. Okay. Pull up that picture there on images. That big one right there. And
[1:49:45 - 1:49:51] ▶
let's go to the right. Yeah, just hit that one. Yeah, just hit that. Now blow that up.
[1:49:51 - 1:49:55] ▶
Are we allowed? By the way, not literally. I mean, okay. Now what,
[1:49:58 - 1:50:02] ▶
now, Julie, what do you see there in that picture? I see a pale blue dot in the middle of that
[1:50:03 - 1:50:08] ▶
little light strip. That's right. You want to know what that is? So let me tell you, everything
[1:50:08 - 1:50:13] ▶
you have ever learned every moment in human history, every person that has ever lived,
[1:50:13 - 1:50:19] ▶
every person that has ever died, every person that's ever loved or hated, or all contained in
[1:50:19 - 1:50:25] ▶
that little blue dot. That is a picture taken by the void or spacecraft. When it was leaving
[1:50:25 - 1:50:30] ▶
towards the outer parts of our solar system, we had to turn around and take a selfie, take a picture
[1:50:30 - 1:50:35] ▶
of our home planet. That's earth. And that is earth. That little dude, two pixels, but what that
[1:50:35 - 1:50:40] ▶
is is that is our planet floating through the vacuum of space, the inky blackness of nothingness.
[1:50:40 - 1:50:46] ▶
So if you want a demonstration of really how fragile we really are, you only have to look at that
[1:50:47 - 1:50:52] ▶
and realize our place in the universe. And yet as infinitesimally obscure as that may be,
[1:50:53 - 1:51:00] ▶
we're also very special. We're also very unique. It's a very, that's a very special place.
[1:51:01 - 1:51:05] ▶
Some people, when you look at that picture, creates anxiety because people begin to realize how fragile
[1:51:06 - 1:51:11] ▶
we really are. And very humbling. But other people look at that and they also find hope. They say,
[1:51:11 - 1:51:17] ▶
yeah, but that's what makes that so special. And so governments job is to hopefully represent
[1:51:17 - 1:51:27] ▶
the will of the people. And I think when we talk about how fragile we really are,
[1:51:27 - 1:51:33] ▶
if you look at that picture, you realize there's really no such thing as
[1:51:36 - 1:51:39] ▶
ever being in the same place at the same time. You can come in here morning after morning and
[1:51:40 - 1:51:44] ▶
do your little routine. But the fact is that little blue dot is hurtling at an incredible speed
[1:51:44 - 1:51:51] ▶
around some obscure star that we call the sun. That's hurtling around some obscure part of a galaxy.
[1:51:51 - 1:51:57] ▶
We call the Milky Way. That's part of a supercluster. And it's there's no going back. There is
[1:51:57 - 1:52:03] ▶
no such thing as being in the same place at the same time. It will never happen. And so all we
[1:52:03 - 1:52:08] ▶
have is future. All we have is going forward. And so that's another reason why I think we all,
[1:52:08 - 1:52:14] ▶
it's in our best interest as humanity to work together. Because there is, we can learn from the past,
[1:52:14 - 1:52:20] ▶
but there's no going back. There's never going back. And we have to, we have to realize that we're
[1:52:20 - 1:52:27] ▶
all in this together. When you look at that and you blow that up, you realize something interesting
[1:52:27 - 1:52:32] ▶
when you look at earth from space, it's not like looking at a map. You don't have lines of
[1:52:32 - 1:52:36] ▶
delineation. You don't have borders. You begin to realize we're all kind of in this together. You
[1:52:36 - 1:52:41] ▶
know what I mean? And so I would encourage people to kind of think of government that way too.
[1:52:41 - 1:52:47] ▶
That, you know, the job of government is to preserve our way of life and to create a path
[1:52:48 - 1:52:55] ▶
for us. There's also the danger though of the people who are in a position within the government to
[1:52:56 - 1:53:03] ▶
have to know so much than having the psychological bias of being not able to share that information.
[1:53:03 - 1:53:09] ▶
And therefore thinking that they're making the right decisions on behalf of the people that
[1:53:09 - 1:53:13] ▶
they're supposed to answer to. Now that is there you go. And I'll tell you what, man,
[1:53:13 - 1:53:18] ▶
I would be remiss if I didn't admit that myself. There were certain things that I work on that I do
[1:53:20 - 1:53:24] ▶
that I can't disclose because I actively, yeah, because I feel that I am,
[1:53:25 - 1:53:32] ▶
I hate to use word combat effective, but it's a military term. I'm more effective being able to
[1:53:34 - 1:53:38] ▶
in some cases operate some things in the shadows. Eventually they'll come out and the
[1:53:38 - 1:53:43] ▶
public will realize I was part of it, but it's too premature. And yes, I'm making that decision.
[1:53:43 - 1:53:48] ▶
And yes, in some cases I'm making that decision unilaterally. My heart's in the right place,
[1:53:48 - 1:53:52] ▶
but you know what? I could be wrong. And that's why it's important that our government,
[1:53:52 - 1:53:59] ▶
we work with the elements in our government. So more people are aware and more people can decide,
[1:54:00 - 1:54:06] ▶
more people can put their brain power to it, right? And come up with a decision, come up with
[1:54:06 - 1:54:12] ▶
with a way forward. And that's true in government transparency, I believe, on a lot of issues,
[1:54:12 - 1:54:18] ▶
not just the UEP topic, the drone topic, and you bring up a really good point. That's a very
[1:54:18 - 1:54:23] ▶
fair point. And I would be lying to you if I told you even myself that if I said, well, I'm
[1:54:23 - 1:54:27] ▶
not subject to that, yes, I am. Sure you are. Because we're human and we all have bias, right? We all
[1:54:27 - 1:54:32] ▶
have, we have desires that we want to see fulfilled. In this particular case, I want greater
[1:54:32 - 1:54:39] ▶
transparency with the American government. And yet I'm the first one to admit that there are
[1:54:39 - 1:54:43] ▶
things that I'm not transparent on. And yes, you know what? That is a contradiction. But that is
[1:54:43 - 1:54:48] ▶
a, that is part of the human condition, right? It's, it's anybody to deny that is full of crap.
[1:54:48 - 1:54:54] ▶
You know, we're all that way. And so how do we, how do we, how do we thread that needle?
[1:54:55 - 1:55:00] ▶
In your work within the Pentagon and things that you were read in on or things you
[1:55:03 - 1:55:07] ▶
heard about second hand from other teams or things that your team directly worked on.
[1:55:08 - 1:55:12] ▶
I don't want to just like put the name DARPA on this, but things that are like that were,
[1:55:13 - 1:55:18] ▶
were related programs, including obviously DARPA, which works on advanced, really cool toys.
[1:55:18 - 1:55:23] ▶
I'm like, I mean, we do. I can't talk about them. We got some really, really cool advanced toys.
[1:55:23 - 1:55:27] ▶
Now, I've heard from different people I've had through here, like, I don't want to say like
[1:55:27 - 1:55:32] ▶
consensus, but you know, sometimes the estimation seems to fall on the range of DARPA could have
[1:55:32 - 1:55:38] ▶
stuff that's 40, 50 years ahead of us, which when you extrapolate that across, I think it's more
[1:55:38 - 1:55:44] ▶
as law like that gets a little crazy. Obviously that said, if we could start with the statement that
[1:55:44 - 1:55:50] ▶
mathematically speaking, we could agree looking at just even what we know with the size of the galaxy,
[1:55:50 - 1:55:54] ▶
the idea that we are alone is the only intelligent life is impossible. If not almost impossible.
[1:55:54 - 1:55:59] ▶
And I would actually argue that maybe we're not intelligent at all. So sure, if you're looking for
[1:55:59 - 1:56:03] ▶
intelligent life, Earth may not be the place to look just bear with me here, though. I say that
[1:56:03 - 1:56:08] ▶
because if we could just agree on that for a second and assume that we're not alone and then say,
[1:56:08 - 1:56:15] ▶
we're open to the possibility of whether or not we've been visited or visited by future humans or
[1:56:15 - 1:56:19] ▶
whatever, but we're not even going to necessarily say whether that's true or false right now.
[1:56:19 - 1:56:23] ▶
At the third layer of that, the thing that I think we can be very confident exists is high level
[1:56:23 - 1:56:28] ▶
advanced weaponry. And I hope we in the United States, I'm biased have the best stuff that said,
[1:56:28 - 1:56:34] ▶
could you not see why it would be very useful for people like you, people like any of the people
[1:56:35 - 1:56:42] ▶
we've mentioned who maybe know that kind of stuff to be able to use a topic like UAP that may very
[1:56:42 - 1:56:49] ▶
well be real and say, let's get the focus of the people on that because we don't want China and
[1:56:49 - 1:56:54] ▶
Russia and these other countries to know about. I'm just going to put random names on this. Sure.
[1:56:54 - 1:56:57] ▶
I don't know anti gravity type technology that we may have could you see why there's people who might
[1:56:57 - 1:57:04] ▶
think, oh, this might be a dis, it might be a distraction campaign rooted in some truth. I can,
[1:57:04 - 1:57:09] ▶
but that it would be the hardest way to do it. You don't need to, if you want to galvanize
[1:57:09 - 1:57:13] ▶
the American people looking 911, we got to attack what happened. We went to war global war on terror,
[1:57:13 - 1:57:16] ▶
right? And so we literally went to war and I've kind of said in Iraq, in essence, because of the
[1:57:16 - 1:57:20] ▶
predicate of an event that happened in 911, you have to lie to people about it. Same thing with
[1:57:20 - 1:57:24] ▶
this topic, if you want more money to compete against Russia or China, the best thing to do is tell
[1:57:24 - 1:57:29] ▶
the American people they're ahead of us. You don't need to create some cockamazing story that there's
[1:57:29 - 1:57:33] ▶
you a pain. That's not what I'm saying. Let me be more clear. I wasn't clear on that.
[1:57:33 - 1:57:37] ▶
Assume you don't need more money. Assume you just know you have ex technology. Whatever
[1:57:38 - 1:57:43] ▶
fuck that is here. And you don't want that information being looked into. You don't want
[1:57:43 - 1:57:48] ▶
adversaries spying on this or trying to find a way to spy on a thread that could give them to
[1:57:48 - 1:57:53] ▶
that thing. Right. You use a public campaign to distract people from whatever that is to create.
[1:57:53 - 1:57:59] ▶
I don't know like an end around. See, I think I think it's the opposite. I think
[1:57:59 - 1:58:04] ▶
by doing that, you're going to create more curiosity, more foreign intelligence and involvement. Look,
[1:58:04 - 1:58:08] ▶
it's no secret that Russia and China have their own program and have their own program. In fact,
[1:58:08 - 1:58:14] ▶
the China, the South, the South Morning Sun, I believe it was a Chinese, China, South Morning Sun,
[1:58:14 - 1:58:19] ▶
newspaper article had something called the Five Content Incident Initiative, where they were
[1:58:19 - 1:58:23] ▶
actually proposing to the United Nations to run the world's UFO investigative body.
[1:58:23 - 1:58:28] ▶
So you don't need, if you want to keep something secret, what you don't do is call attention to it.
[1:58:29 - 1:58:35] ▶
And by talking about UAP and people speculating, well, maybe we've reversed engineer, maybe we learn,
[1:58:35 - 1:58:40] ▶
that's the last thing you want to do. Because now you're putting people onto the trail. Now,
[1:58:40 - 1:58:44] ▶
other governments would be like, oh, so America knows something about this and maybe they have the
[1:58:44 - 1:58:48] ▶
advantage, right? And then of course, they're going to apply all their intelligence collection
[1:58:48 - 1:58:53] ▶
efforts to try to figure you out. Okay. But what if what if it's not, sorry, to cut you off,
[1:58:53 - 1:58:57] ▶
but I got to play this. What if it's not anti-gravity? And that's the whole point we're trying to
[1:58:57 - 1:59:02] ▶
act like, oh, no, don't look at that anti-gravity over there. When in reality, maybe the thing we're
[1:59:02 - 1:59:06] ▶
working on is AI. Okay. And we have some crazy AI that they don't know we have. And now they're not
[1:59:06 - 1:59:12] ▶
guessing that we have that because they think, oh, my God, they might have reused the
[1:59:12 - 1:59:15] ▶
person to use it. Oh, no, no, no, no, Intel, Intel doesn't work that way. Intel is very specific,
[1:59:15 - 1:59:21] ▶
man. Intel is spoken like a true Intel. Look, if you got an understanding that country,
[1:59:21 - 1:59:26] ▶
extra country wise, got a certain capability, no matter what they say publicly, it's not going to
[1:59:26 - 1:59:31] ▶
change. I'll give you case and point. Look, Russians have something called a super-cavitational torpedo.
[1:59:31 - 1:59:36] ▶
I want a super-cavitated pull it out. I'm only telling you the same things that are in a public
[1:59:36 - 1:59:40] ▶
domain. So I'm not going to talk about spill secrets here. But type in super-cavitational security.
[1:59:40 - 1:59:47] ▶
So there you go, super-cavitating torpedo. You know, coming up with a cockamame story to try to
[1:59:47 - 1:59:54] ▶
divert countries from collecting that capability, that technology, we already know it exists. So no
[1:59:54 - 2:00:00] ▶
matter what they say, we're going to continue focusing, right? But if they don't, I mean, US, I mean,
[2:00:00 - 2:00:05] ▶
any type of intelligence organization in another country who wants that type of technology,
[2:00:05 - 2:00:09] ▶
you're going to continue collecting no matter what type of story Putin or the Kremlin try to come
[2:00:09 - 2:00:15] ▶
up with, right? The cats out of the bag, they know we know this capability exists. If the cat was
[2:00:15 - 2:00:21] ▶
and out again, technology X, let's even forget what it is, technology X exists and the cat is not
[2:00:21 - 2:00:27] ▶
out of the bag. Then you would even come up with a story because it's protected. Why would you come up
[2:00:27 - 2:00:31] ▶
with a diversion? That's way over here. That's way over here. But for something that hasn't been
[2:00:31 - 2:00:35] ▶
compromised yet, it's all you're doing. It's proactively. Yeah, but even if you're over here,
[2:00:35 - 2:00:40] ▶
you're still creating a diversion where eventually second and third order effects, you might
[2:00:41 - 2:00:46] ▶
wind up getting back to this technology, this capability saying, oh, this is just the Americans
[2:00:46 - 2:00:50] ▶
trying to do a show game with us, right? These are all as, you know, analysts and the intelligence
[2:00:50 - 2:00:55] ▶
community are really, really good at looking at the second and third order consequences. If we do
[2:00:55 - 2:01:00] ▶
this, they'll do this. If we do that, they'll do that. And if we do over here, then they'll come
[2:01:00 - 2:01:04] ▶
over on this side. That's all part of you. If you don't want to, here's, for example, you have
[2:01:04 - 2:01:13] ▶
an anniversary ring that you have for your significant other, but you don't want that person to know
[2:01:13 - 2:01:17] ▶
that you bought them an anniversary ring and you're going to propose, right? So what you're not going
[2:01:17 - 2:01:21] ▶
to do is start acting all spooky by saying, oh, in the living room, don't look over there because I
[2:01:21 - 2:01:27] ▶
have, you know, you're not going to mention it at all because she's like, oh, you're acting kind of
[2:01:27 - 2:01:32] ▶
strange or he might be like, that's weird. Why are you acting the way you're acting? What are you
[2:01:32 - 2:01:37] ▶
hiding? Right? And now suspicion goes and now they're going to be sensitized to trying to find what
[2:01:37 - 2:01:42] ▶
you're doing, what you're trying to hide, right? They're looking at like, how that's nonsense.
[2:01:42 - 2:01:45] ▶
That person's acting weird for a reason, right? And now you are creating suspicion where there was
[2:01:46 - 2:01:51] ▶
no suspicion before. So to do that, I think would be counterproduct. I certainly, if I was ever leading
[2:01:51 - 2:01:57] ▶
in operation, I would never make the recommendation to come up with a cover story as a diversion preemptively.
[2:01:57 - 2:02:02] ▶
I would have waited till I know that, okay, they know something about something. So let's go ahead and
[2:02:02 - 2:02:09] ▶
do what we have to do right now to stop that. But there's a lot of risk in trying to create some sort
[2:02:09 - 2:02:14] ▶
of preemptive cover story. Could it be done? It can, but you'd have to have everything go exactly
[2:02:14 - 2:02:21] ▶
the way you want, every time you want, for that story to be sold. I mean, and that's you'd have to have
[2:02:21 - 2:02:27] ▶
a lot of people, a lot of approval all the way up the chain of command. We just know that good.
[2:02:27 - 2:02:33] ▶
See what you're saying. I think it's a complicated subject matter because there's context that
[2:02:35 - 2:02:40] ▶
especially not even existing in that world, I can't even conceive of. That said, we have seen
[2:02:41 - 2:02:47] ▶
an unprecedented move as we mentioned multiple times today and it's talked about all the time in
[2:02:47 - 2:02:52] ▶
the media where since 2017 we've seen people like you who have, quote unquote, do, do, do, do,
[2:02:52 - 2:02:57] ▶
do, do, do, do, walk the out of the government and start to discuss this stuff. And recently,
[2:02:57 - 2:03:02] ▶
we had the, in 2023, David Grush came out and gave testimony of things that he was able to uncover
[2:03:02 - 2:03:09] ▶
through research that nothing necessarily he was standing in front of, you know, in some cases he was,
[2:03:09 - 2:03:14] ▶
but like he was there in 1933. Right, correct. They don't have the magenta, yes, correct. So
[2:03:14 - 2:03:19] ▶
he then may have had access to certain things and seen certain things, but he has this,
[2:03:20 - 2:03:26] ▶
there's like this grush group of, you know, 43 whistleblowers or whatever that supposedly are
[2:03:26 - 2:03:31] ▶
attached to him that are slowly coming out. And now we've had this guy, Jake Barber come out,
[2:03:31 - 2:03:36] ▶
Jesse Michaels, friend of the show and your friend as well did a great sit down with him where he
[2:03:36 - 2:03:41] ▶
went through this whole thing for I think like three hours running through his story where it got
[2:03:41 - 2:03:47] ▶
interesting because here you had essentially like a pilot who worked within special operations,
[2:03:47 - 2:03:55] ▶
special operations pilot who worked within the Air Force and then worked for,
[2:03:55 - 2:03:59] ▶
worked for a contractor, right, on for projects on behalf of the government where he claims that
[2:04:01 - 2:04:08] ▶
he was a part of crash retrievals and recovering things that are not of these are of this earth,
[2:04:08 - 2:04:15] ▶
which I will actually defend him and say the way that he said he came up with that if I understood
[2:04:15 - 2:04:22] ▶
it correctly is that he, it was his opinion when he looked at it was not of this earth. It wasn't like
[2:04:22 - 2:04:27] ▶
you know, someone came to him and said that's not of this earth. So this is personal observation.
[2:04:28 - 2:04:32] ▶
Right. So maybe devil's advocate for him. It could be some crazy advanced technology with this
[2:04:32 - 2:04:39] ▶
egg thing that you know he doesn't know about that. Remember the words of Arthur C. Clark, right?
[2:04:39 - 2:04:43] ▶
He said no. Any advanced technology would appear like magic. Yes. Okay. All right. Yes. I am
[2:04:43 - 2:04:47] ▶
familiar with that. So it could mean like you might look at advanced technology and not even be able
[2:04:47 - 2:04:51] ▶
to conceive it and think that that's extraterrestrial. That said, what do you think of this guy's testimony?
[2:04:51 - 2:04:58] ▶
Well, I don't know. I never met him. I can tell you that some of the special operators who I do
[2:04:59 - 2:05:02] ▶
know personally have worked with him and have validated his story. I don't know. It's just like when
[2:05:02 - 2:05:08] ▶
people ask me about bottles are. I've never met the gentleman. And so my opinion really doesn't count.
[2:05:08 - 2:05:13] ▶
I think I think he's telling his truth. I think he is you know, first of all very brave to come out
[2:05:13 - 2:05:18] ▶
to have this conversation knowing the crap that he's going to and have to endure. And he's already
[2:05:18 - 2:05:24] ▶
had to endure, you know, as a former military person and special operator, he automatically has my
[2:05:24 - 2:05:29] ▶
respect. Now that does that mean he's always right or always perfect now. I mean, you see him in just
[2:05:29 - 2:05:33] ▶
like me and you and everybody else. But I do applaud him for his courage to come forward. I think
[2:05:33 - 2:05:41] ▶
I think he is doing what he feels is right. Again, I do not know him personally, but I think it's
[2:05:42 - 2:05:49] ▶
important that anybody who comes out as a whistleblower, we need to give them their their day in court.
[2:05:49 - 2:05:54] ▶
We need to they they have a voice. They earned it, you know. Unfortunately, there are some people
[2:05:54 - 2:06:00] ▶
that have come out previously where it turns out maybe they didn't have quite the access that they
[2:06:00 - 2:06:05] ▶
you know, that they had or something to that effect. Do you have an example? Again, I don't like to
[2:06:05 - 2:06:10] ▶
talk about people. You know, I don't there's this this community has for many many years talked
[2:06:10 - 2:06:16] ▶
about whistleblowers going back to the 1970s. And so, you know, I can only speak from from my
[2:06:16 - 2:06:23] ▶
perspective and I'm certainly not going to throw anybody on other bus, especially if I wasn't there,
[2:06:23 - 2:06:28] ▶
you know, so, you know, if I wasn't there to witness their story, most people say,
[2:06:28 - 2:06:31] ▶
oh, that's BS, but well, if you're not there to witness it, then how can you say it's BS? You
[2:06:31 - 2:06:35] ▶
can't just like you can't say it's real, right? So I prefer to, you know, address address
[2:06:35 - 2:06:42] ▶
Jake for for what he did do. And we do know his military background and his legitimate. And he
[2:06:42 - 2:06:48] ▶
was, you know, he is who he says he is. So that all checks out. And the people that I know personally,
[2:06:48 - 2:06:54] ▶
who I would be willing to go to combat with have vouch for him. But again, I wasn't there. So I,
[2:06:54 - 2:07:00] ▶
you know, my my involvement in this topic was completely different. My name was more Pentagon,
[2:07:00 - 2:07:06] ▶
nuts and bolts, you know, big picture, programatics, where his involvement allegedly was far more
[2:07:06 - 2:07:13] ▶
nuanced on the actual recovery. Right. You know, and so, but, you know, he's got the he's got the
[2:07:13 - 2:07:18] ▶
pedigree. He's got the military pedigree. And by the way, as a special operator, you're the best
[2:07:18 - 2:07:22] ▶
the best. You have your subject to routine psychological evaluations, polygraph examinations,
[2:07:22 - 2:07:27] ▶
drug testing, right? And you got to pass every one of them and all of them.
[2:07:27 - 2:07:30] ▶
I think that bothers me that I run into with literally every single one of these guys. I probably
[2:07:32 - 2:07:37] ▶
run into it with you. But again, like you said, you were more in the office part of this rather than
[2:07:37 - 2:07:42] ▶
some of these like actual on the ground things that happen. So specifically with the guys who are
[2:07:42 - 2:07:46] ▶
talking about shit on the ground is when they come out and they whistle blow on something and they
[2:07:46 - 2:07:51] ▶
say something that at first thought just sounds fucking crazy. Like Barbara coming out and saying,
[2:07:51 - 2:07:56] ▶
yeah, I picked up a fucking NHI vehicle with my helicopter. And, you know, by the way,
[2:07:56 - 2:08:00] ▶
I did it for a contractor on behalf of the government. Here you go. That's fucking crazy. That
[2:08:00 - 2:08:05] ▶
would seem like the biggest secret ever that someone coming out and saying that would never even
[2:08:05 - 2:08:10] ▶
get the chance to say because, you know, the deep forces of the government were killing before.
[2:08:10 - 2:08:14] ▶
Right. Like it sounds like that kind of thing. But then the same guy will then say, you know,
[2:08:14 - 2:08:19] ▶
he'll start talking about some firefight that happened that might have involved some of these,
[2:08:19 - 2:08:24] ▶
I don't know, retrievals or projects existing around it be like, all I can't talk about that.
[2:08:24 - 2:08:29] ▶
Like how do we, you're out here talking about retrieving a fucking alien craft and leaking
[2:08:29 - 2:08:34] ▶
an alleged video, which the video didn't do. Well, there's a difference between reporting on
[2:08:34 - 2:08:39] ▶
advanced technologies and reporting on work crimes. That's a different issue altogether.
[2:08:39 - 2:08:45] ▶
So if you're talking about a firefight, you know, between friendly forces, that's a whole different
[2:08:46 - 2:08:51] ▶
issue. Again, hypothetically, that's an example. Also, you know, let's not forget that claims that
[2:08:51 - 2:08:58] ▶
sounded ridiculous at the time in certain things turn out to be true. So case in point, you know,
[2:08:58 - 2:09:06] ▶
CIA, when they were experimenting with LSD and administering it to unsuspecting people.
[2:09:06 - 2:09:12] ▶
Long-tailed traction. Maybe, right? Or perhaps the syphilis experiments where we had a cure for
[2:09:12 - 2:09:19] ▶
syphilis and let, and yet we allowed people to go and progress the entire stages and die from it.
[2:09:19 - 2:09:27] ▶
Your government did, look, there's a report that just came out last week from the CIA. You
[2:09:27 - 2:09:30] ▶
want to pull it up. It's unbelievable. About the syphilis stuff? No, worse, where the CIA actually
[2:09:30 - 2:09:36] ▶
was going to blow up a military boat in Havana Harbor as a predicate in order to go ahead and
[2:09:36 - 2:09:42] ▶
invade Cuba. This just came out for you. For you. Yeah. So they let this out. So type in, is that
[2:09:42 - 2:09:50] ▶
it? CIA military boat Cuba. There you go. And look at the report that come up. Well, that's Operation
[2:09:50 - 2:09:56] ▶
Mongoose. No, we know that one. Yeah, that's right. Who planned bomb plot and Cuban invasion? There you go.
[2:09:56 - 2:10:01] ▶
Okay. And the CIA admitted it and they released the report and they said it's okay if we go ahead and
[2:10:02 - 2:10:06] ▶
kill a bunch of Americans because we're going to piss off the American people, we can blame Cuba.
[2:10:06 - 2:10:10] ▶
They would never do that. Come on now. It's in black and white. I didn't write that damn
[2:10:10 - 2:10:16] ▶
book. Ellen, dollars, come on. You would never do such a thing. So, you know, this is the problem.
[2:10:16 - 2:10:22] ▶
And if you go, you can see I actually news report on it and you can see they did a big, but, you
[2:10:22 - 2:10:26] ▶
know, this is, yeah, good news. Type in CIA report. Yeah, put CIA report and then put in
[2:10:26 - 2:10:37] ▶
US military. Yeah, there you go. Senator Cuba, legacy, dedicated diplomacy towards organization.
[2:10:41 - 2:10:51] ▶
Uh, Pentagon, DX show deep state. There you go. Fear's release of JFK files. Hit that one,
[2:10:51 - 2:10:58] ▶
Shilling Pentagon document reveals war provoking reason deep state has always feared release of JFK
[2:11:01 - 2:11:06] ▶
assassination files. Shilling Pentagon documents may reveal why the deep state has always feared
[2:11:06 - 2:11:10] ▶
the release of the files. A 12 page report signed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962,
[2:11:10 - 2:11:15] ▶
details a secret plan to commit heinous acts against American citizens to justify war with Cuba
[2:11:15 - 2:11:20] ▶
in the 1960s. Code name, oh, yeah, we can talk about Operation Northwoods. So, this just got declassified.
[2:11:20 - 2:11:25] ▶
Yeah. This is old news. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So, the problem is not the releasing it. Yeah.
[2:11:25 - 2:11:29] ▶
Now they're releasing it. But yeah, we read this. We've read some of the stuff on podcasts before,
[2:11:29 - 2:11:34] ▶
but yeah, exactly. Like they were doing all kinds of shit. Yeah. So people say, oh, that
[2:11:34 - 2:11:37] ▶
shocking, that would never happen. No. Who's who the fuck says that? Yeah, I mean, look,
[2:11:37 - 2:11:44] ▶
there's a real, there we are at the crux. And this issue is just one of the many on the,
[2:11:44 - 2:11:50] ▶
on the, you know, spinning wheel of issues related to it. If you're talking about UFOs,
[2:11:51 - 2:11:56] ▶
there's just one little nugget here. But we are, we are in this moment where the institution
[2:11:56 - 2:12:02] ▶
exposure at every level I'm talking in private society government, everything has gotten so bad
[2:12:03 - 2:12:09] ▶
with the internet and access to old files and people being able to talk about on social media
[2:12:09 - 2:12:14] ▶
that and and things have gone so wrong in the last 20 years too, that the trust level is at a zero
[2:12:14 - 2:12:20] ▶
with many people. Yeah. The faith and confidence is at an all-time low with with our government.
[2:12:20 - 2:12:25] ▶
And I do think this new administration recognizes that and is is trying to repair some of that
[2:12:26 - 2:12:32] ▶
by by following through and what what they said they're going to do. I do see them making a
[2:12:32 - 2:12:37] ▶
proactive effort to try to do that, trying to restore some of the faith and confidence. Well,
[2:12:37 - 2:12:41] ▶
let's bring it full circle back to Tulsi, where we talked about at the very beginning of this
[2:12:41 - 2:12:44] ▶
conversation. Through no fault of her own, she's been someone who's already long before she was
[2:12:44 - 2:12:51] ▶
ever nominated for this position has been attacked by say forces within the existing government
[2:12:51 - 2:12:57] ▶
and bureaucratic structure. So not to say that she doesn't per se. By the way, I know how that feels.
[2:12:57 - 2:13:02] ▶
Yeah, but I'm saying not to say she doesn't come in with the best intentions. She may very well
[2:13:02 - 2:13:07] ▶
be coming in with the best intentions. But isn't isn't it cynically also looking at it and knowing
[2:13:07 - 2:13:12] ▶
how the government works as a citizen who sees this from the outside. Wouldn't it be fair for me to
[2:13:12 - 2:13:19] ▶
say they're going to treat her like a mushroom, feed her shit, keep her in the dark because the same
[2:13:19 - 2:13:22] ▶
people that tried to like destroy her are now supposed to report to her and they're the ones their
[2:13:23 - 2:13:27] ▶
whole job is to be covert and intel where she's not on the ground with them. She doesn't know what
[2:13:27 - 2:13:31] ▶
they're doing. A lot of those people are being removed. I don't even keep it up with the news.
[2:13:31 - 2:13:34] ▶
Yeah, but this administration is canon the hell out of a lot of people that we're trying to
[2:13:34 - 2:13:40] ▶
sequester the truth in all sorts of different topics. If you know a little bit about, again,
[2:13:40 - 2:13:48] ▶
if you were to actually meet Tulsi, the one thing that you realize is that she's
[2:13:48 - 2:13:54] ▶
fearless. She does not care about breaking China. There's a couple people that I've always
[2:13:54 - 2:14:03] ▶
kind of felt sometimes you need a bull in the China shop, right? And sometimes you need
[2:14:03 - 2:14:09] ▶
a proverbial hand grenade in the punch bowl to fix things. And also it helps that if you
[2:14:12 - 2:14:18] ▶
haven't understanding how government works. So then you can fix those problems, right? You
[2:14:18 - 2:14:22] ▶
don't want to throw the baby out with the bathwater. We're not trying to to rebuild the intelligence
[2:14:22 - 2:14:29] ▶
community. We're just trying to make it work better the way it was designed to. And unfortunately
[2:14:29 - 2:14:34] ▶
the challenge is when you were in government, you have a responsibility, you inherit this car.
[2:14:34 - 2:14:39] ▶
And all of a sudden this car that you've paid a thousand bucks for, you realize it's got a
[2:14:39 - 2:14:42] ▶
blown radiator, the water pumps shot. Maybe you're missing cylinder number seven for whatever reason.
[2:14:42 - 2:14:48] ▶
It's not firing and you got these problems. Most of the time you have the ability to take it to
[2:14:49 - 2:14:54] ▶
the shop and fix it. The problem is we can't do that. We have to figure out a way to fix the car
[2:14:54 - 2:15:00] ▶
while we're driving it at 80 miles an hour down the highway. And so to do that, you don't want to
[2:15:00 - 2:15:04] ▶
just start mucking around the engine and tearing crap out. That's going to make it even worse,
[2:15:04 - 2:15:08] ▶
what you want to do is fix the problem. And so in order to fix a problem and have a solution,
[2:15:09 - 2:15:13] ▶
you first underneath don't understand how it works. How does the engine work? How does it relate to
[2:15:13 - 2:15:16] ▶
the transmission? How does it relate to the cooling system? How does it relate to all these things?
[2:15:16 - 2:15:20] ▶
As you're trying to fix the car while you're driving down the road, you don't break something
[2:15:21 - 2:15:25] ▶
inadvertently that makes it even worse. And so people say, well, with that government background,
[2:15:25 - 2:15:31] ▶
it is a kind of a fox in the hand-house situation. Well, yeah, that's the risk you take. That's why
[2:15:31 - 2:15:35] ▶
you have to look at the person's track record. That's why you have to look at a person's capabilities
[2:15:35 - 2:15:38] ▶
and their strengths and their weaknesses and their skill sets. And in this case, you have somebody
[2:15:38 - 2:15:42] ▶
who understands intel, understands military, understands government, understands politics and
[2:15:42 - 2:15:46] ▶
the legislative branch. Pretty much checks all the blocks that if you're having somebody for a job
[2:15:46 - 2:15:51] ▶
and you're like, hey, you know what? You kind of check all the blocks. And then, you know, you have
[2:15:51 - 2:15:56] ▶
personality, the ability to communicate with other people in a fair and open way. And look, I'm
[2:15:56 - 2:16:02] ▶
going to get a bunch of crap for this because people, you know, just the mere fact that she was a
[2:16:02 - 2:16:08] ▶
Democrat and now Republican, they're going to be all over me for this. So my endorsement of her
[2:16:08 - 2:16:14] ▶
isn't a political endorsement. It is an operational and experienced endorsement. She has what is
[2:16:14 - 2:16:21] ▶
necessary to do the job. Now, you may not like her, okay, fine. You're entitled to that. And you may
[2:16:21 - 2:16:26] ▶
not like the fact that she said this or said it that way or whatever. That's fine. But you can't deny
[2:16:26 - 2:16:32] ▶
the fact that she was very effective as a leader and had accomplished and achieved more
[2:16:32 - 2:16:36] ▶
despite the challenges, right? So I want someone like that in my government to help
[2:16:37 - 2:16:43] ▶
help make the necessary changes. Someone who's not going to be overly gunshot who understands
[2:16:43 - 2:16:50] ▶
how to govern works and how to fix the car without breaking it anymore.
[2:16:50 - 2:16:53] ▶
Do you think that, and by the way, there's a lot of people right now in government that I feel
[2:16:55 - 2:16:59] ▶
that way about. It's not just Tulsi. Yeah, I mean, obviously, we're talking about Tulsi
[2:16:59 - 2:17:05] ▶
Gabbert because you brought it up, but there's other individuals as well that I'm extremely hopeful for.
[2:17:05 - 2:17:10] ▶
Is there anyone you'd care to name with that? No, only because you brought it up. I mentioned it,
[2:17:10 - 2:17:15] ▶
but I, again, I want to respect the privacy of anybody who's coming into this administration.
[2:17:15 - 2:17:20] ▶
I do not want to affect their ability to do their job one way or the other. But, you know, there's
[2:17:20 - 2:17:29] ▶
quite a few folks that are really going to try their best to make a change. And I see it.
[2:17:29 - 2:17:34] ▶
And I know it from personal experience, seeing their track record, looking at their engagement on
[2:17:35 - 2:17:40] ▶
the hill, you know, they're there, they're no nonsense people. Have you talked with anyone in the
[2:17:40 - 2:17:44] ▶
incoming administration at length about things like remote viewing? You know, again, I'm not going
[2:17:44 - 2:17:49] ▶
to talk about what I may or may not have said to anybody in the incoming administration. That would
[2:17:49 - 2:17:54] ▶
be for them to answer. I want to give them the full ability. I want to respect their authority.
[2:17:54 - 2:18:00] ▶
And I'm not a kiss and tell kind of guy. I'm not going to go there. Again, I'll do respect. I know
[2:18:01 - 2:18:06] ▶
it's a great question, but it's like, you know, if you and I having this interview right now, and then
[2:18:06 - 2:18:10] ▶
someone when I get home saying, Hey, would you guys talk about in a car? You know what, some of your
[2:18:10 - 2:18:13] ▶
business? Yeah. You know, you want to know ask, ask Julian. You know, I know you're curious and
[2:18:13 - 2:18:18] ▶
don't take offense to it, but it's part of a conversation that occurred between two people.
[2:18:18 - 2:18:22] ▶
And you know, that that other person has a vote. Maybe they don't want people to know, right?
[2:18:23 - 2:18:28] ▶
We had a conversation because they had a conversation with you, the UFO guy, right? So,
[2:18:28 - 2:18:33] ▶
I'll do a pollute pass on that question. Okay. Well, you and I talked about that at the very end
[2:18:35 - 2:18:40] ▶
last time and you had to get out of here. So we didn't get to spend a lot of time on it. But there's
[2:18:40 - 2:18:45] ▶
there's a lot of scrutiny on this stuff because people from the outside, they hear about something
[2:18:45 - 2:18:48] ▶
like remote viewing, which you know, it's essentially being able to see other things around the
[2:18:48 - 2:18:53] ▶
world or see into the future in some ways. And they're like, oh, the fuck could that exist?
[2:18:53 - 2:18:58] ▶
And yet we had something like Project Stargate where, you know, and grow flame before that.
[2:18:58 - 2:19:02] ▶
And what before that? Grow flame. What was that? It was the natural. So Stargate was really one of
[2:19:02 - 2:19:09] ▶
the last code names it was used. There were several names before that. And these are guys like Joe
[2:19:09 - 2:19:13] ▶
McMonical was involved with that. And they, you know, claimed to be able to see things. And you
[2:19:13 - 2:19:18] ▶
wrote about it in your book, how like you remote viewed. And my, my, the thing that was, I was looking
[2:19:18 - 2:19:24] ▶
at the page and kind of gone on that a little bit was, you know, you made it sound like, oh, yeah,
[2:19:24 - 2:19:31] ▶
anyone could do this. And I don't, when I talked with you about it, I think we talked about that
[2:19:31 - 2:19:36] ▶
offline a little bit at one point. You didn't describe it that way. You know, like, like, meaning
[2:19:36 - 2:19:43] ▶
when the way it sounded when I was reading the words in the book is that it sounded, you were like,
[2:19:44 - 2:19:49] ▶
yeah, fucking anyone could do this. But I do love that. I think most people can do it. Absolutely.
[2:19:49 - 2:19:54] ▶
I don't think it's, I don't think it's totally misunderstood you off air.
[2:19:54 - 2:19:57] ▶
It must have been because I think most people can do it. I think it's actually a very, I don't
[2:19:57 - 2:20:00] ▶
think it's anything new. In fact, I think it's probably related to some sort of vestigial capability
[2:20:00 - 2:20:05] ▶
we had as ancient humans because most people could see halfway around the world right now.
[2:20:05 - 2:20:10] ▶
I think if you understand, yeah, I don't think it's, I don't think it's will way. I think it's
[2:20:10 - 2:20:13] ▶
all based in quantum mechanics. How on physics? Can you explain that? Yeah, sure. So let's,
[2:20:13 - 2:20:18] ▶
let me, let me give you an example. You ever smoke cigars? Of course.
[2:20:19 - 2:20:24] ▶
Okay, so let me give you an example. We now realize we live, we live in a three-dimensional space,
[2:20:24 - 2:20:30] ▶
right? You can think of the way our space is as three axis, x axis, y axis, and z axis, meaning
[2:20:30 - 2:20:35] ▶
up, down, left, right, forward, backward. And you can navigate in a three-dimensional space that way.
[2:20:35 - 2:20:39] ▶
Time is experienced a little bit differently, even though it's considered a dimension,
[2:20:40 - 2:20:44] ▶
we experience time as linear as an always going forward, right? But in the classic models of physics,
[2:20:45 - 2:20:51] ▶
for example, when I was in school, we learned about the electron orbiting around the nucleus of an
[2:20:51 - 2:20:56] ▶
atom. Turns out that's not really accurate. Turns out that there's this weird duality principle
[2:20:56 - 2:21:01] ▶
that the electron is, they call it an electron cloud because you can never actually predict the
[2:21:01 - 2:21:07] ▶
exact location of an electron. In fact, some scientists now predict that an electron is so small
[2:21:07 - 2:21:14] ▶
that it's actually zipping in and out of the existence of our universe, trillions of times per
[2:21:14 - 2:21:20] ▶
second. And so therefore it is there and not all at the same time. So take that principle.
[2:21:20 - 2:21:25] ▶
Now let's look at time itself. We know for a fact time is is is inextricably tied to space,
[2:21:25 - 2:21:34] ▶
right? You can't have one without the other in S and space and time. That's what we call space time.
[2:21:34 - 2:21:39] ▶
And we know that space time is flexible. That's a fact. In fact, if you look at the ground station
[2:21:39 - 2:21:44] ▶
here, a GPS ground station with an atomic cesium clock and compare it to the atomic cesium clock,
[2:21:44 - 2:21:50] ▶
exactly the same same exact atomic decay half life as the clock on the spacecraft,
[2:21:50 - 2:21:56] ▶
you're going to realize there's something called atomic drift. Time is experienced differently.
[2:21:56 - 2:22:02] ▶
The watch actually runs differently the further you are away from a massive object in this case,
[2:22:03 - 2:22:08] ▶
earth. Okay. So mass and energy can affect space time. And again, it's not just space, it's space
[2:22:08 - 2:22:17] ▶
and time. So let's let's look at that for a minute. Let's look at a cigar. Imagine if I were to ask
[2:22:17 - 2:22:23] ▶
you, Julian, give me your simplest one sentence or less few words possible. What's your definition of
[2:22:23 - 2:22:31] ▶
the past of the past? Of the past? What's your definition of the past? No one has already happened.
[2:22:31 - 2:22:35] ▶
Great. Things that have occurred, right? What is then by that by that same type of thinking,
[2:22:35 - 2:22:42] ▶
what would your definition of the future be? Things that haven't yet occurred haven't happened yet,
[2:22:42 - 2:22:46] ▶
right? So what is the present? Well, the present is actually very elusive. The present actually
[2:22:46 - 2:22:53] ▶
isn't a moment in time. It's actually a transition process where the future becomes the past.
[2:22:53 - 2:23:00] ▶
And we live in that moment and probably it's an infinitesimal moment of space time that's probably
[2:23:00 - 2:23:06] ▶
measured in playing time, right? And so let's go back to our cigar analogy. Imagine the ashes of
[2:23:06 - 2:23:10] ▶
the cigar as being the past. You can't put it back together. It's burnt. Imagine that part of the
[2:23:10 - 2:23:15] ▶
cigar that hasn't burnt yet, the tobacco leaf, as the future. And the present is that moment of
[2:23:15 - 2:23:22] ▶
ignition. It's the cherry. It's that it's the fire where the future, the tobacco leaf is being
[2:23:22 - 2:23:29] ▶
consumed and turned into ash. And so if you were to look at that cigar at the burning or cigarette,
[2:23:29 - 2:23:34] ▶
and you had the ability to kind of remove some of the glare and focus really in on that moment of
[2:23:34 - 2:23:39] ▶
ignition, that cherry, that transition process between tobacco leaf and ash, you would notice that the
[2:23:39 - 2:23:44] ▶
cigar burns unevenly. It doesn't burn evenly. I mean, there's moments at the very, very finest
[2:23:44 - 2:23:50] ▶
point, smallest point where it becomes hard to distinguish between the future and the past.
[2:23:50 - 2:23:55] ▶
Because it burns unevenly. And so using that analogy, somehow speculated that
[2:23:56 - 2:24:01] ▶
reviewing is really where some people experience the present where that cherry is maybe a little bit
[2:24:01 - 2:24:06] ▶
bigger, where more of the future and more of the past is being experienced as now. And that this
[2:24:06 - 2:24:12] ▶
is probably related to quantum mechanics and quantum entanglement. More so than it is,
[2:24:12 - 2:24:18] ▶
the woo-woo stuff that people will scribe it to. And in fact, if you talk to some, probably some
[2:24:19 - 2:24:24] ▶
neuroscientists, some actually believe that human consciousness is a quantum process. And you
[2:24:24 - 2:24:30] ▶
can look it up online again. There's not quote-unquote alludes. You're taking the words out of my mouth.
[2:24:30 - 2:24:34] ▶
Keep going. Yeah. So if that's the case, then no wonder some people can experience the present
[2:24:34 - 2:24:40] ▶
with more elements of the future and the past as if it's happening now. And even more so,
[2:24:40 - 2:24:44] ▶
importantly, that this may be something that a lot of living things have. If you ever see one,
[2:24:44 - 2:24:49] ▶
two dogs walk into a room, there's this nonverbal communication that is occurring. Why? Because they
[2:24:49 - 2:24:53] ▶
haven't developed the language. Now, we are lazy. As human beings, we've developed language to the
[2:24:53 - 2:24:58] ▶
point now where you and I can communicate. But the reality is there was a time where we couldn't,
[2:24:58 - 2:25:03] ▶
depending on what village I came from or what cave I came from, I would never be able to communicate
[2:25:03 - 2:25:08] ▶
with you because I don't have the same language. We didn't develop the same, right? And so,
[2:25:08 - 2:25:10] ▶
is there another form of communication that's more innate, that's more primitive, that we relied
[2:25:11 - 2:25:17] ▶
on for our survival way back when before we had verbal communication and these little things
[2:25:17 - 2:25:21] ▶
called cell phones and global devices that allowed us to communicate with one another.
[2:25:21 - 2:25:26] ▶
Was there another way to do it? And some people have speculated, well, you know, the closer you get
[2:25:26 - 2:25:31] ▶
to your spouse, it's weird because all of a sudden now, I've been with that person for seven years,
[2:25:31 - 2:25:36] ▶
and you know, I'm overseas, I give them a call and they're like, oh my God, I was just thinking of
[2:25:36 - 2:25:39] ▶
you, I was just going to call you, right? Maybe that's really more, more in line with where
[2:25:39 - 2:25:45] ▶
remote viewing comes from. It's where space and time is not necessarily experienced linearly.
[2:25:45 - 2:25:53] ▶
But maybe a little bit more like the electron cloud versus an electron orbit around the nucleus.
[2:25:54 - 2:26:00] ▶
If we're also capable of it though, why doesn't it happen way more? Maybe it does. I mean, how often
[2:26:00 - 2:26:05] ▶
do we, so that's such a coincidence? Was it? I mean, there's someone around the world was like
[2:26:05 - 2:26:10] ▶
making that happen? Well, that's a deliberately look, here's another case from point, my background's
[2:26:10 - 2:26:15] ▶
medical program was microbiology immunology and pinch and pens. Look, it's, it's, when you are on,
[2:26:15 - 2:26:27] ▶
when you're in a hospital and you get into a severe accident, what is the one way we know if you
[2:26:27 - 2:26:32] ▶
are truly alive or not? And it's not the heart monitor? Well, it's more than that actually,
[2:26:32 - 2:26:37] ▶
because you can be kept off artificially alive, right? It's brain activity. And how do we detect
[2:26:37 - 2:26:44] ▶
brain activity where there are biochemical reactions that occur and bio electrical, more importantly,
[2:26:44 - 2:26:52] ▶
reactions that occur in the brain. And we can put sensors and we can detect brain wave activity
[2:26:52 - 2:26:58] ▶
to determine if someone is brain dead or not, right? That's the decision to pull the plug.
[2:26:59 - 2:27:04] ▶
So we know we can pick up these invisible signals, just like radio transmissions from the human
[2:27:05 - 2:27:09] ▶
brain. We do it all the time at every hospital out there just about. Is it possible that we know the
[2:27:09 - 2:27:15] ▶
brain give off communication signals? That's a fact. Is it possible that some people can actually also
[2:27:15 - 2:27:22] ▶
interpret that or like an antenna? So not only transmit a signal, but also receive a signal like
[2:27:22 - 2:27:27] ▶
a radio, right? And if that's the case, then would that explain some of these things where people say,
[2:27:27 - 2:27:32] ▶
oh, what a coincidence. Well, maybe it wasn't. Maybe you guys are just synchronized now. And we're like
[2:27:32 - 2:27:37] ▶
deja vu type things, right? Possibly as well, right? So there's a whole area of exploration here
[2:27:37 - 2:27:42] ▶
that I think scientists are now beginning to look at and realize that was once considered,
[2:27:43 - 2:27:47] ▶
woo is probably just biological. And it's probably not as uncommon as we think it is. And it might be
[2:27:48 - 2:27:54] ▶
even shared with other species too. For people who did not hear episode 237 with you, can you just
[2:27:54 - 2:28:00] ▶
breathe? Can you just briefly explain? That was the last time we were in here. I think that was like
[2:28:00 - 2:28:06] ▶
three hours and 21 minutes. The fact that you know that is incredible. Yeah. So I think it was like
[2:28:06 - 2:28:12] ▶
the last eight or nine minutes that episode we discussed this, but you're you laid this out in
[2:28:12 - 2:28:17] ▶
your book, imminent. You had your remote viewing experience involved. You I guess I don't know
[2:28:17 - 2:28:24] ▶
how you described it, but like peering into where there were terrorist prisoners. And then they
[2:28:24 - 2:28:31] ▶
describe like a ghost dancing above them or something. Can you just explain this again? I want to make
[2:28:31 - 2:28:35] ▶
sure I get that. Yeah, I mean, I want to be really careful because I'm going to get a lot of crap
[2:28:35 - 2:28:39] ▶
for this. Yeah, I know a lot. Okay. Well, we've already been talking for two and a half hours. There's
[2:28:39 - 2:28:43] ▶
already a lot of crap in the comments. Okay. Oh, lovely. I'm sorry. You have to do that. I don't
[2:28:43 - 2:28:49] ▶
care. You guys are actually watching the comments live. Oh my God. I'm so sorry. You just can't look
[2:28:49 - 2:28:53] ▶
at them. Yeah, I know. I know. Yeah. So for me, it was like, let me see if I can describe it.
[2:28:53 - 2:29:04] ▶
Like a vivid memory. That's probably the best way I can describe it. There's aspects that become
[2:29:06 - 2:29:11] ▶
fuzzy, but you try to dial in on it. And then there's aspects that come in with a lot of clarity.
[2:29:11 - 2:29:16] ▶
Where are you when this is happening? Right here physically. No, no, but like where were you the day you
[2:29:17 - 2:29:23] ▶
remote? You take me there? Oh, for that particular moment. Yeah. We were in a skiff at the Pentagon. Okay.
[2:29:23 - 2:29:28] ▶
And we were, I got cleared. So I guess I can talk about it.
[2:29:28 - 2:29:34] ▶
Some colleagues in mine took a lunch, did a brown bag lunch. I had been to get more before
[2:29:35 - 2:29:42] ▶
to the to the prisons and came various camps here. And we decided to an experiment and say,
[2:29:42 - 2:29:50] ▶
you know, see if we could remove you. A particular detainee. And so we conducted this experiment.
[2:29:50 - 2:29:59] ▶
And shortly thereafter, why colleagues came in with a newspaper article in the Miami-Herald,
[2:29:59 - 2:30:08] ▶
where there was a complaint through the person's defense team that he felt like he was being
[2:30:10 - 2:30:16] ▶
tormented and that there was a, as I described, described that as a secret CIA program that had been
[2:30:16 - 2:30:25] ▶
established to torment one of these individuals. First of all, I'll tell you it was not a CIA program.
[2:30:25 - 2:30:34] ▶
Lunch bag in the skiff. It was lunch bag in the skiff. And because of what this newspaper article
[2:30:35 - 2:30:43] ▶
came at with, we stopped immediately. We did not need to create any type of issues regarding
[2:30:43 - 2:30:51] ▶
these particular detainees or their defense teams. There's some potentially moral issues.
[2:30:52 - 2:30:59] ▶
How did they even come up with that, Lou? Like how did they come up with that trace that back to
[2:31:01 - 2:31:05] ▶
like you guys did? I don't know. And if you want to look, there's a there's a there's a newspaper
[2:31:05 - 2:31:11] ▶
article if you want to, if you really want to see it. Yeah. So type Miami-Herald. Miami-Herald.
[2:31:11 - 2:31:16] ▶
Um, type, you know what? I don't want to say this on here. So can I type something there for
[2:31:16 - 2:31:20] ▶
your request? Sure. See what pops up. Lou's going to pop around to the big board. Take over for a
[2:31:20 - 2:31:25] ▶
lessy for a minute. I just don't want to. We're going to give you a producer credit on this. Don't
[2:31:25 - 2:31:28] ▶
worry. I got you. Never a dull moment in the studio with the walls on the right there. Go
[2:31:28 - 2:31:36] ▶
forward. Yeah, that board, not that one. That's where you can just see the results. Not what I'm actually doing.
[2:31:36 - 2:31:40] ▶
Yes. On that screen that you're on right there. So don't drag it onto the other screen.
[2:31:40 - 2:31:44] ▶
And I just want Lou's doing this. I know we had to blue balls earlier with what he showed me on
[2:31:45 - 2:31:50] ▶
the phone, but that's not what you think. It was just very out of left field. Certainly not a,
[2:31:50 - 2:31:59] ▶
you saw, you saw the John Kiriaku thing, right, Olessi? I showed you that picture when he showed
[2:32:00 - 2:32:04] ▶
me on camera and we couldn't show it on camera of Abuzu Beta. Oh, yeah. Yeah, nothing, not even remotely
[2:32:04 - 2:32:12] ▶
close to that. But fascinating stuff. I'll put it that way.
[2:32:12 - 2:32:16] ▶
Okay, so tell us what we can read there because he doesn't want. It doesn't have search engine
[2:32:20 - 2:32:28] ▶
where this is the article. Okay, cool. So I can read this. Yeah, but let me preface this. Okay.
[2:32:28 - 2:32:34] ▶
Okay. You know, I don't know if I, if you know, I certainly want to say I'm responsible for that because.
[2:32:34 - 2:32:44] ▶
You have no responsibility. Okay. Defense lawyer to defense lawyer to Guantanamo judge secret
[2:32:46 - 2:32:52] ▶
program may be depriving 9-11 defendant of sleep. Okay. Now, first of all, people already accuse me
[2:32:52 - 2:32:57] ▶
of whaness horrible things at Guantanamo Bay. So, right. You know, this is obviously not helping
[2:32:57 - 2:33:02] ▶
me. People are going to think that, but you asked your third question of trying to be as transparent
[2:33:02 - 2:33:06] ▶
as possible. Yeah. So, but I know I'm going to get a lot of, well, you mentioned it in your, I mean,
[2:33:06 - 2:33:10] ▶
to your credit, you mentioned it in your book, like what the nickname was and all that.
[2:33:10 - 2:33:14] ▶
So, like, there's a part of you that's like, people are going to say what they're going to say. I
[2:33:15 - 2:33:20] ▶
guess, I guess on that one, you kind of accept that in that way. Not necessarily agree with the
[2:33:20 - 2:33:24] ▶
title, but accept that people are going to say what they're going to say. Yeah. I know nothing
[2:33:24 - 2:33:26] ▶
can do about it. I mean, that's what people are going to say. Okay. All right. So an attorney for the
[2:33:26 - 2:33:29] ▶
accused 9-11 platter who has complained about strange overnight noises and vibrations in his
[2:33:29 - 2:33:34] ▶
prison cell for years told a military judge Sunday that the that the problem was back and then
[2:33:34 - 2:33:38] ▶
it may be caused by a covert Pentagon program disclosed at the court just last week. Oh, so it was
[2:33:38 - 2:33:43] ▶
disclosed to the court. Death penalty defender Jim Harrington raised the issue in a rare Sunday
[2:33:43 - 2:33:47] ▶
session of pretrial hearings in the September 11 trial, seeking to delay a conflict question
[2:33:47 - 2:33:53] ▶
in favor of a forensic examination of what's going on in camp seven Guantanamo's most client
[2:33:53 - 2:33:57] ▶
destined lock up were former CIA captives are held. Army Colonel James L. Pol the 9-11 trial
[2:33:57 - 2:34:02] ▶
judge refused the request, but not before he asked whether the noises and vibrations said to be
[2:34:02 - 2:34:06] ▶
experienced by alleged terrorists Ramsey bin al-Shib were known to his army guards. Not necessarily
[2:34:06 - 2:34:12] ▶
Harrington replied. It's a very, very sophisticated pro. Oh, so he like admits it's a very, very
[2:34:12 - 2:34:18] ▶
sophisticated program. The exchange was the latest in the court effort to talk about the things at
[2:34:18 - 2:34:24] ▶
the secret prison in public without going to details. The program was so clandestined the prosecutors
[2:34:24 - 2:34:28] ▶
knew about it, but the judge didn't until last week. And that's not true. The prosecutors did not know
[2:34:28 - 2:34:34] ▶
that's not correct. That this wasn't attempt by I think the defense team to this was a legal
[2:34:34 - 2:34:40] ▶
maneuver to try to, you know, cast shade on the prosecution team. Okay. Yeah. So it goes on people
[2:34:41 - 2:34:47] ▶
can based on what I read. They can Google just the words I said and they'll probably find it. So
[2:34:47 - 2:34:52] ▶
that's fine. But that's got I'm so confused because like to even know about that means that someone had
[2:34:52 - 2:35:01] ▶
to tip him off. Yeah, there's other. Yeah, there's other. Yeah, I look, I can't talk about it.
[2:35:01 - 2:35:10] ▶
Obviously, we were very concerned and very disappointed by that. You know, it was not an officially
[2:35:10 - 2:35:16] ▶
sanctioned thing. It wasn't that, you know, one of these to be very clear here. You know, this was
[2:35:16 - 2:35:21] ▶
experiment. It's so hard for me to conceive of that. Yeah. And like your explanation of like
[2:35:22 - 2:35:30] ▶
quantum mechanics, just because I mean, maybe there's there's this involuntary thing that happens
[2:35:30 - 2:35:36] ▶
where people are doing it. I'm doing it sometimes and don't even know I'm doing it. And I affect
[2:35:36 - 2:35:40] ▶
something halfway around the world. In this case, though, you're sitting in the skiff gun.
[2:35:40 - 2:35:44] ▶
Let's do it. Right? Like there's not exactly like that, but it's applied. I mean,
[2:35:45 - 2:35:49] ▶
where your feet cross, like how are we doing it? Proud style.
[2:35:49 - 2:35:51] ▶
That's, you know, it's part of my life. I don't look. It's already weird enough.
[2:35:53 - 2:35:57] ▶
I try to be as no nonsense as possible. Yeah. You know, it doesn't help when, you know,
[2:35:58 - 2:36:04] ▶
we live in an awfully big universe. Very complex. Yeah. And things that seem kind of weird and
[2:36:06 - 2:36:12] ▶
wew, you know, could just be that it's our lack of understanding, right? It's like,
[2:36:12 - 2:36:17] ▶
imagine being in 1860 and explaining to somebody, Wi-Fi, visible signals through the air that
[2:36:19 - 2:36:26] ▶
you have a magic box and now all of a sudden you can play music anytime you want, right? That sounds
[2:36:26 - 2:36:31] ▶
crazy. But it's not a science. So yeah, but well, I can say about that.
[2:36:31 - 2:36:41] ▶
I look, I realize it's a weird conversation. Yeah.
[2:36:41 - 2:36:45] ▶
You know, I'm not ignorant to that fact. And at the end of the day, I can't tell you how it works.
[2:36:46 - 2:36:51] ▶
I don't know how it works. I don't know how it works. But I know that the government put a lot of
[2:36:51 - 2:36:54] ▶
money into doing research on it. You know, if they closed like air quotes, their project,
[2:36:54 - 2:37:02] ▶
Stargate though, is it reasonable to assume hypothetically that that kind of project still exists
[2:37:02 - 2:37:08] ▶
just under some different name and we don't know about it. It's covert and assuming you didn't know
[2:37:08 - 2:37:13] ▶
about it. Well, I can't assume a fair so because of my security. So I'm just what I'm going to do
[2:37:13 - 2:37:18] ▶
is simply say, I would not be able to comment if there was a government program existing to do
[2:37:18 - 2:37:25] ▶
certain things. I don't have permission to discuss that. Okay. If I did it, I confirmed it tonight.
[2:37:25 - 2:37:32] ▶
I cannot. But it is fair to say it's definitely not a perfect science. Of course not. No, it's
[2:37:32 - 2:37:38] ▶
subjective. It should never be considered unilateral. If you get something, you could be dead wrong.
[2:37:38 - 2:37:43] ▶
So it should just be yet, it's just like all intelligence, right? So you have human until what happens
[2:37:44 - 2:37:47] ▶
when you place more emphasis on one form of intelligence over another, well, you get bias, right? So
[2:37:47 - 2:37:54] ▶
that's why like Operation Curve Ball with our human source that we had in Iraq. You never rely on
[2:37:54 - 2:38:00] ▶
a single source of intelligence ever, whether it's human, image, sigants, doesn't matter, right? Or
[2:38:00 - 2:38:05] ▶
certainly removing it's subjective. So you know, I would tell anybody's like, oh, he knows that
[2:38:05 - 2:38:11] ▶
like looking through a crystal ball, not at all, new. And it definitely would never ever promote
[2:38:11 - 2:38:16] ▶
the idea of relying on as a single source ever. Should be there to maybe help support. Now there's
[2:38:16 - 2:38:21] ▶
examples where, for example, remote viewers for the US government found a supersonic
[2:38:21 - 2:38:27] ▶
experimental jet that the Russians were testing over Africa. And I believe it crashed in Congo.
[2:38:28 - 2:38:33] ▶
And it was in the spider best, you know, airborne capabilities and maybe other capabilities. We
[2:38:34 - 2:38:39] ▶
couldn't find it. And other could the Russians, it would promote viewers that found the air.
[2:38:39 - 2:38:44] ▶
Yeah. Right. So I believe there's something there. I like some of the things I've heard, like,
[2:38:44 - 2:38:48] ▶
there's something there. Yeah, exactly. Now what it is, I don't know if anybody knows that answer.
[2:38:48 - 2:38:53] ▶
I certainly don't. I can't see. Oh, it works this way in that way. And there's other people that
[2:38:53 - 2:38:57] ▶
tell you, Hey, methods vary. Yeah. You know, what works for me may not work for you and what works for
[2:38:57 - 2:39:02] ▶
you may not work for me. There's a time where they used to do kilograms. And that didn't
[2:39:02 - 2:39:07] ▶
craft for me. Yeah. I mean, it was not helpful at all. Never worked for me. There's something, you know,
[2:39:07 - 2:39:13] ▶
I'm more open-minded on not necessarily like viewing itself, but like this whole subcategory of
[2:39:14 - 2:39:20] ▶
what the capabilities of our consciousness is because. Well, you remember the oracles of Delphi,
[2:39:20 - 2:39:25] ▶
right? I mean, yes, I do know that. What is that? Yeah, these were the ancient Suethsayers
[2:39:25 - 2:39:30] ▶
and beware of the hides of March. Yes. You know, this is nothing new. Removing has been in practice
[2:39:30 - 2:39:37] ▶
for a long time by countries and governments and militaries, spanning thousands of years. You
[2:39:37 - 2:39:43] ▶
can call it what you want, but you know, remove viewing today or a Sueth saying yesterday or
[2:39:43 - 2:39:49] ▶
the oracles of Delphi or no Stradamus or whatever you want to put in there in term. But it's all
[2:39:49 - 2:39:56] ▶
maybe describing the same thing, you know, have you seen this podcast that went viral from the
[2:39:56 - 2:40:01] ▶
fall called the Delphi tapes? I have not seen it. And I have it on purpose. I heard of it, but I have
[2:40:01 - 2:40:07] ▶
not at all listened to it. And I did on purpose because I don't want to I want to be careful. I
[2:40:07 - 2:40:12] ▶
don't I don't prejudice the jury. So to speak, meaning I don't want to have someone else's
[2:40:12 - 2:40:17] ▶
analytic overlay subconsciously being incorporated by me. Okay. So have you talked with people about
[2:40:17 - 2:40:24] ▶
this though? About the telepathy. Yeah. Okay. No. So it has worked my mind a little bit just because
[2:40:24 - 2:40:33] ▶
of the way that this this woman, Kai Dickens was able to gather some of this data essentially.
[2:40:33 - 2:40:39] ▶
And I'm really dumbing this down here like it's an amazing series. I highly recommend everyone
[2:40:39 - 2:40:44] ▶
go listen to the full thing. But she had heard about all these reports from people around the world
[2:40:44 - 2:40:50] ▶
who were reporting how their autistic nonverbal kids or brother or whatever could communicate telepathically.
[2:40:51 - 2:41:02] ▶
And you hear that and you're like, yeah, okay. And then you hear some of the experiments she did
[2:41:03 - 2:41:10] ▶
with, you know, a doctor on site, a scientist on site, these double blind, I'm getting some of
[2:41:11 - 2:41:16] ▶
the terminology wrong, but these things she did were these kids seem like they can do that. And
[2:41:16 - 2:41:23] ▶
it makes you wonder if, oh, brother, I mean, Russians had the psychotronic weapons development program.
[2:41:23 - 2:41:29] ▶
I mean, what's that? That's that's that is using care hating technology to amplify
[2:41:29 - 2:41:34] ▶
brain capability to affect change matter in physical change in things. So how effective was it?
[2:41:35 - 2:41:42] ▶
Type it up. You you tell me. Okay. What's it called again? Russian psychotronic
[2:41:42 - 2:41:46] ▶
weapons development program. Look it up on on on your little thing there. God, what a cool name.
[2:41:47 - 2:41:52] ▶
Russian psychotheronic weapons development program.
[2:41:53 - 2:41:57] ▶
You know, that's a bond movie. All right, zombie ray gun program. Does that ring about?
[2:41:58 - 2:42:03] ▶
I mean, well, go right there since KGB and Soviet go down to about three CIS CIA. There you go.
[2:42:03 - 2:42:08] ▶
That's from the CIA, not Louis LaSondis. Okay. You need it for yourself.
[2:42:08 - 2:42:11] ▶
Psych, you got to zoom in a little bit. Alas, that's really small. All right, go up.
[2:42:11 - 2:42:14] ▶
All right, psychotronic weapon weapon, doops KGB and Soviet military highlights of foreign ground
[2:42:15 - 2:42:22] ▶
combat developments in a 21 April 1993, litter a Ternaya Gazeta interview. You've
[2:42:22 - 2:42:30] ▶
Gini Alexandrov of the Villanova optical institute of revealed that experiments conducted in the
[2:42:30 - 2:42:38] ▶
former Soviet Union on mine altering weapons were largely a hoax intended to milk millions of
[2:42:38 - 2:42:44] ▶
rubles from the KGB and the military. Alexandrov in commenting on the validity of psychotronic weapons
[2:42:44 - 2:42:50] ▶
research stated the whole thing was a grandiose snow job, a monstrous squandering of the national
[2:42:50 - 2:42:56] ▶
wealth. This work fortunately for humanity did not have any real content. It was an imitation of
[2:42:56 - 2:43:01] ▶
work science like shamanism. The military and KGB were simply taken for a ride. So this is important
[2:43:01 - 2:43:07] ▶
because this shows definitively that not only were the Russians investing in this, but it's
[2:43:07 - 2:43:13] ▶
enough interest in the CIA that we actually reported on it, right? But they got to do it. Well,
[2:43:13 - 2:43:18] ▶
okay, so this is a report this thing that you got to do. There's you'll see other reports where
[2:43:18 - 2:43:21] ▶
they say they didn't get to the Russians say no, it actually worked quite well. We had our own
[2:43:21 - 2:43:25] ▶
psychotronic weapons development program because of it. So yes, that's right. So because the Russians
[2:43:25 - 2:43:31] ▶
were doing it, we did it too. So it's important to note that like, for example, go to
[2:43:31 - 2:43:36] ▶
yeah, there you go, weird Russian wired, weird Russian mine control research behind it to go down
[2:43:39 - 2:43:45] ▶
a little bit there one more there to hit that. The weird Russian mine control research behind a
[2:43:45 - 2:43:50] ▶
DHS contract, a dungeon like room in the psycho technology research institute in Moscow is used
[2:43:50 - 2:43:56] ▶
for human testing. The institute claims its technology can read the subconscious mind and ultra
[2:43:56 - 2:44:01] ▶
behavior. A dungeon like room and say, all right, so Elena Russo, Kina, the silver haired woman who
[2:44:01 - 2:44:09] ▶
runs the institute gesture to the center of the claustrophobic room, where what looked like a
[2:44:09 - 2:44:14] ▶
dentist chair sits in front of a glowing computer monitor. We've had volunteers, a lot of them,
[2:44:14 - 2:44:18] ▶
she said, the thick concrete was muffling the noise from the college campus outside. We worked
[2:44:18 - 2:44:22] ▶
out a program a psychiatric facility to study criminals. There's no way to falsify the results,
[2:44:22 - 2:44:26] ▶
there's no subjectivism. The Department of Homeland Security has gone to many strange places and
[2:44:26 - 2:44:31] ▶
searched for ways to identify terrorists before they attack, but perhaps none stranger than this
[2:44:31 - 2:44:36] ▶
lab on the outskirts of Russia's capital. The institute has for years served as the center of an
[2:44:36 - 2:44:40] ▶
obscure field of human behavior study dubbed psycho ecology that traces its root back to Soviet
[2:44:40 - 2:44:47] ▶
Aramine control research. My point is that people took this enough seriously, not just in Russia,
[2:44:47 - 2:44:54] ▶
but the US. So, don't, but people say, oh, this is nonsense. Don't blame me. We spent
[2:44:54 - 2:45:01] ▶
taxpayer money on it. That was my decision to do that. People like to paint me with a broad
[2:45:01 - 2:45:08] ▶
brush and say, well, it's a bunch of hoey. That wasn't my decision to do that. Those decisions
[2:45:08 - 2:45:14] ▶
were made by very, very senior people that thought it was worth investing in. So,
[2:45:14 - 2:45:18] ▶
maybe the execution was, could have been better. I don't know, but the bottom line is that there
[2:45:19 - 2:45:24] ▶
is enough there there to say, hey, maybe we should look into this a little bit, right? Maybe there's
[2:45:24 - 2:45:28] ▶
something there. But again, I'm not going to sit and tell you how, I don't know. But if someone
[2:45:29 - 2:45:34] ▶
comes up to you and says, hey, Julian, you know, this weird feeling that you or a BMX
[2:45:34 - 2:45:40] ▶
has a kid, you like bikes and I want to do BMX riding and maybe do some racing and I have this clear
[2:45:40 - 2:45:48] ▶
image of you doing x, y and z. And if that's information that only you know, and you've never told
[2:45:48 - 2:45:53] ▶
me or anybody else about that, right? Then you've got to say, oh, that's interesting. How would
[2:45:53 - 2:45:58] ▶
you know that? And what did you see? Is there any accuracy there? Right? So, you know, I think I
[2:45:58 - 2:46:05] ▶
guess the bottom line for me is that I always try to keep an open mind everything. And there's a
[2:46:05 - 2:46:10] ▶
whole lot of mystery behind the human being, right? And if you look at this with it genetically,
[2:46:10 - 2:46:14] ▶
or anything else, we are very unique. And I don't, I personally believe, you know, when we get into
[2:46:14 - 2:46:22] ▶
the discussion of what people consider paranormal, I think everything in science is technically paranormal
[2:46:22 - 2:46:28] ▶
until it becomes normal, meaning my cell phone here, all the things that we have we take for granted,
[2:46:28 - 2:46:34] ▶
right? The technology we use today, at some point in time, we're considered very paranormal.
[2:46:34 - 2:46:38] ▶
And I think it's really our lack of understanding and our bias to try to things that we don't understand,
[2:46:39 - 2:46:46] ▶
we kind of pigeonhole them as being weird or odd. When really, it's just it's our naivety,
[2:46:46 - 2:46:53] ▶
really, you know, because this not, and this goes into the bigger psychological issue of human beings.
[2:46:53 - 2:46:58] ▶
We like everything in a nice little box. We like to know where we are. And that's why we people
[2:46:58 - 2:47:03] ▶
look at the pale blue dot picture, they get freaked out. You know, that's why if you look at it,
[2:47:03 - 2:47:07] ▶
the way a city's, you know, the new cities are all north, south, east, west grid lines, and I live in
[2:47:07 - 2:47:12] ▶
in the southwest part of town on street 32, right, we drive down the highway, speed limit 65, you know,
[2:47:12 - 2:47:18] ▶
no passing, like we like rules, we like, we like boundaries to know where we are. And society does
[2:47:18 - 2:47:25] ▶
that innately. We build these barriers on purpose so we can feel comfortable and we know kind of
[2:47:25 - 2:47:31] ▶
where we are in the world, right? When you remove that, human beings get very insecure.
[2:47:31 - 2:47:38] ▶
And if there's something happening that we don't understand, whether it's a common in the sky,
[2:47:38 - 2:47:42] ▶
and we want to say it's the Lord of the underworld that's coming in to show us who they are or
[2:47:42 - 2:47:47] ▶
earthquake, right? The gods must be angry. No, it's actually just based in science. What happens,
[2:47:47 - 2:47:52] ▶
paranormal is our lack of understanding of the science. And I think that's the same true with
[2:47:52 - 2:47:57] ▶
human psychology. I think it's the true with topics like remote viewing. Our understanding hasn't
[2:47:57 - 2:48:03] ▶
caught up with yet the reality of what something is. And so it creates this internal angst
[2:48:03 - 2:48:07] ▶
as a species and as in I'm open. I'm open to that for sure. Lou, real quick, I got to run to the
[2:48:08 - 2:48:13] ▶
bathroom, but I think we're always too done. Yeah, we're going to do it. We're going to do a
[2:48:13 - 2:48:18] ▶
patron episode right after this. I think we'll cut that there, but your book, Eminent, as always,
[2:48:18 - 2:48:23] ▶
we'll have to link that up. The link down below. People can go get it there. It's a very good book,
[2:48:23 - 2:48:27] ▶
and I appreciate you doing round two with me. Absolutely. My honor and privilege, man. And listen,
[2:48:27 - 2:48:31] ▶
you guys are doing a great job. And even a bigger thanks to your audience, yes, and even the ones
[2:48:31 - 2:48:37] ▶
that hate me that find because we're having a conversation here that's collectively about all of
[2:48:37 - 2:48:43] ▶
us and involves all of us. And so I think you're doing a great service. You and your production team.
[2:48:43 - 2:48:48] ▶
I mean, yeah, well, I was going to say you have the shoes. You guys are killing
[2:48:49 - 2:48:55] ▶
a big. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I'm not. Yeah. But thank you. I'd say a big
[2:48:55 - 2:49:00] ▶
dog operation. I appreciate you, Lou. I appreciate you coming through and getting this done again. I
[2:49:00 - 2:49:05] ▶
know you got snowed in last time. Yeah, I'm sorry about that. No, it's okay. You know, I promise
[2:49:05 - 2:49:09] ▶
you I'd come back out. You came right out. I really appreciate that. But we'll have the patron
[2:49:09 - 2:49:13] ▶
episode as well. So people can get that link down below. Everybody else you know what it is. Give
[2:49:13 - 2:49:17] ▶
it a thought. Get back to me. And the only reason why I can even tell you this right now is because
[2:49:17 - 2:49:21] ▶
I have approval from the Pentagon to say exactly what I'm saying right now. But I was also reminded
[2:49:21 - 2:49:26] ▶
of I signed documentation that I am not allowed to discuss. This specific is specific. Right.
[2:49:26 - 2:49:31] ▶
Like it's in writing and it's now stored in a city. I think it's safe. So it's a legal contract.
[2:49:31 - 2:49:36] ▶
I want to violate that. I just want to make sure like, you know, they weren't pulling the wool
[2:49:36 - 2:49:42] ▶
over you without providing you any type of way. There is a safe. There is documentation. You want
[2:49:42 - 2:49:47] ▶
to see something. Take a look at. Thank you guys for watching the episode. Before you leave,
[2:49:47 - 2:49:54] ▶
please be sure to hit that subscribe button and smash that like button on the video. It's a huge
[2:49:54 - 2:49:58] ▶
help. And also if you're over on Instagram, be sure to follow the show at Julian Dory podcast
[2:49:58 - 2:50:04] ▶
or also on my personal page at Julian D Dory. Both links are in the description below. Finally,
[2:50:04 - 2:50:09] ▶
if you'd like to catch up on our latest episodes, use the Julian Dory podcast playlist link in
[2:50:09 - 2:50:14] ▶
the description below. Thank you.
[2:50:14 - 2:50:17] ▶